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INTRODUCTION 
USTICE William J. Brennan, Jr. was fond of describing the 
Constitution as “a charter of human rights and human dignity.”1 
It was, in his view, “a bold commitment by a people to the ideal of 
dignity protected through law.”2 Throughout his tenure on the 
United States Supreme Court, Justice Brennan attempted to trans-
late this vision into doctrinal reality. What is perhaps most striking 
about his jurisprudential oeuvre is how human dignity served as a 
unifying theme in his opinions across otherwise disparate areas of 
the law.3 
To describe his quest to elevate human dignity in the Court’s de-
cisionmaking as striking, however, is not to say that it has been en-
during. With the ascendancy of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, 
human dignity has become a value most often invoked defiantly in 
dissent.4 This is not to suggest that the Burger and Rehnquist 
 
1 William J. Brennan, Jr., My Life on the Court, in Reason & Passion: Justice Bren-
nan’s Enduring Influence 17, 18 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., 
1997). 
2 Id. 
3 See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 474 U.S. 1050, 1053 (1986) (Brennan & Stevens, 
JJ., mem.), granting cert. to 702 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1985) (“[A] truly free society is one in 
which every citizen—guilty or innocent—is treated fairly and accorded dignity and 
respect by the State.”); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (finding in 
the context of equal protection that sex discrimination “both deprives persons of their 
individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide participation in political, 
economic, and cultural life”); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1970) (holding 
under the doctrine of procedural due process that “[f]rom its founding the Nation’s 
basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within 
its borders”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding 
function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against 
unwarranted intrusion by the State.”). 
4 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 672 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“[S]tate-compelled, state-monitored collection and testing of urine, while 
perhaps not the most intrusive of searches, is still ‘particularly destructive of privacy 
and offensive to personal dignity.’”) (quoting Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 
U.S. 656, 680 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119, 1122 
J 
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Courts were (or are) callous; but, at least as a descriptive matter, 
for a number of years dignity became a seldom-expressed value in 
constitutional decisionmaking. 
Dignity is once again in vogue at the Court, but it is probably fair 
to say that Justice Brennan would not approve. The Court’s recent 
focus has been not on human dignity, but on the dignity of the 
states. In a series of recent decisions expanding the states’ immu-
nity from suits by individuals seeking monetary relief,5 the Court 
has explained that the “preeminent purpose of state sovereign im-
munity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their 
status as sovereign entities.”6 One is tempted, of course, to treat 
 
(1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 1994)  
(“[P]artial or complete decapitation of the person, as blood sprays uncontrollably, ob-
viously violates human dignity.”); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 675 (1990) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he death penalty is wholly inconsistent with the constitutional 
principle of human dignity . . . .”), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 
(2002); Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 302 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (“Nancy Cruzan is entitled to choose to die with dignity.”); Webster v. Reprod. 
Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 548–49 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[F]ew decisions 
are ‘more basic to individual dignity and autonomy’ . . . than the right to make the 
uniquely personal, intimate, and self-defining decision whether to end a pregnancy.”) 
(quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 
U.S. 747, 772 (1986)); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 697 (1980) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he requirement that a finder of facts must hear the testimony offered 
by those whose liberty is at stake derives from deep-seated notions of fairness and 
human dignity.”); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 232 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“‘The restraints and the punishment which a criminal conviction entails do not place 
the citizen beyond the ethical tradition that accords respect to the dignity and intrinsic 
worth of every individual.’”) (quoting United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 
701, 712 (7th Cir. 1973)). 
5 In light of the Court’s discussion in recent state sovereign immunity cases, it is 
perhaps no longer appropriate to describe the states’ immunity as Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, ___, 
122 S. Ct. 1864, 1871 (2002) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not define the scope 
of the States’ sovereign immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that im-
munity.”); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“The phrase [“Eleventh 
Amendment immunity”] is convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for 
the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms 
of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the Constitution’s structure, its history, and 
the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the States’ immunity from 
suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the 
ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today (either literally or by vir-
tue of their admission into the Union upon an equal footing with the other States) ex-
cept as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amend-
ments.”). 
6 S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. at 1874. 
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such language simply as what it appears to be: a rhetorical device 
intended to underscore a substantive justification for the decisions 
reached by the Court. Indeed, this not-so-subtle anthropomorphi-
zation of the states has raised only a few scholarly eyebrows,7 and 
has (at least until now) typically been somewhat cavalierly dis-
missed as a rhetorical flourish without substantive content or im-
plication.8 
But with each state sovereign immunity decision, it becomes 
more difficult to dismiss the language of state dignity as mere 
rhetoric. In the Court’s most recent word on the subject—Federal 
Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority,9 
which held that state sovereign immunity bars an independent fed-
eral agency from adjudicating a private party’s complaint against a 
nonconsenting state—the Court rejected the United States’ argu-
ment that the state’s financial integrity was not threatened by the 
adjudication in question. The Court asserted that “the primary 
function of sovereign immunity is not to protect State treasur-
ies, . . . but to afford the States the dignity and respect due sover-
eign entities.”10 
 
7 See, e.g., Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court’s New 
Federalism, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 245, 246 (2000) (arguing that the dignity rationale ele-
vates form over substance in the state sovereign immunity doctrine); Evan H. 
Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. 
Sci. 81 (2001) (offering an expressivist account of the Court’s dignity rationale); 
Daniel A. Farber, Pledging A New Allegiance: An Essay on Sovereignty and the New 
Federalism, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1133, 1136 (2000) (explaining the implications of 
a doctrine premised on state dignity); Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1121, 1127, 1129 (2000) (analogizing the Court’s dignity rationale 
to late-nineteenth-century attempts to personify corporations). 
8 See, e.g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. 139, 
151 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (calling the dignity rationale “embarrassingly in-
sufficient”) [hereinafter PRASA]; Farber, supra note 7, at 1144 n.60 (“Living as I do 
in a state where the current governor is best known nationally for his earlier career as 
a boa-wearing professional wrestler, perhaps it is not surprising that the idea of inher-
ent state dignity does not strongly resonate for me.”); Sherry, supra note 7, at 1127 
(“Not since extending the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to corporations 
has the Court so anthropomorphized an abstract entity.”). 
9 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1874 (2002). 
10 Id. at 1879; see also id. at 1877 (“While state sovereign immunity serves the impor-
tant function of shielding state treasuries and thus preserving ‘the States’ ability to 
govern in accordance with the will of their citizens,’ the doctrine’s central purpose is 
to ‘accord the States the respect owed them as’ joint sovereigns.” (citation omitted) 
(quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 750–51)). 
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Much of the recent commentary about the Court’s state sover-
eign immunity cases has been critical.11 But even those commenta-
tors who have defended the Court’s “federalism revival”12 in gen-
eral,13 and its sovereign immunity decisions in particular,14 have not 
attempted to defend the Court’s increasingly odd focus on the dig-
nitary interests of the states. Why, then, does the Court continue 
not only to invoke the arguably oxymoronic concept of state dig-
nity, but also to rely on the states’ dignity as the “central,”15 “pre-
eminent,”16 and “primary”17 justification for its expansion of the 
states’ immunity from suit? 
This Article suggests a tentative answer to this puzzle, although 
that answer plainly falls short of justifying the Court’s current state 
sovereign immunity doctrine. The concept of state dignity may 
 
11 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1201 
(2001) (arguing that sovereign immunity is an anachronistic doctrine inconsistent with 
the principles of the American legal system); William A. Fletcher, The Eleventh 
Amendment: Unfinished Business, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 843 (2000) (arguing that 
the Court has not translated the Constitution into a workable federal structure); Vicki 
C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh 
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 953 (2000) (argu-
ing that the Court’s sovereign immunity case law “deserves the condemnation and re-
sistence of scholars”); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in 
Search of a Theory, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1011 (2000) (arguing that state sovereign 
immunity decisions fail to promote any coherent conception of state autonomy); 
Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 1 (arguing that state sovereign immunity is a poor way to protect state sover-
eignty). 
12 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Feder-
alism Decisions, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 429, 431 (2002). 
13 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Stan-
dard of Judicial Review, 51 Duke L.J. 75, 135 (2001) (“We are cognizant, of course, of 
the danger of equating the rights of individuals and the rights of states. Indeed, we 
would be the first to concede that states’ rights have no independent value; their 
worth derives entirely from their utility in enhancing the freedom and welfare of indi-
viduals.”). 
14 See Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 
485, 495 n.33 (2001) (“From time to time the Court has adverted to sovereign immu-
nity as serving to protect the ‘dignity’ of the states. It should not be assumed that such 
rhetoric is the basis of the immunity . . . . Sovereign immunity is based upon raw 
power, which in the case of the United States is distributed by the Constitution; ‘dig-
nity’ has nothing to do with it. The Founding Fathers were not beguiled by such a no-
tion.”). 
15 S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. at 1877. 
16 Id. at 1874. 
17 Id. at 1879. 
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sound strange to the ears of a domestic public-law scholar, but the 
concept in fact has a well-established historical pedigree and well-
established meaning in the law-of-nations doctrine of foreign state 
sovereign immunity. In focusing on state dignity in its state sover-
eign immunity cases, the Court has invited attention to this related, 
but distinct, line of cases. 
The Court has long held that U.S. courts will not entertain a pri-
vate suit against a foreign nation absent clear authorization from 
Congress. This rule is premised on the theory that all sovereign na-
tions are of equal status, or “dignity.” Each nation is wholly sover-
eign within its borders, according to this theory, and the submission 
of one sovereign state to the authority and jurisdiction of another 
would be inconsistent with the “equal rights” and “absolute inde-
pendence” of the former.18 Recognition of the equal “dignity”—
that is, the equal rank and importance—of the foreign sovereign 
thus depends on the forum nation’s courts’ declining to assert ju-
risdiction over the foreign nation. Because absolute adherence to 
this rule, however, would effectively diminish the sovereignty of 
the forum nation by preventing it from exercising absolute author-
ity within its borders, the Court has long recognized the power of 
Congress to override the presumptive immunity of the foreign sov-
ereign. The Court will exercise jurisdiction over a foreign sover-
eign, however, only if it is clear that Congress intended to abrogate 
the foreign state’s immunity. 
In referring to a foreign state’s dignity in the context of foreign 
state sovereign immunity, the Court has sought to underscore two 
important points. First, the sovereign nations of the world enjoy 
equal status on the world stage; it would be necessarily inconsistent 
with that equality of status for one nation to assert sovereign au-
thority over another nation. Second, there is a particular impera-
tive of judicial non-intervention in matters of international rela-
tions, which are more appropriately left to the political branches. 
Because entertaining a suit against a foreign state could have pro-
found (and negative) consequences for foreign relations, the Court 
has long required that such an assertion of jurisdiction be clearly 
authorized by Congress.  
 
18 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136–37 (1812). 
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When the Court invokes the concept of state dignity in the state 
sovereign immunity cases, therefore, it does not write on a clean 
slate; to the contrary, the concept has an established meaning, with 
established implications, in the doctrine of foreign state sovereign 
immunity. By invoking state dignity to support its view of state 
sovereign immunity, the Court thus appears to have drawn on for-
eign state sovereign immunity doctrine. There is, of course, no way 
to know for sure what the Court actually intends when it invokes 
the concept in its state sovereign immunity decisions, and it is fruit-
less—not to mention arguably inappropriate—to attempt to psy-
choanalyze the Justices to determine what exactly they mean when 
they refer to “state dignity.” But by relying on a concept with an 
established doctrinal meaning, the Court naturally invites an as-
sessment whether the concept is apposite in the context in which 
the Court has invoked it. 
What is the import of the Court’s recent reliance on state dignity 
in its decisions concerning the domestic-law doctrine of state sov-
ereign immunity? More important, does it make sense for the 
Court to describe state dignity as the central justification for state 
sovereign immunity doctrine? This Article offers two principal ob-
servations. First, there is a serious question whether the concept of 
sovereign dignity has any application in the context of state sover-
eign immunity. Second, assuming that the concept is apposite, the 
doctrinal consequence ought to be that Congress has authority to 
abrogate the states’ immunity 
When the Court refers to state dignity in a foreign state sover-
eign immunity case, it refers to the status relationship among 
wholly sovereign nations. The question in those cases is whether it 
is consistent with the inherent equality—the equal status or “dig-
nity”—of sovereigns for one to subject the other to jurisdiction in 
its courts. At first blush, there is nothing particularly striking about 
invoking a concept drawn from the doctrine of foreign state sover-
eign immunity in the obviously related context of state sovereign 
immunity. Indeed, the Court has long borrowed principles from in-
ternational law in other contexts that implicate the relations among 
the states. But although the relationship among the several states 
resembles the relationship among sovereign nations, it is another 
thing altogether to suggest that the states stand in the same relation 
to the federal government as does a foreign nation. Whatever one 
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can say about the extent of the powers retained by the states, they 
plainly are not fully sovereign nations within the meaning of inter-
national law. 
Yet in invoking the law-of-nations concept of state dignity to de-
feat attempts by Congress to subject the states to suit for violations 
of federal law, the Court has effectively suggested that the states 
stand in relation to the federal government as does a foreign na-
tion. In other words, the Court has suggested that the states’ status 
with respect to the federal government is effectively the same as 
the relationship of, say, France to the federal government. 
This is a dubious premise. Even assuming that the Court’s anal-
ogy is appropriate, the logical doctrinal consequence of borrowing 
the notion of state dignity from foreign state sovereign immunity 
doctrine would be that Congress enjoys the power to subject the 
states to suit, at least in federal court. The foreign state sovereign 
immunity cases make clear that Congress, even if not the courts 
acting sua sponte, has authority to override the presumptive im-
munity of foreign states in U.S. courts. Sovereign dignity and the 
essential independence and equality of sovereign nations may be 
enough to create a strong presumption of immunity, but ultimately 
Congress retains authority to abrogate that immunity. 
Under current state sovereign immunity doctrine, however, 
Congress can abrogate the states’ immunity only when it acts to en-
force the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court has construed 
even that authority increasingly narrowly. The ironic result of the 
Court’s apparent attempt to import the language of customary in-
ternational law decisions to the federalism debate, therefore, is that 
the Court now provides more protection to American states than it 
does to foreign states. Under current doctrine, the equal status of a 
wholly sovereign nation does not shield it from amenability to suit 
when Congress so decrees, but the status of the several states, 
which plainly are not wholly sovereign nations, erects a virtually 
absolute bar to Congress’s authority to subject them to suit.19 
 
19 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) (con-
struing narrowly Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment); Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that Congress lacks the au-
thority to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to its Article 
I powers). 
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Of course, our federal system is unique, and analogies drawn 
from doctrines governing the relations among sovereign nations 
may simply be inapposite. In our constitutional system, it is plain 
that the states retain some attributes of sovereignty, and the Court 
is charged with the difficult task of determining precisely which at-
tributes. Even if the states are not wholly sovereign entities, per-
haps it is as reasonable to say that immunity from suit is one of the 
sovereign prerogatives that the states retained when they joined 
the Union as it is to say that, for example, the power to tax is one 
such retained prerogative. 
But far from justifying the Court’s recent decisions, this point ul-
timately demonstrates the tenuousness of the Court’s dignity ra-
tionale. According to the Court, the task in the state sovereign im-
munity cases is to determine what attributes of sovereignty the 
states retained at the ratification. But even if one thinks—as the 
Court suggests by relying on the state-dignity rationale—that the 
states retained the immunity of wholly sovereign nations from suit 
before other sovereign’s courts, that immunity presumably would 
be only as potent as that enjoyed by wholly sovereign nations. 
Congress, however, has authority to abrogate that immunity with a 
clear statement of intent. It is difficult to see how the states could 
have retained a power that they—like even wholly sovereign na-
tions—never enjoyed in the first place. 
Moreover, if analogies drawn from the law governing the rela-
tions among sovereign nations are inapposite in our federal system, 
it is perplexing that the Court has chosen to rely on the notion of 
state dignity to support this doctrine of federalism. As matters cur-
rently stand, the Court appears to have made an assertion about 
state dignity that bears no relationship to the doctrinal and histori-
cal meaning of that term. Further, if state dignity does not mean in 
this context what it means in the context from which it was drawn, 
then the Court has some obligation to explain precisely why it 
should mean something different here. The Court’s attempts thus 
far, however, have been inadequate. 
The Court’s recent attention to state sovereign immunity has 
been accompanied by a rich scholarly literature that exhaustively 
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details the relevant constitutional history and doctrinal debates.20 
Those accounts, however, generally have not made a serious effort 
to assess the Court’s reliance on the notion of state dignity. Part I 
accordingly begins with an overview of the recent ascendancy of 
state dignity as an apparent basis for decision in state sovereign 
immunity cases. The Article continues, in Part II, with an overview 
of the doctrine from which the notion of state dignity derives: for-
eign state sovereign immunity under the law of nations. That sur-
vey, especially when viewed in conjunction with the overview in 
Part III of mid-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century state sov-
ereign immunity decisions, demonstrates that the Court’s most re-
cent doctrinal and rhetorical experiment is not without some pre-
cedential pedigree; it suggests that it would be more accurate to say 
that the current Court’s efforts represent a renaissance for the lan-
guage of state dignity. 
Part IV considers the implications for state sovereign immunity 
doctrine of the Court’s implicit reliance on foreign state sovereign 
immunity cases. The Article concludes that the Court has been “ju-
risprudentially ambivalent.” In invoking the dignity of the states, 
the Court has suggested both that the states ought to be treated as 
fully sovereign nations—a debatable proposition, at best—and that 
the states ought to be treated better than fully sovereign nations—
certainly an odd proposition, given the undisputed constitutional 
limitations on the sovereign authority of the states. 
 
20 In addition to those articles cited supra note 11, see, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of 
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425 (1987); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh 
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of 
Suit Upon the States, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1203 (1978); William A. Fletcher, A Histori-
cal Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Af-
firmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 
Stan. L. Rev. 1033 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sov-
ereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889 (1983); Vicki C. Jack-
son, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 
98 Yale L.J. 1 (1988); Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh 
Amendment, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1342 (1989); Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and 
the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 61 (1989); Caleb Nelson, 
Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1559 
(2002). 
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I. STATE DIGNITY IN RECENT STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CASES 
A. Identifying the Symptoms 
Judge William Fletcher recently observed that the Eleventh 
Amendment, despite being ratified over 200 years ago, did not 
forcefully appear on the judicial and academic radar screen until 
the 1970s. In the last thirty years, the Supreme Court has decided 
more cases involving the Eleventh Amendment than it did in the 
preceding 170-odd years.21 The last seven years have marked even 
more dramatic doctrinal change. In that time, the Court has held 
that Congress lacks authority under Article I to abrogate the 
states’ immunity from suit both in federal court22 and in state 
court.23 The Court also has significantly narrowed Congress’s au-
thority to abrogate the states’ immunity pursuant to its power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.24 It is during this period that 
the Court has increasingly relied on the states’ dignitary interests 
to justify expansion of the doctrine. 
To be sure, as discussed below, the references to state dignity 
have not been without precedent, even within the context of state 
sovereign immunity. But they have increased in frequency and im-
port in recent years, and the Court has used such references to 
mark a new front in the battle over the appropriate balance be-
tween state and federal power. The first modern reference to state 
dignity in a state sovereign immunity case was in 1993, in Puerto 
Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. 
(“PRASA”).25 PRASA held that a district court order denying a 
claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity is immediately appeal-
able under the collateral order doctrine.26 Whether such an order 
 
21 See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 844. 
22 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72–73. 
23 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999). 
24 See Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, 531 U.S. at 374; Kimel v. Fla. 
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
536 (1997) (holding that in passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Congress 
exceeded its authority under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
by violating the principles of federalism and the separation of powers). 
25 506 U.S. 139 (1993). 
26 Id. at 147. The collateral order doctrine is a judicially created exception to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 (2001), which generally permits appeals only from “final decisions of 
the district courts.” In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., the Court held that 
an order that is not the complete and final judgment in a case within the meaning of 
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would “not make any step toward final disposition of the merits of 
the case,” and whether it would be “too late effectively to review” 
the order after final judgment, turned on the nature of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.27 If the Eleventh Amendment merely im-
munizes states from liability for damages, then an interlocutory or-
der denying a claim of immunity would not be appealable; a state 
could appeal from an adverse final judgment and raise the Elev-
enth Amendment as a grounds for reversal.28 If, on the other hand, 
the Eleventh Amendment confers immunity from suit, then its 
value would “for the most part [be] lost as litigation proceeds past 
motion practice.”29 
The Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment provides 
immunity from suit, which would effectively be worthless if the 
state had to wait for a final judgment to appeal the denial of im-
munity. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim to the contrary, 
noting that, in the words of a nineteenth-century decision concern-
ing the scope of Eleventh Amendment immunity, “[t]he very ob-
ject and purpose of the 11th Amendment were to prevent the in-
dignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial 
tribunals at the instance of private parties.”30 The Court explained 
that “[t]he Amendment is rooted in a recognition that the States, 
although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty,” and 
thus that it “accords the States the respect owed them as members 
of the federation.”31 
If the Court had stopped there, its reference to state dignity, al-
though perhaps a bit foreign to the ears of most modern watchers 
 
Section 1291 will nevertheless be immediately appealable if it “fall[s] in that small 
class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights 
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the 
cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is 
adjudicated.” 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
27 PRASA, 506 U.S. at 143 (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546). 
28 See, e.g., Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1988). 
29 PRASA, 506 U.S. at 145; cf. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (holding 
that an order denying qualified immunity is an appealable collateral order). 
30 PRASA, 506 U.S. at 146 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 
(1887)). In re Ayers held that a suit seeking to restrain the Attorney General of Vir-
ginia from bringing suits to recover taxes from persons who had previously paid with 
a state bond issue was, in effect, a suit against the state and thus barred by the Elev-
enth Amendment. 123 U.S. at 507. See infra notes 277–86 and accompanying text. 
31 PRASA, 506 U.S. at 146. 
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of the Court, would have seemed entirely innocuous. Indeed, the 
Court’s entire point—perhaps debatable,32 but certainly not unrea-
sonable33—was that it was the very act of being subjected to a suit 
for damages that was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. But the 
Court had more to say about the states’ dignity: “While application 
of the collateral order doctrine in this type of case is justified in 
part by a concern that States not be unduly burdened by litigation, 
its ultimate justification is the importance of ensuring that the States’ 
dignitary interests can be fully vindicated.”34 Whatever one thinks of 
the actual holding in the case with respect to the collateral order 
doctrine,35 the Court’s insistence that the “ultimate justification” of 
sovereign immunity is to vindicate “the States’ dignitary interests”36 
was surely surprising to most commentators. Indeed, although Jus-
tice Stevens’ dissent focused mostly on a quibble with the majority 
over whether Eleventh Amendment immunity truly was analogous 
to an official’s qualified immunity,37 he felt compelled to add that 
 
32 See id. at 150 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] defense based on the Eleventh 
Amendment, even when the Amendment is read at its broadest, does not contend 
that the State or state entity is shielded from liability for its conduct, but only that the 
federal courts are without jurisdiction over claims against the State or state entity. 
Nothing in the Eleventh Amendment bars [a] respondent from seeking recovery in a 
different forum.”) (citation omitted). But cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) 
(holding that Congress lacks authority under Article I to subject a state to suit in its 
own courts without its consent). 
33 See PRASA, 506 U.S. at 145 (noting that “the value to the States of their Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, like the benefit conferred by qualified immunity to individual 
officers, is for the most part lost as litigation proceeds past motion practice”); id. at 
147–48 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that “I continue to believe that the Court’s 
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as embodying a broad principle of state 
immunity from suit in federal court simply cannot be reconciled with the federal sys-
tem envisioned by our Basic Document and its Amendments,” but “a district court’s 
denial of a claim of immunity [in the narrow class of cases that fall] under the Elev-
enth Amendment should be appealable immediately”) (citation omitted). 
34 Id. at 146 (emphasis added). 
35 See, e.g., id. at 148 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Whether the assertion of an 
Eleventh Amendment claim is well founded—a matter not before us in this case—is a 
question separate from the question whether the Eleventh Amendment interests are 
‘too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require 
that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.’”) (cita-
tion omitted) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Life Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 
546 (1949)). 
36 Id. at 146. 
37 See id. at 149–50 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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he found the Court’s dignity rationale “embarrassingly insuffi-
cient.”38 
The Court elaborated on PRASA’s reference to state dignity in 
its decision in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., in which 
it described the protection of state dignity as one of the two princi-
pal justifications for the Eleventh Amendment.39 In that case, the 
Court held that the Port Authority—a bi-state railway authorized 
by Congress under the Interstate Compact Clause40—was not enti-
tled to Eleventh Amendment protection.41 The Court reasoned that 
neither of the “Eleventh Amendment’s twin reasons” argued in fa-
vor of immunity.42 First, because pursuant to the particular ar-
rangement among New York, New Jersey, and Congress the “[d]ebts 
and other obligations of the Port Authority are not liabilities of the 
two founding States, and the States do not appropriate funds to the 
Authority,”43 permitting suit would not threaten the solvency of the 
states.44 Second, “[s]uit in federal court is not an affront to the dig-
nity of a Compact Clause entity, for the federal court, in relation to 
such an enterprise, is hardly the instrument of a distant, discon-
nected sovereign.”45 To the contrary, “the federal court is ordained 
by one of the entity’s founders.”46 
The rhetoric of state dignity did not have a profound effect on 
the substance of the doctrine, however, until the Court’s decision 
in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.47 The Court held in Semi-
nole Tribe that Congress lacks authority under Article I to abro-
gate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal 
court.48 In so concluding, the Court expressly overruled Pennsyl-
 
38 Id. at 151 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
39 513 U.S. 30, 39–40 (1994). 
40 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
41 Hess, 513 U.S. at 32–33. 
42 Id. at 47. 
43 Id. at 37. 
44 Id. at 48–50. 
45 Id. at 41 (emphasis added); see also id. at 47 (finding “[n]o genuine threat to the 
dignity of New York or New Jersey” in allowing the claims to proceed); id. at 52 (stat-
ing that permitting the suit “does not touch the concerns—the States’ solvency and 
dignity—that underpin the Eleventh Amendment”). 
46 Id. at 41. 
47 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
48 Seminole Tribe involved a suit by an Indian tribe to compel the State of Florida to 
negotiate in good faith with the tribe over the formation of a compact to permit gam-
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vania v. Union Gas Co.,49 in which a plurality of the Court had rec-
ognized Congress’s power to abrogate the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity pursuant to the Interstate Commerce 
Clause.50 The tribe argued that “one consideration weighing in fa-
vor of finding the power to abrogate here is that the Act authorizes 
only prospective injunctive relief rather than retroactive monetary 
relief.”51 Previous case law had established that, when the state is 
the real party in interest, a suit within the scope of the Eleventh 
Amendment is barred regardless of the character of the relief 
sought.52 There nevertheless was some merit to the tribe’s conten-
tion. In light of the Court’s prior decisions establishing that the 
Eleventh Amendment was not a complete bar to the exercise of 
subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving states,53 Congress 
arguably had authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause54 to 
provide a remedy for state transgressions of validly imposed fed-
eral law; surely the character and scope of that remedy were rele-
 
ing activities on tribal land. Id. at 51–52. The tribe sued under a provision of the In-
dian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2702–2721 (2000), that purported to abro-
gate the states’ immunity from suit. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (2000). 
49 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
50 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
51 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58. 
52 In Cory v. White, for example, the Court had explained that “[i]t would be a novel 
proposition indeed that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit to enjoin the 
State itself simply because no money judgment is sought.” 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982). The 
proposition is not, however, quite as novel as the Court suggested. Indeed, under the 
doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), a suit against a state official seeking 
prospective injunctive relief to “end a continuing violation of federal law” is not 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985); see 
also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665–66 (1974) (holding that Young applies only 
to actions for prospective injunctive relief). See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Ameri-
can Constitutional Law § 3-27, at 555–66 (3d ed. 2000) (providing an overview of the 
relevant caselaw). 
53 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 675–76 (1999) (noting that states can consent to suit in federal court); cf. Nelson, 
supra note 20, at 1615–17 (arguing that in cases covered by the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment, the states cannot consent to suit in federal court, but that in cases not 
covered by the text of the Amendment, states enjoy “personal jurisdiction”-type im-
munity and “therefore can consent to suits”). 
54 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”). 
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vant considerations in deciding whether in fact it was “necessary 
and proper.”55 
The Court, however, concluded that if the “relief sought . . . is ir-
relevant to the question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment,” then “it follows a fortiori . . . that the type of relief 
sought is irrelevant to whether Congress has power to abrogate 
States’ immunity.”56 In support for this conclusion, the Court fol-
lowed Hess and PRASA, observing that the “Eleventh Amend-
ment does not exist solely in order to ‘preven[t] federal-court 
judgments that must be paid out of a State’s treasury’; it also serves 
to avoid ‘the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process 
of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties.’”57 Once 
again, therefore, the Court invoked the states’ dignitary interests to 
justify the states’ broad immunity from suit; but in Seminole Tribe, 
unlike PRASA and Hess, the Court relied on the states’ dignitary 
interests to justify a broad expansion of the doctrine. 
The Court again cited the states’ dignitary interests as a basis for 
decision in Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho.58 The case in-
volved a dispute between an Indian tribe and the state of Idaho 
over ownership of the banks and submerged lands of Lake Coeur 
d’Alene.59 The tribe filed suit in federal court seeking both a decla-
ration that its ownership of the land to the south of the lake ex-
tended to the disputed areas and an injunction preventing state of-
ficials from regulating the lands or otherwise violating the tribe’s 
right of quiet enjoyment.60 The tribe’s claims of ownership were 
based on federal law—specifically, the tribe claimed a “beneficial 
 
55 The Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress “to avail itself of experience, 
to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.” 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415–16 (1819); see also id. at 421 
(“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all 
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not 
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitu-
tional.”); cf. Nelson, supra note 20, at 1629 (arguing that “the Necessary and Proper 
Clause might well be thought to give Congress the requisite authority to abrogate the 
states’ traditional exemptions from suit”). 
56 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58 (emphasis added). 
57 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hess, 513 U.S. at 48, and PRASA, 506 U.S. at 
146). 
58 521 U.S. 261 (1997). 
59 Id. at 264. 
60 Id. 
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interest, subject to the trusteeship of the United States, in the beds 
and banks of all navigable watercourses and waters . . . within the 
original boundaries of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation, as defined 
by” an 1873 Executive Order.61 
The tribe contended that because the suit sought only prospec-
tive injunctive relief to remedy an ongoing violation of federal law, 
the doctrine of Ex Parte Young62 was applicable and thus that the 
Eleventh Amendment did not bar the suit.63 The Court, however, 
disagreed. The Court observed that the Eleventh Amendment 
would bar a quiet title suit against the state in federal court.64 Be-
cause the “declaratory and injunctive relief the Tribe seeks is close 
to the functional equivalent of quiet title in that substantially all 
benefits of ownership and control would shift from the State to the 
Tribe,”65 the Court reasoned that the suit, even though against state 
officials, should be barred, as well.66 
Given the Court’s prior precedent, this holding seemed perfectly 
reasonable.67 Indeed, although the tribe’s allegations placed the suit 
neatly within the letter of the Ex Parte Young doctrine as inter-
preted by the Court,68 it is difficult to conceive of a remedy that 
would have more directly affected the state’s sovereign interests 
than a request permanently to divest the state of some of its terri-
tory. But as in PRASA and Seminole Tribe, the Court did not rest 
solely on such functional considerations. Instead, the Court ex-
plained that “the immunity is designed to protect” the “dignity and 
respect afforded a State,”69 and thus that the “dignity and status of 
 
61 Id. (citing Exec. Order of Nov. 8, 1873, reprinted in 1 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs: 
Laws and Treaties 837 (1904)). 
62 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see discussion infra notes 278, 285–86 and accompanying text. 
63 Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 281. 
64 Id. at 281–82 (citing Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 223 (1897)). 
65 Id. at 282. 
66 Id. at 282–88. 
67 See Tribe, supra note 52, § 3-27, at 565 (discussing Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s “seem-
ingly sensible result”). 
68 As Justice Souter noted in dissent: 
a federal court has jurisdiction in an individual’s action against state officers so 
long as two conditions are met. The plaintiff must allege that the officers are 
acting in violation of federal law, and must seek prospective relief to address an 
ongoing violation, not compensation or other retrospective relief for violations 
past. The Tribe’s claim satisfies each condition. 
Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 298–99 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
69 Id. at 268 (emphasis added). 
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its statehood allow Idaho to rely on its Eleventh Amendment im-
munity and to insist upon responding to these claims in its own 
courts, which are open to hear and determine the case.”70 The 
Court also expressed concern that permitting the suit to proceed 
would cause “offense to Idaho’s sovereign authority and its stand-
ing in the Union,”71 and Justice Kennedy, in a portion of the opin-
ion joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, defended “the wisdom 
and necessity of considering, when determining the applicability of 
the Eleventh Amendment, the real affront to a State of allowing a 
suit to proceed.”72 
State dignity played an even more prominent role in the Court’s 
decision in Alden v. Maine.73 Alden involved a suit by employees of 
the state of Maine alleging violation of the overtime provisions of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.74 The employees originally 
filed the suit in federal court, but the district court dismissed it af-
ter the Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe. The employees re-
filed the action in Maine state court, pursuant to the Act’s provi-
sion creating concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction.75 The 
Supreme Court held that the states enjoy a constitutionally inde-
feasible immunity from suit in their own courts without their con-
sent.76 
The Court’s decision in Alden is striking in several respects—
perhaps most significantly in its utter disavowal of the text of the 
Eleventh Amendment as the source of a constitutional principle of 
state sovereign immunity. For present purposes, it suffices to note 
the Court’s continued—and increasingly emphatic—insistence that 
the states’ dignitary interests are a central justification for the 
 
70 Id. at 287–88 (emphasis added). 
71 Id. at 282 (emphasis added). 
72 Id. at 277 (emphasis added). Justice O’Connor, in an opinion joined by Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, concurred in part and in the judgment, but disagreed with Justice 
Kennedy’s assertion that “federal courts determining whether to exercise jurisdiction 
over any suit against a state officer must engage in a case-specific analysis of a number 
of concerns.” Id. at 291 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). Justice O’Connor concluded that Justice Kennedy’s approach “unnecessarily 
recharacterizes and narrows much of our Young jurisprudence.” Id. (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
73 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
74 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2000)). 
75 Alden, 527 U.S. at 711–12. 
76 Id. at 712, 759–60. 
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states’ immunity from suit. The Court began its discussion by ex-
plaining that “[t]he generation that designed and adopted our fed-
eral system considered immunity from private suits central to sov-
ereign dignity.”77 Accordingly, the federal system “preserves the 
sovereign status of the States” by “reserv[ing] to them a substantial 
portion of the Nation’s primary sovereignty, together with the dig-
nity and essential attributes inhering in that status.”78 The Court’s 
decision refers to state dignity, or the imperative of demonstrating 
“respect” or “esteem” for the states, on five other occasions in the 
opinion.79 
To be sure, the Court did attempt in Alden to support its extra-
textual conclusion with reference to policy and constitutional his-
tory and structure. In particular, the Court sought to justify its con-
clusion that Congress cannot authorize private suits for damages 
against states by invoking the need to protect the states’ fiscal in-
tegrity80 and preserve political accountability.81 The persuasiveness 
 
77 Id. at 715 (emphasis added). 
78 Id. at 714 (emphasis added). The Court stated that the other principal means by 
which the Constitution preserves the “sovereign status of the States” is by creating “a 
system in which the State and Federal Governments would exercise concurrent au-
thority over the people.” Id. (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919–20 
(1997) (discussing The Federalist No. 15, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961))). 
79 See id. at 715 (finding that the states “are not relegated to the role of mere prov-
inces or political corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of 
sovereignty”) (emphasis added); id. at 748–49 (“The principle of sovereign immunity 
preserved by constitutional design ‘thus accords the States the respect owed them as 
members of the federation.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting PRASA, 506 U.S. at 146); 
id. at 749 (“recognizing ‘the dignity and respect afforded a State, which the immunity 
is designed to protect’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 
268); id. at 749 (“Private suits against nonconsenting States . . . present ‘the indignity 
of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of pri-
vate parties,’ regardless of the forum.”) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Ayers, 123 
U.S. 443, 505 (1887)); id. at 758 (“Congress must accord States the esteem due to them 
as joint participants in a federal system, one beginning with the premise of sover-
eignty in both the central Government and the separate States.”) (emphasis added). 
80 The Court argued that— 
[p]rivate suits against nonconsenting States—especially suits for money dam-
ages—may threaten the financial integrity of the States. . . . [A]n unlimited con-
gressional power to authorize suits in state court to levy upon the treasuries of 
the States for compensatory damages, attorney’s fees, and even punitive dam-
ages could create staggering burdens, giving Congress a power and a leverage 
over the States that is not contemplated by our constitutional design. 
SMITH.BOOK.DOC 2/24/03  9:31 PM 
20 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 89:1 
of these rationales can be debated,82 but the Court’s mere attempt 
in Alden to assert them distinguishes that decision from the Court’s 
latest word on state sovereign immunity. In Federal Maritime 
Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority,83 the Court 
apparently did not see the need to provide any justification other 
than the states’ dignitary interests for the broad immunity that it 
has extrapolated from the constitutional structure.84 The case in-
volved an administrative complaint filed with the Federal Maritime 
Commission against South Carolina’s port authority by the owner 
of a cruise ship. The complainant alleged that the state violated 
federal law in denying its ship a berth in the Port of Charleston and 
sought injunctive relief and statutory reparations.85 Although only 
the United States, in light of established Eleventh Amendment 
doctrine, would have the authority to enforce a reparations order 
against the state,86 the Court held that state sovereign immunity 
barred the agency from adjudicating the claim.87 
 
Id. at 750; see also id. at 750–51 (“A general federal power to authorize private suits 
for money damages would place unwarranted strain on the States’ ability to govern in 
accordance with the will of their citizens.”). 
81 See id. at 751 (“When the Federal Government asserts authority over a State’s 
most fundamental political processes, it strikes at the heart of the political account-
ability so essential to our liberty and republican form of government.”). 
82 See id. at 803 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The ‘judgment creditor’ in question is not a 
dunning bill collector, but a citizen whose federal rights have been violated . . . .”); id. 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“So long as the citizens’ will, expressed through state legisla-
tion, does not violate valid federal law, the strain will not be felt; and to the extent 
that state action does violate federal law, the will of the citizens of the United States 
already trumps that of the citizens of the State . . . .”). 
83 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002). 
84 To be fair, the Court may simply have felt secure in relying on its prior justifica-
tions in Seminole Tribe and Alden. But given the consistent refusal of four Justices to 
accept those decisions as binding precedent, one would expect the Court to offer as 
many substantive justifications for its decisions as possible. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank 
v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 699 (1999) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (“I am not yet ready to adhere to the proposition of law set forth in 
Seminole Tribe.”); Alden, 527 U.S. at 814 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“I expect the 
Court’s late essay into immunity doctrine will prove the equal of its earlier experi-
ment in laissez-faire, the one being as unrealistic as the other, as indefensible, and 
probably as fleeting.”) 
85 See S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. at 1868–69. 
86 Because the Federal Maritime Commission’s orders are not self-executing, an 
administrative order can be enforced only by a federal district court. See id. at 1875 
(citing 46 U.S.C. §§ 1712(e), 1713(c)–(d) (1994)). Under current doctrine, such a suit 
by a private party—effectively, a suit against a state in federal court to recover mone-
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The Court’s analysis of the question presented proceeded in 
three steps. First, the Court dispensed with the contention that the 
Eleventh Amendment limits only the “judicial”—Article III—
power, by reaffirming its prior conclusion that “the sovereign im-
munity enjoyed by the States extends beyond the literal text of the 
Eleventh Amendment.”88 Second, given the “numerous common 
features shared by administrative adjudications and judicial pro-
ceedings,”89 the Court concluded that federal agency adjudications 
were “the type of proceedings from which the Framers would have 
thought the States possessed immunity when they agreed to enter 
the Union.”90 Third, the Court considered the “affront to a State’s 
dignity . . . when an adjudication takes place in an administrative 
tribunal as opposed to an Article III court,”91 and concluded that it 
was at least as great as when Congress attempts to subject a state to 
suit in federal court. 
To be sure, the Court’s first two rationales—loosely speaking, 
precedent and original intent—are conventional bases for constitu-
tional decisionmaking. But given the consistent refusal of four Jus-
tices either to accept recent decisions as binding precedent92 or to 
recognize the historical accuracy of the Court’s interpretation of 
the Framers’ intent,93 one might have expected the Court to be ea-
ger to demonstrate the correctness of its view of constitutional his-
tory and structure. 
The facts of the case actually put the Court in somewhat of a doc-
trinal bind. The United States conceded that orders of the Commis-
 
tary damages—would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. A suit by the United 
States to enforce the order, however, would not be barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment, which does not extend to suits by the United States. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 
755. 
87 S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. at 1867–68. 
88 Id. at 1871. 
89 Id. at 1872. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1874. 
92 See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 814 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissent-
ing); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
699 (1999) (Breyer, Stevens, Souter, & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
93 See, e.g., S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. at 1880 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (chal-
lenging the Court’s interpretation of the history of the ratification of the Eleventh 
Amendment); Alden, 527 U.S. at 814 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s 
“conception of state sovereign immunity . . . is true neither to history nor to the struc-
ture of the Constitution”). 
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sion were not self-executing, and that, because of existing Eleventh 
Amendment doctrine, they could be enforced only by the United 
States.94 Existing doctrine permits suits by the United States against 
a state in federal court,95 and the Court had already explained in 
Alden that suits by the United States against a state satisfy con-
cerns about political accountability.96 Thus, concerns about protect-
ing the states’ fiscal integrity and ensuring political accountability 
did not appear to be powerfully present in the case. 
Presumably, that is where the rationale of state dignity comes in. 
In response to the United States’ contention that South Carolina’s 
fiscal integrity was not threatened by the adjudication before the 
Commission, the Court asserted: “While state sovereign immunity 
serves the important function of shielding state treasuries and thus 
preserving ‘the States’ ability to govern in accordance with the will 
of their citizens,’ the doctrine’s central purpose is to ‘accord[] the 
States the respect owed them as’ joint sovereigns.”97 Similarly, in 
response to the United States’ argument that the Commission 
should, at a minimum, not be precluded from considering a private 
party’s request for non-monetary relief, the Court explained that 
“the primary function of sovereign immunity is not to protect State 
treasuries, but to afford the States the dignity and respect due sov-
ereign entities.”98 
But the Court did not simply invoke state dignity defensively. 
Quite to the contrary, the Court dedicated an entire section of its 
opinion to a discussion of state dignity and the adverse effect that 
permitting the adjudication to proceed would have had on that 
dignity. The Court explained that the “preeminent purpose of state 
sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent 
with their status as sovereign entities.”99 Alluding to the Court’s 
 
94 See supra note 86. 
95 Such suits are not barred by either the Eleventh Amendment or any other extra-
textual source of state sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 755. 
96 See id. at 756 (“Suits brought by the United States itself require the exercise of 
political responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State, a control which is ab-
sent from a broad delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting States.”). 
97 S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. at 1877 (citation omitted) (quoting Alden, 527 
U.S. at 750–51, and PRASA, 506 U.S. at 146). 
98 Id. at 1879 (citation omitted). 
99 Id. at 1874. 
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prior conclusions about the states’ dignity in Seminole Tribe and 
Coeur d’Alene Tribe, the Court then reasoned: 
Simply put, if the Framers thought it an impermissible affront to 
a State’s dignity to be required to answer the complaints of pri-
vate parties in federal courts, we cannot imagine that they would 
have found it acceptable to compel a State to do exactly the same 
thing before the administrative tribunal of an agency, such as the 
[Federal Maritime Commission]. . . . The affront to a State’s dig-
nity does not lessen when an adjudication takes place in an ad-
ministrative tribunal as opposed to an Article III court.100 
Responding to such an assertion is difficult; indeed, measuring the 
“affront” of a given action to a state’s “dignity” is an imprecise sci-
ence (to say the least).101 One might wonder, for example, how to 
measure the validity of Justice Thomas’s assertion, in an aside that 
surely was the subject of much grumbling among federal adminis-
trative law judges, that 
[o]ne, in fact, could argue that allowing a private party to haul a 
State in front of such an administrative tribunal constitutes a 
greater insult to a State’s dignity than requiring a State to appear 
in an Article III court presided over by a judge with life tenure 
nominated by the President of the United States and confirmed 
by the United States Senate.102 
Justice Stevens was left to complain again in dissent that “the ‘dig-
nity’ rationale is ‘embarrassingly insufficient,’ in part because 
‘Chief Justice Marshall early on laid to rest the view that the pur-
pose of the Eleventh Amendment was to protect a State’s dig-
nity.’”103 
 
100 Id. (citations omitted). 
101 See Meltzer, supra note 11, at 1039 (recognizing that “[a]ppeals to dignity are 
somewhat evanescent”). 
102 S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. at 1874 n.11. 
103 Id. at 1880 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 
Wheat.) 264, 406–07 (1821)). Justice Stevens also relied on an impressive recent piece 
of scholarship by Professor Caleb Nelson. See id. at 1880–81 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(citing Nelson, supra note 20, at 1565–66). I discuss Professor Nelson’s work infra at 
notes 414–17 and accompanying text. 
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B. Diagnosing the Problem 
As Justice Stevens’s comment suggests, the current Court has 
not invented the dignity rationale. But to the extent that the term 
has a historical pedigree, one must wonder why the Court has re-
cently revived it. Not even those relatively few commentators who 
have defended the Court’s recent state sovereign immunity deci-
sions have been eager to defend the dignity rationale.104 Indeed, at 
least viewed in isolation, it seems intuitively silly at best and down-
right strange at worst. So why has the Court not only persisted in 
its invocation of state dignity, but also made the concept increas-
ingly central to the rationale of its decisions? 
Only a few commentators have hazarded an answer. Some have 
summarily dismissed the references to state dignity as inappropri-
ate anthropomorphizations devoid of any substantive or functional 
content.105 Others have noted that although the language of dignity 
appears to be shorthand for the relatively uncontroversial proposi-
tion that the states clearly have some special status under the Con-
stitution, “broad notions of state dignity are difficult to square with 
accepted features of constitutional tradition.”106 
 
104 See Hill, supra note 14. 
105 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Foreword: The Lim-
its of Socratic Deliberation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 61 (1998) (“[T]he Court appears to 
be much more concerned about preserving the dignity of the states—as if they were 
natural persons that could experience hurt feelings beyond those of their residents—
than in pursuing decentralization and the other policy goals that federalism serves.”); 
Henry Paul Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Comment: The Sovereign 
Immunity “Exception,” 110 Harv. L. Rev. 102, 132 (1996) (“The idea that a state, an 
utterly abstract entity, has feelings about being sued by a private party when ‘its’ 
highest officials are regularly so sued surely strains credulity.”); Sherry, supra note 7, 
at 1127 (“Not since extending the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to corpo-
rations has the Court so anthropomorphized an abstract entity.”); id. (arguing that 
Justice Kennedy’s imagery in Alden of the federal government’s purported power 
over the states brings to mind “an independent toddler dragged along by a deter-
mined parent”); cf. Caminker, supra note 7, at 82 (“It is tempting to dismiss these ar-
ticulations as mere rhetorical flourishes, window dressing on federalism walls con-
structed from other methodological building blocks.”). 
106 Meltzer, supra note 11, at 1040. Professor Daniel Meltzer explains: 
Foremost among these are the power of another sovereign (the federal gov-
ernment) to impose unwanted duties . . . on the states, and the power of that 
other sovereign to strip states of their regulatory authority via federal preemp-
tion. State dignity is also compromised by all of the alternative means of judicial 
enforcement of federal duties that the [Alden] majority mentions as valid (per-
haps most notably, by state subjection to injunctions entered nominally against 
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Professor Evan Caminker has offered a more thorough—and 
persuasive, if tentative—account of the Court’s recent solicitude 
for state dignity.107 Professor Caminker has taken a preliminary 
stab at exploring whether the “Court’s phraseology has independ-
ent justificatory significance.”108 Noting that “the Court’s references 
to dignitary interests and injuries do not appear in casual and iso-
lated snippets but, rather, are characterized as an affirmative ra-
tionale for state sovereign immunity,”109 he proposes that “the 
Court’s focus on state dignity reflects an alternative approach to 
constitutional interpretation, one focusing on ‘expressive harms’ 
wrought by governmental conduct.”110 Under this account, the 
Court’s invocation of state dignity has “expressive significance by 
articulating and reinforcing norms that are constitutive of a soci-
ety’s very identity and self-understanding.”111 Viewed as such, “the 
Court’s jurisprudence is nonconsequentialist: it protects the dignity 
 
state officials), and by the manifold prohibitions and duties set forth in Article I 
Section 10, in Article IV, and in Amendments 13–15, 19, 24 and 26 to the Con-
stitution. . . . [T]he notion that state dignity demands some form of sovereign 
immunity from federal regulation falling within those enumerated powers is 
anything but axiomatic. 
Id. at 1040–41. Professor Daniel Farber has suggested that “the perceived mandate to 
protect the ‘dignity’ of the states from being sullied by certain kinds of litigation stems 
from their unique role in republican self-government.” Farber, supra note 7, at 1136. 
Recognition of that role, he argues, “has real doctrinal consequences rather than be-
ing merely a rhetorical flourish.” Id. at 1137. Professor Ann Althouse has made a re-
lated argument. She distinguishes between “normative federalism,” under which “the 
states are accorded autonomy because of the good to be achieved through separate 
functioning,” and the “states’ rights model” of federalism, which holds that states 
“can claim their autonomy as a matter of right.” Althouse, supra note 7, at 246. Al-
though, in her view, there are compelling reasons to enforce a doctrine of normative 
federalism, the Court’s— 
insistence on ‘dignity’ for the states sounds like what Younger [v. Harris, 401 
U.S. 37 (1971),] explicitly disclaimed: “blind deference to ‘States Rights.’” . . . 
‘Dignity’ connotes worthiness, the idea that honor and esteem are deserved. To 
find dignity inherent in the state’s mere status as a state and then to design doc-
trine to express honor and esteem toward the state is, I think[,] to embrace the 
states’ rights model. The normative model would stop to ask what the state de-
serves and why. 
Id. at 250–51 (footnote omitted). 
107 See Caminker, supra note 7. 
108 Id. at 83. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 82. 
111 Id. at 84. 
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of states because this affirmance of the fundamental structural 
commitments embedded in our constitutional system of govern-
ance matters for its own sake, not as a means to achieving some 
other end.”112 
After constructing this expressivist account, however, Professor 
Caminker recognizes that it is ultimately “unpersuasive” because it 
“fails to take account of countervailing expressive norms that the 
protection of state sovereign immunity itself violates, and it reflects 
an anachronistic view of [the] states’ role in our federalist sys-
tem.”113 He accordingly speculates whether the Court is “employing 
expressive reasoning instrumentally to inculcate values to induce 
attitudinal or behavioral change.”114 There are “immediate and ap-
preciable cost[s],” however, to such a judicial approach—specifically, 
“individuals are denied compensation for injuries caused by state mis-
conduct.”115 These costs, combined with the empirical and norma-
tive concerns associated with any instrumental justification for a 
 
112 Id. at 85. Professor Evan Caminker recognizes that “[t]aken at face value, the 
Court’s discussions of state dignity suggest that the states themselves suffer a cogniza-
ble expressive harm when their rightful dignitary status is impugned by private suits.” 
Id. But such a characterization, he acknowledges, would be “surely silly. Unlike per-
sons, states have no feelings of dignity to be protected.” Id. Instead, a “far more plau-
sible characterization of the Court’s language does not similarly depend on pretend-
ing that states have human qualities; rather, it holds that disrespectful treatment of 
states should not be tolerated because it contravenes the proper understanding of our 
governmental regime.” Id. 
113 Id. at 86 (emphasis omitted). For example, Professor Caminker notes that “the 
particular language with which the Court proclaims the states’ entitlement to dignified 
treatment appears to exalt states as having a status superior to individuals,” a view “at 
odds with our foundational notion of popular sovereignty . . . .” Id. Similarly, “in the 
specific context of sovereign immunity, the prioritization of states’ dignitary interests 
over individuals’ competing interest in compensation for injuries caused by state 
wrongdoing arguably expresses a message that individuals are subordinate to states 
rather than the other way around.” Id. 
114 Id. at 89 (emphasis added). On this account: 
[j]udicial protection and exaltation of state dignity will encourage people to in-
ternalize, as a political norm, the importance of having strong and vibrant states 
exercising significant governmental authority. This norm-internalization will 
help lead to an actual revival of such state power, thus securing the . . . advan-
tages of decentralization within the federal structure. 
Id. at 89–90; see also Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New Defense of 
the Anti-Commandeering Rule?, 33 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1309 (2000) (defending the 
anti-commandeering rule as outlined in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), on expressivist grounds). 
115 Caminker, supra note 7, at 91. 
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jurisprudential change,116 lead Professor Caminker to conclude that 
“immunity doctrine cannot be persuasively justified on this instru-
mentalist ground.”117 
Much can be said for the expressivist account as a plausible de-
scriptive explanation of the Court’s focus on state dignity.118 In-
deed, given the seemingly oxymoronic concept of state dignity, one 
is tempted to find some justification for the Court’s continued reli-
ance on it. This Article does not dispute the validity, as a descrip-
tive matter, of the expressivist account. Instead, it suggests that, 
wholly aside from any expressive rationale for the Court’s invoca-
tion of state dignity, in focusing on state dignity the Court is en-
gaged in a much more conventional judicial enterprise, albeit one 
that the Court has conducted below the radar screen. 
In stressing the dignity of the states, the Court appears to have 
drawn on a related, but distinct, line of cases: those concerned with 
the immunity of foreign states under the law of nations.119 To be 
sure, it is true, as the current Court’s majority has insisted, that the 
Court in the late nineteenth century referred to state dignity in its 
decisions addressing the scope of state immunity from suit.120 It is 
 
116 Professor Caminker notes that it is doubtful that the Court could correctly predict 
how people “will perceive and internalize judicial protection of states from private 
damages claims,” and that, in any event, “one might worry about the practical—and 
even expressive!—implications of having courts intentionally engage in social engi-
neering.” Id. at 90–91. 
117 Id. at 91. 
118 But cf. Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism, 
1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 142 (“[A]n intrinsic, expressive theory of federalism doctrine, 
to be plausible, must presuppose some objective semantic rules for attaching ‘mean-
ings’ to acts of federal legislation. But we know of no such rules independent of the 
federalism values at stake in this area . . . . Because the anticommandeering doctrines 
cannot . . . be otherwise justified on federalism grounds, the expressive story fails as 
well.”). 
119 One commentator recently came close to suggesting this connection between 
state sovereign immunity doctrine and the law of nations. See Thomas H. Lee, Making 
Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 1027 (2002). Professor Thomas Lee argues that the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment incorporates the law-of-nations rule of foreign state sovereign immunity. 
See infra notes 158–62. Professor Lee does not, however, attempt to assess how the 
Court’s current theory of state dignity conforms to this view of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, or even to suggest that the Court’s current reliance on the notion of state dig-
nity is in fact an attempt to rely on principles of the law of nations. Instead, Professor 
Lee’s article is concerned principally with understanding the meaning of the text of 
the Eleventh Amendment and its Framers’ intent. 
120 See infra notes 275–86 and accompanying text. 
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equally true, as Justice Stevens has observed in dissent, that Chief 
Justice Marshall long ago dismissed the rationale as a justification 
for the doctrine of (American) state sovereign immunity.121 But the 
discussion that follows of these earlier state sovereign immunity 
decisions clearly demonstrates that the rationale of state dignity 
has its roots beyond its immediate context. 
Before discussing those state sovereign immunity decisions, how-
ever, this Article turns to a consideration of the cases from which the 
notion of state dignity appears to derive: cases concerning the law of 
nations and the immunity of one nation in the courts of another. The 
concept of state dignity is not alien to the jurisprudence of foreign 
state sovereign immunity. To the contrary, as explained below, the 
decisions applying the law of nations often refer to state dignity to 
underscore the importance of courts recognizing the equal status of 
the sovereign nations whose interests collide in a judicial forum. The 
language of state dignity, although at first blush an inappropriate an-
thropomorphization, thus makes some sense in this context. 
II. DOCTRINAL ORIGINS OF STATE DIGNITY 
A. The Origins of Sovereign Immunity in American Jurisprudence 
To appreciate the significance of the Court’s invocation of state 
dignity in its state sovereign immunity cases, it is essential to under-
stand the context from which that concept derives. As explained in 
detail below, that context is the doctrine of foreign state sovereign 
immunity. As a preliminary matter, however, it is important to distin-
guish between two related yet distinct doctrines addressing the im-
munity of sovereign states from suit. The first—the English common-
law doctrine of sovereign immunity—in fact “comprises two distinct 
rules.”122 One, which limited the substantive reach of the law, held that 
“the King or the Crown, as the font of the law, is not bound by the 
law’s provisions.”123 This rule rested on the notion that, in Black-
 
121 See infra notes 254–60 and accompanying text (discussing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)). 
122 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 102 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); 
see also Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 
77 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1963) (“[T]he immunity of the sovereign from suit (sovereign 
immunity) and his capacity to violate or not violate the law (‘the King can do no 
wrong’) are distinct and independent concepts . . . .”). 
123 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 102–03 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
SMITH.BOOK.DOC 2/24/03  9:31 PM 
2003] States as Nations 29 
stone’s words, “the king himself can do no wrong.”124 Although this 
maxim suggests that the King is above the law—and, indeed, that is 
the meaning the maxim came to enjoy—it “originally meant precisely 
the contrary to what it later came to mean.”125 According to Professor 
Louis Jaffe, the phrase originally meant that “the king must not, was 
not allowed, not entitled, to do wrong.”126 As it evolved, however, “the 
king can do no wrong” took on the meaning that the King was “not 
only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong; he can 
never mean to do an improper thing.”127 The fiction that the King can 
do no wrong is, of course, entirely foreign in a system of popular sov-
ereignty,128 and accordingly was received quite hostilely in early post-
ratification decisions.129 
The other rule of the English common law was that “the King or 
Crown, as the font of justice, is not subject to suit in its own courts.”130 
This doctrine, which was jurisdictional in nature, “had its origins in 
the feudal system.”131 Under that system, “no lord could be sued by a 
vassal in his own court, but each petty lord was subject to suit in the 
courts of a higher lord. Since the King was at the apex of the feudal 
pyramid, there was no higher court in which he could be sued.”132 Ac-
 
124 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *244. 
125 Jaffe, supra note 122, at 4. 
126 Id. (quoting Ludwik Ehrlich, No. XII: Proceedings Against the Crown (1216–
1377), in 6 Oxford Studies Soc. & Legal Hist. 42 (Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1921)); see 
also 1 Blackstone, supra note 124, at *246 (“[T]he prerogative of the crown extends 
not to do any injury.”). 
127 1 Blackstone, supra note 124, at *246 (emphasis omitted). 
128 See, e.g., The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“The history of 
the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all 
having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States.”); 
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 697 n.24 (1997) (“Although we have adopted the re-
lated doctrine of sovereign immunity, the common-law fiction that [the King can do 
now wrong] was rejected at the birth of the Republic.”); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 
415 (1979) (“We must, of course, reject the fiction. It was rejected by the colonists 
when they declared their independence from the Crown . . . .”); Langford v. United 
States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879) (“We do not understand that either in reference to 
the government of the United States, or of the several States, or of any of their offi-
cers, the English maxim [the King can do no wrong] has an existence in this coun-
try.”). 
129 The most important of these early decisions was Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 
419, 458, 471–72 (1793); see discussion infra notes 221–53 and accompanying text. 
130 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 103 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
131 Hall, 440 U.S. at 414. 
132 Id. at 414–15 (citing 1 Sir Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The 
History of English Law: Before The Time of Edward I, at 518 (2d ed. 1899) (noting 
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cordingly, this rule, which was well established in England as early 
as the thirteenth century,133 barred individuals from bringing suit 
against a sovereign in its own courts.134 This Article refers to this 
doctrine as “English common-law sovereign immunity.” 
A distinct, albeit related, doctrine—also part of the legal con-
sciousness at the time of the Framing—accorded sovereign nations 
immunity in the courts of other sovereigns. “This source of sover-
eign immunity owed less to the common law than to the law of na-
tions.”135 Under an interpretation of the law of nations that has 
changed little since the Revolutionary period, courts of one nation 
generally refused to entertain actions against other sovereign na-
tions. This doctrine was based on the “perfect equality[] and entire 
independence of all distinct states.”136 Given this parity of status, it 
was thought that disputes between sovereigns should be resolved 
through diplomatic relations,137 or through war,138 rather than by 
 
that the fact “that there happens to be in this world no court above [the King’s] court 
is, we may say, an accident.”)). 
133 See Clyde E. Jacobs, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity 5 
(1972); Jaffe, supra note 122, at 2. 
134 As Professor Louis Jaffe persuasively demonstrated, however, in England the 
doctrine that the “King cannot be sued without his consent . . . has not meant that the 
subject was without remedy.” Jaffe, supra note 122, at 1. He explained: 
From time immemorial many claims affecting the Crown could be pursued in 
the regular courts if they did not take the form of a suit against the Crown. And 
when it was necessary to sue the Crown eo nomine consent apparently was 
given as of course. . . . Where the doctrine was in form applicable the subject 
had to proceed by petition of right, a cumbersome, dilatory remedy to be sure, 
but nevertheless a remedy. If the subject was the victim of illegal official action, 
in many cases he could sue the King’s officers for damages. And the writs of 
certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus ran against many offi-
cial boards and commissions . . . . 
Id. 
135 James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-
Party Cases, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 555, 582 (1994). 
136 1 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 21 (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
ed., 12th ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1878). 
137 Under the doctrine of espousal, the remedy of an individual aggrieved by the act 
of a foreign state was to appeal to his own government to seek redress through diplo-
matic channels. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 259–60 (1796) (Iredell, J., 
concurring). 
138 See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135–46 
(1812); see also discussion infra notes 176–202 and accompanying text. Early 
commentators on the law of nations sometimes justified this doctrine by reference to 
the distinction between the sovereign as an entity (or, in the case of a monarchy, a 
person) and the individuals who were citizens or subjects of the sovereign. For 
example, Emmerich de Vattel, the leading treatise writer on the law of nations in the 
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forcing one sovereign to submit to the commands of another sov-
ereign’s courts. This Article refers to this strand of sovereign im-
munity doctrine as “foreign state sovereign immunity.”139 
The current doctrinal debate over the appropriate status of state 
sovereign immunity in our constitutional system has tended to fo-
cus, at least ostensibly, on English common-law sovereign immu-
nity. As Professor James Pfander has explained, “[t]wo schools of 
thought prevail regarding the history of sovereign immunity in the 
period preceding the framing and ratification of the Constitu-
tion.”140 One school believes that the states inherited common-law 
sovereign immunity—which they hold to be a “fundamental pre-
cept of Anglo-American law”—following the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, and that the “framers reaffirmed their immunity during 
the constitutional ratification debates.”141 The other school empha-
sizes that “even in Great Britain, the doctrine did not establish a 
 
Emmerich de Vattel, the leading treatise writer on the law of nations in the eight-
eenth century, explained that “[n]o individual, though ever so free and independent, 
can be placed in competition with the sovereign; this would be to put a single person 
alone upon an equality with an united multitude of his equals.” 2 Emmerich de Vat-
tel, The Law of Nations or Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct 
and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns § 35, at 209 (Northampton, Mass., Simeon But-
ler 4th Am. ed. 1820) (1758); see Lee, supra note 119, at 1033. Accordingly, an indi-
vidual of one sovereign could not force another sovereign to be subject to suit. 
139 Professor James Pfander refers to it as “law-of-nations” immunity. Pfander, supra 
note 135, at 559; see also Alfred Hayes, Private Claims Against Foreign Sovereigns, 
38 Harv. L. Rev. 599, 599 (1925) (“[I]mmunity of a foreign sovereign is not identical 
with immunity of the local sovereign.”); Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and 
Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions from the 
Public-Lands Cases, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 867, 886 (1970) (distinguishing between “the 
principles governing the amenability of a state to suit before its own courts and those 
governing its amenability to suit before the courts of another sovereign”). I have cho-
sen the term “foreign state sovereign immunity” because application of the doctrine 
necessarily requires two sovereigns: the forum sovereign and the foreign sovereign 
who is sued in the forum sovereign’s courts. English common-law sovereign immu-
nity, in contrast, only contemplates one sovereign: the one that is immune from suit in 
its own courts. 
140 Pfander, supra note 135, at 578. 
141 Id. at 578–79 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11–15 (1890)); see, e.g., Alden 
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715–16 (1999) (“When the Constitution was ratified, it was 
well established in English law that the Crown could not be sued without consent in 
its own courts . . . . Although the American people had rejected other aspects of Eng-
lish political theory, the doctrine that a sovereign could not be sued without its con-
sent was universal in the States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.”). 
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complete bar to relief against either the crown or its officers,”142 
and maintains that “Americans had substituted the sovereignty of 
the people for the sovereignty of the crown and had secured limita-
tions on governmental power through adoption of written constitu-
tions.”143 Whatever the merits of these competing views, the princi-
pal point of dispute has tended to be the degree to which, or 
whether, the constitutional structure incorporated English com-
mon-law sovereign immunity.  
Regardless of the Court’s current view of the origins of the doc-
trine of state sovereign immunity—a view that is, as explained be-
low, generally ambivalent and cryptically expressed—it makes 
some sense to distinguish between those cases that involve the cir-
cumstances specific to English common-law sovereign immunity 
and those that involve the circumstances specific to foreign state 
sovereign immunity. Because the former generally applied only 
when the sovereign was sued in its own courts, English common-
law sovereign immunity is the logical doctrinal ancestor when an 
individual sues a state in the state’s own courts144—at least when a 
state is sued under a cause of action created by its own laws.145 For-
eign state sovereign immunity, on the other hand, is the logical 
doctrinal source when a state is sued in federal court—a court of 
“another” sovereign.146 
 
142 Pfander, supra note 135, at 580 (citing Jaffe, supra note 122, at 16–18). 
143 Id. (citing John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Im-
munity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889, 1896–99 (1983), and Akhil Reed 
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1438–51 (1987)); see, e.g., 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 102–04 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(discussing English common-law sovereign immunity and then arguing that 
“[w]hatever the scope of sovereign immunity might have been in the Colonies, how-
ever, or during the period of Confederation, the proposal to establish a National 
Government under the Constitution drafted in 1787 presented a prospect unknown to 
the common law prior to the American experience”). 
144 See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 715–16, 733–35, 741–42 (discussing English common 
law). 
145 Cf. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (“A sovereign is exempt 
from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical 
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that 
makes the law on which the right depends.”). Justice Holmes’s formulation of sover-
eign immunity is discussed infra notes 315–20 and accompanying text. 
146 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69 (invoking “the much more fundamental 
‘jurisprudence in all civilized nations’” (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 
(1890)); see also Scalia, supra note 139. 
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This is not to suggest that either doctrine has any place in 
American constitutional jurisprudence. Indeed, the main jurispru-
dential debate in current state sovereign immunity decisions is over 
the extent to which the states obtained (or retained) immunity 
from suit upon ratification of the Constitution. Moreover, the rele-
vance of the two doctrines of sovereign immunity is complicated by 
the fact that states are not wholly sovereign entities. Thus, it is 
strained to suggest that, with respect to the several states, the 
courts of the United States are the courts of “another” sovereign. 
But understanding the source of immunity that the states enjoy 
under current doctrine is essential to assessing that doctrine. 
There is some disagreement about the doctrinal origins of the 
states’ immunity from suit. As suggested above and explained in 
greater detail below, the current debates on the Court tend to fo-
cus, at least explicitly, on the English common law. Moreover, the 
early post-ratification practice suggests that the Court saw little 
place for the law-of-nations doctrine of foreign state sovereign im-
munity in cases involving suits against the several states, although 
the early Court was not particularly receptive to claims based on 
the English common law, either. 
But several commentators have argued that the states, at one 
time or another, enjoyed foreign state sovereign immunity. For ex-
ample, Professors James Pfander and Caleb Nelson147 have sepa-
rately argued that the pre-ratification case of Nathan v. Virginia148 
demonstrates that the states enjoyed foreign state sovereign im-
munity in the courts of other states under the Articles of Confed-
eration.149 In that case, the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas 
 
147 Professor Nelson actually suggests that it is not entirely clear that the Framers 
consistently distinguished between what is referred to here as “English common-law 
sovereign immunity” and “foreign state sovereign immunity,” but suggests that the 
distinction is not particularly important, because “in America, sovereign immunity 
operated through the same mechanism in both contexts.” Nelson, supra note 20, at 
1574–75 n.70. 
148 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 77 (Pa. C.P. 1781). 
149 See Nelson, supra note 20, at 1578–79; id. at 1577 (“[T]here was broad consensus 
about the states’ immunity from suit under the Articles.”); id. at 1575 (arguing that 
the dominant view among the Framers before ratification was that “courts could not 
adjudicate plaintiffs’ claims against a sovereign unless the sovereign voluntarily ap-
peared or otherwise consented to suit, because there was no other way to bring the 
sovereign within a court’s power and because a court could not proceed to judgment 
against defendants who were not at least constructively before it”); Pfander, supra 
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dismissed an action brought against the Commonwealth of Virginia 
by Simon Nathan to recover a debt that the Commonwealth alleg-
edly owed him. Nathan sought a writ to attach some military uni-
forms that belonged to Virginia but were in Philadelphia. After re-
ceiving a request from Virginia, the Supreme Executive Council of 
Pennsylvania ordered the sheriff not to return the writ to the court. 
During argument before the court, William Bradford, Pennsyl-
vania’s Attorney General, argued that the action should be dis-
missed, and the Court agreed.150 Subsequent accounts of the case 
reveal Bradford’s argument that subjecting Virginia to suit would 
violate the immunity of the state under the law of nations, and that 
the court accepted that view.151 
That the states may have enjoyed foreign state sovereign immu-
nity in each other’s courts before ratification, however, does not 
answer whether they enjoyed it after ratification. Professor Pfander 
argues that although, in light of the decision in Nathan, “the fram-
ers of the Constitution considered [law-of-nations] sovereign im-
munity a substantial hurdle to securing state compliance with the 
plan of the convention,”152 they addressed this concern by abrogat-
ing the states’ immunity through inclusion of the Original Jurisdic-
tion Clause in Article III.153 Professor Nelson argues that whether 
the Framers thought that the states enjoyed law-of-nations immu-
nity after the ratification is a close question. Instead, he offers a 
novel and sophisticated account under which the federal courts 
lack subject matter jurisdiction over suits within the literal text of 
 
note 135, at 586–87 (citing contemporaneous accounts and asserting that “[t]he dispo-
sition of Nathan in favor of law-of-nations immunity deserves to be viewed as a deci-
sive rejection of state suability in the courts of other states”). 
150 See Nathan, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 78 n.(a). 
151 See id. (account of Alexander Dallas); Nelson, supra note 20, at 1579–80 n.95 
(quoting Letter from Joseph Reed to Virginia Delegates (July 10, 1781), in 3 The Pa-
pers of James Madison 187 n.2 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 
1963)). Alexander Hamilton also apparently believed that the states’ immunity from 
suit derived from the law of nations. See The Federalist No. 81, at 487–88 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); Nelson, supra note 20, at 1577–78; Pfander, 
supra note 135, at 581 n.99. The Supreme Court has since held that the Constitution 
does not prevent one state from entertaining a suit against another state. See Nevada v. 
Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421, 426–27 (1979); discussion infra notes 259–62 and accompanying 
text. 
152 Pfander, supra note 135, at 587. 
153 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Pfander, supra note 135, at 560. 
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the Eleventh Amendment, and the states enjoy a “personal juris-
diction” type of sovereign immunity in other suits against them.154 
In contrast, then-Professor Antonin Scalia, who also recognized 
the difference between what he called “‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ 
sovereign immunity,”155 argued (albeit rather cursorily)156 that the 
states continue to enjoy the latter as a matter of constitutional law. 
According to then-Professor Scalia, “[t]he eleventh amendment to 
the Constitution embodies only that ‘foreign’ immunity, protecting 
the states from being sued before federal tribunals by citizens of 
other states or nations.”157 Professor Thomas Lee recently provided 
a more comprehensive justification for this account of the Eleventh 
Amendment. Professor Lee argues that the literal text of the Elev-
enth Amendment is best explained as an attempt to “incorporate 
into the Constitution, in recognition of the sovereign equality of 
the States, the classical international law rule that only states have 
rights against other states.”158 Under this view, “[t]he Amendment 
is essentially just a negative formulation of the affirmative interna-
tional rule, namely, a foreign citizen may not sue a sovereign 
state.”159 That international rule, Professor Lee explains, was in-
tended to protect sovereign dignity. 
[Because the] atomized individual was . . . a nonentity with no 
rights or duties so far as the law of nations was concerned, . . . to 
recognize the rights of a citizen or subject of one state against a 
foreign state . . . would imply that a fraction of the sovereignty of 
one state was equal to the full sovereignty of another.160 
This would “belittle the sovereign dignity of the latter state” by 
“impeaching the irreducible equality and dignity” of that state in 
the society of nations.161 
 
154 See Nelson, supra note 20, at 1566. 
155 Scalia, supra note 139, at 886. 
156 Then-Professor Scalia made his observations about the states’ sovereign immu-
nity in an article addressing judicial review of federal administrative action. Thus, he 
discussed the states only briefly, by way of analogy. See id. at 886–88. 
157 Id. at 886. For further consideration of then-Professor Scalia’s argument, see infra 
notes 413–17 and accompanying text. 
158 Lee, supra note 119, at 1028. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 1033. 
161 Id. (discussing Vattel, supra note 138, at 208–09). 
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Professor Lee’s cogent article may well “mak[e] sense of the Elev-
enth Amendment,” but it does not attempt to assess how the cur-
rent Court’s particular theory of state dignity conforms to this view 
of the Eleventh Amendment, or even suggest that the Court’s cur-
rent reliance on the notion of state dignity is in fact an attempt to 
rely on principles of the law of nations. To be sure, as demon-
strated below, identifying customary international law as the doc-
trinal source of the notion of state dignity is an important first step 
in understanding and assessing the Court’s current reliance on the 
concept. But the real work of this project is to determine the impli-
cations for current state sovereign immunity doctrine of the Court’s 
apparent invocation of the principles of customary international 
law, which Professor Lee has not attempted.162 
For the purposes of this Article, the important point is that Eng-
lish common-law sovereign immunity and foreign state sovereign 
immunity historically had specific contexts for application. To help 
demonstrate that proposition, this Article turns to a consideration 
of the Court’s treatment of the doctrine of foreign state sovereign 
immunity. It is in that doctrine that the concept of state dignity is 
of paramount importance. 
B. State Dignity and Foreign State Sovereign Immunity 
1. The Law of Nations 
As explained above, the doctrine of foreign state sovereign im-
munity is part of the law of nations. The author of the most fre-
quently cited eighteenth-century treatise on the law of nations, 
Emmerich de Vattel, defined the law of nations as “[c]ertain max-
 
162 Professor Lee does offer two brief concluding thoughts about the implications of 
his view of the Eleventh Amendment for current doctrine. Lee, supra note 119, at 
1096. First, he argues that because the law of nations recognized a right to sue a state 
for a violation of “fundamental law,” a U.S. citizen should be permitted to sue a state 
for any constitutional violation, not just a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
Second, he concludes that, contrary to the Court’s decision in Monaco v. Mississippi, 
292 U.S. 313 (1934), a foreign state should be permitted to sue a state in federal court. 
Id. at 1096. Professor Lee does briefly criticize the Court for invoking a “boundless 
principle of dignity,” noting that “the international law theory” relies on a notion of 
dignity “that is based on the private citizens who constitute the State, not a dignity 
that is separate from and superior to its citizens.” Id. at 1096–97. He does not, how-
ever, attempt further to analyze the implications of the Court’s reliance on the notion 
of state dignity. 
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ims and customs, consecrated by long use, and observed by nations 
in their mutual intercourse with each other.”163 Although today the 
law of nations is known as “customary international law,”164 its 
definition has changed very little.165 As Professor Brad Clark has 
explained, in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth cen-
tury the “law of nations was not ‘law’ as we usually think of it to-
day—that is, a sovereign command . . . . Rather, . . . the law of na-
tions was an identifiable body of rules and customs developed and 
refined by a variety of nations over hundreds and, in some cases, 
thousands of years.”166 
At least in theory, the law of nations did not represent the deci-
sions or interpretations of law of any one sovereign. Instead, “it ex-
isted by common practice and consent among a number of sover-
eigns.”167 In Blackstone’s words, because “none of [the individual 
nations of the world] will acknowledge a superiority in the other, 
[the law of nations] cannot be dictated by any.”168 Sovereign nations 
followed the law of nations’ customary rules not out of legal com-
pulsion, but in order to “foster peaceful coexistence and to facili-
tate mutually beneficial transactions among their citizens. In es-
sence, the law of nations operated as a set of background rules that 
courts applied in the absence of any binding sovereign command to 
the contrary.”169 When the United States declared and achieved in-
dependence, it embraced the law of nations as did other sovereign 
nations in the world.170 
 
163 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations § 25, at 62 (Joseph Chitty ed., Phila., T. 
& J.W. Johnson & Co. 1859) (1758) (emphasis in original). 
164 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102 
(1987). 
165 Id. § 101 (defining international law as a set of “rules and principles of general 
application dealing with the conduct of states and of international organizations and 
with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, 
whether natural or juridical”). Of course the content of those rules and principles has 
changed substantially over time. 
166 Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1245, 1279 (1996). 
167 William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1513, 1517 (1984). 
168 1 Blackstone, supra note 124, at *43. 
169 Clark, supra note 166, at 1280. 
170 Shortly after the ratification and during the same year that he argued Chisholm v. 
Georgia for the plaintiff, Attorney General Edmund Randolph advised the Secretary 
of State that “[t]he law of nations, although not specially adopted by the constitution 
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In the early days of the Republic, the law of nations supplied 
background customs and norms in three principal substantive ar-
eas:171 commercial law (“law merchant”),172 admiralty law (“law 
maritime”),173 and the law governing the rights and obligations of 
sovereign states (dealing with such sensitive matters of foreign re-
lations as war, neutrality, and immunity for other nations’ ambas-
sadors).174 Given the obvious importance of these matters, particu-
larly to a young nation eager to be accepted by the community of 
nations, U.S. courts recognized and generally enforced the law of 
nations in cases before them.175 
 
or any municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of the land. Its obligation com-
mences and runs with the existence of a nation . . . .” 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 26, 27 (1792). 
On the force of the law of nations in the United States, see generally The Paquete 
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be 
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as 
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determina-
tion. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legis-
lative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civi-
lized nations . . . .”). 
171 See generally Clark, supra note 166, at 1279–84 (explaining the mechanics of the 
law of nations as it was historically applied in three principle categories). 
172 Clark, supra note 166, at 1281. The law merchant was a body of uniform rules de-
signed to promote trade among nations. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 124, at *75; see 
also Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842) (relying on the law of nations in 
formulating federal common law for commercial transactions). 
173 As Professor Brad Clark noted: 
Like the law merchant, the law maritime fostered trade among nations. But the 
law maritime also served to maintain peace and harmony among nations. Fail-
ure to resolve admiralty and maritime disputes satisfactorily could create ten-
sions among nations and even lead to war. Thus, nations had a strong incentive 
to adhere to accepted rules and customs. 
Clark, supra note 166, at 1281 n.168 (citing W. Mitchell, Essay on the Early History of 
the Law Merchant 39–78 (1904)). 
174 See Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815) 
(“The law of nations is the great source from which we derive those rules, respecting 
belligerent and neutral rights, which are recognized by all civilized and commercial 
states throughout Europe and America.”). For the argument that judicial decisions in 
the three principal areas of the law of nations do not constitute impermissible “federal 
judge-made law,” but rather are “consistent with, and frequently required by, the con-
stitutional structure,” see Clark, supra note 166, at 1251. 
175 See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson, J.) (“When the 
United States declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of na-
tions, in its modern state of purity and refinement.”) (emphasis omitted). 
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2. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon 
Early judicial decisions in several of the substantive areas em-
braced by the law of nations are replete with references to sover-
eign dignity. The classic and foundational example is the Supreme 
Court’s decision in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.176 The 
case involved a claim by two American citizens, John McFaddon 
and William Greetham, that they were the rightful owners of the 
Exchange, a boat that they alleged was forcibly taken from them 
by persons acting under the orders of Napoleon, then the Emperor 
of France, and refitted as an armed public vessel of France.177 When 
the ship, after “encounter[ing] great stress of weather upon the 
high seas,” landed in the port of Philadelphia, McFaddon and 
Greetham filed a libel action in federal district court, attaching the 
vessel and seeking its return.178 Neither the French captain nor any 
other French official appeared in court to defend the claim; in-
stead, France protested the libel action through diplomatic chan-
nels. In response, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Pennsylvania, 
on instructions of the “executive department of the government of 
the United States,” appeared to urge the court to dismiss the libel.179 
The district court dismissed the action, but the circuit court re-
versed.180 As Professor Clark notes, “[i]t is difficult to overstate the 
importance of this case at the time . . . . At the time of the circuit 
court’s decision, the United States was on the brink of war with 
England and could hardly afford war with France as well.”181 It is 
also not difficult to see how resolution of the case would directly 
affect relations with France. Chief Justice Marshall described the 
question presented as “whether an American citizen can assert, in 
an American court, a title to an armed [French] national vessel, 
found within the waters of the United States.”182 
To answer that question, Chief Justice Marshall drew on back-
ground principles of the law of nations.183 He started by noting the 
 
176 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
177 Id. at 117. 
178 Id. at 118. 
179 Id. at 117–19. 
180 Id. at 119–20. 
181 Clark, supra note 166, at 1307. 
182 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 135. 
183 See id. at 136 (discussing the “usages and received obligations of the civilized world”). 
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tension between the “exclusive and absolute” jurisdiction of a “na-
tion within its own territory,” on the one hand, and the need for 
“relaxation” of that power in order to promote “intercourse with 
each other [and] . . . an interchange of those good offices which 
humanity dictates and its wants require,” on the other.184 The Chief 
Justice explained that this tension—between the “equal rights and 
equal independence” of distinct sovereignties and the “common in-
terest impelling them to mutual intercourse”185—has “given rise to 
a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to wave the 
exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, 
which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation.”186 
By “[waiving] . . . territorial jurisdiction,” Chief Justice Marshall 
meant that the forum sovereign would, in cases in which a foreign 
sovereign or one of its officers was hauled before one of the fo-
rum’s courts, decline to assert authority over the foreign sovereign. 
This practice was the necessary corollary of the “perfect equality 
and absolute independence of sovereigns”: 
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and be-
ing bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade 
the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights 
within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a for-
eign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence 
that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign sta-
tion, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, 
and will be extended to him.187 
Under the principles of the law of nations, the Court reasoned, the 
same result must obtain when the “person of the sovereign” (in the 
case of monarchs and emperors), the minister of a sovereign (that 
is, an ambassador), or the public armed ship of a friendly sovereign 
entered the territory of another sovereign. In each case, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall explained, assertion of jurisdiction would be incom-
patible with the “dignity” of the foreign sovereign.188 Accordingly, 
 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 136–37. 
186 Id. at 137. 
187 Id. (emphasis added). 
188 Under the law of nations, the “person of the sovereign” was immune from “arrest 
or detention within a foreign territory” because “[a] foreign sovereign is not under-
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the Court held, as a “principle of public law,” that “national ships 
of war, entering the port of a friendly power open for their recep-
tion, are to be considered as exempted by the consent of that 
power from its jurisdiction,”189 and ordered the libel dismissed. 
It is clear from this recital that the Court’s references to sover-
eign “dignity” were intended to underscore the status of the for-
eign sovereign in relation to the status of the forum sovereign. It 
would undermine the absolute independence of one sovereign to 
submit to the authority and jurisdiction of a another sovereign; 
such submission would necessarily entail some diminution of the 
 
stood as intending to subject himself to a jurisdiction incompatible with his dignity, 
and the dignity of his nation, and it is to avoid this subjection that the license [to enter 
the foreign state’s territory] has been obtained.” Id. at 137–38 (emphasis added). The 
law of nations granted immunity to foreign ministers for the same reason: 
The assent of the sovereign to the very important and extensive exemptions 
from territorial jurisdiction which are admitted to attach to foreign ministers, is 
implied from the considerations that, without such exemption, every sovereign 
would hazard his own dignity by employing a public minister abroad . . . . A 
sovereign committing the interests of his nation with a foreign power, to the 
care of a person whom he has selected for that purpose, cannot intend to sub-
ject his minister in any degree to that power; and therefore, a consent to receive 
him, implies a consent that he shall possess those privileges which his principal 
intended he should retain—privileges which are essential to the dignity of his 
sovereign, and to the duties he is bound to perform. 
Id. at 138–39 (emphasis added). The same considerations mandated a background 
principle in favor of immunity for public armed ships. Such a ship— 
constitutes a part of the military force of her nation; acts under the immediate 
and direct command of the sovereign; is employed by him in national objects. 
He has many and powerful motives for preventing those objects from being de-
feated by the interference of a foreign state. Such interference cannot take 
place without affecting his power and his dignity. The implied license therefore 
under which such vessel enters a friendly port, may reasonably be construed, 
and it seems to the Court, ought to be construed, as containing an exemption 
from the jurisdiction of the sovereign, within whose territory she claims the 
rights of hospitality. 
Id. at 144 (emphasis added). 
189 Id. at 145–46. The Court elaborated: 
[T]he Exchange, being a public armed ship, in the service of a foreign sovereign, 
with whom the government of the United States is at peace, and having entered 
an American port open for her reception, on the terms on which ships of war 
are generally permitted to enter the ports of a friendly power, must be consid-
ered as having come into the American territory, under an implied promise, 
that while necessarily within it, and demeaning herself in a friendly manner, she 
should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the country. 
Id. at 147. 
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foreign state’s own sovereign authority.190 Such a state of affairs 
would be highly problematic, given the “equal rights and equal in-
dependence” of the two sovereigns.191 The use of the term “dignity” 
to illustrate this point is not anomalous. “Dignity” connotes, 
among other things, “true worth, excellence”; “[h]onourable or 
high estate; degree of estimation, rank”; and “[e]levated manner; 
fit stateliness”;192 a nineteenth-century dictionary also mentions 
“[h]eight; importance; [and] rank.”193 Recognition of the equal dig-
nity—that is, the equal rank and importance—of the foreign sover-
eign depended on the forum nation’s courts declining to assert ju-
risdiction over the foreign nation.194 
 
190 The Court accordingly has referred to sovereign dignity in cases involving the as-
sertion of jurisdiction over foreign ambassadors, who are, after all, merely representa-
tives of the sovereign. See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 116–17 
(1784) (explaining that under the law of nations, “[t]he person of a public minister is 
sacred and inviolable” because if “his freedom of conduct is taken away, the business 
of his sovereign cannot be transacted, and his dignity and grandeur will be tar-
nished”). See generally Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335 (1816) 
(noting that cases affecting ambassadors “affect not only our internal policy, but our 
foreign relations”). 
191 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136. 
192 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 671 (1993); see also Merriam Web-
ster’s Collegiate Dictionary 323 (10th ed. 1993) (defining “dignity” as, inter alia, “the 
quality or state of being worthy, honored or esteemed,” and “high rank, office, or po-
sition”). According to a contemporaneous dictionary, the term “dignity” had much 
the same meaning in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that it has to-
day. See 2 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (London, Longi-
nan Hurst, Rees & Orme, 9th ed. 1805) (unpaginated) (defining dignity as “rank of 
elevation,” “[g]randeur of mien; elevation of aspect,” and “[a]dvancement; prefer-
ment; high place”). 
193 The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia 1615–16 (New York, Century Co. 1899). 
194 To be sure, in the early cases the Court often used the term “dignity” to describe 
an attribute of an individual sovereign, such as a king or emperor. One could plausi-
bly argue, therefore, that the term, which was used in that context to refer to the 
“quality of being worthy or honourable,” The New Shorter Oxford English Diction-
ary 671 (1993), is inapposite when referring to an incorporeal sovereign entity. In-
deed, many casual readers of the Court’s recent state sovereign immunity decisions 
likely have had precisely that reaction, and the dissenting Justices have often made 
that point. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1881 
(2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The reasons why the majority in Chisholm con-
cluded that the ‘dignity’ interests underlying the sovereign immunity of English Mon-
archs had not been inherited by the original 13 States remain valid today.”); Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 802–03 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for 
“assum[ing] that this ‘dignity’ is a quality easily translated from the person of the King 
to the participatory abstraction of a republican State”). 
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To be sure, to deny the forum nation jurisdiction over a foreign 
state when an official or instrumentality of the latter enters the 
former’s territory is to permit some diminution of the forum na-
tion’s sovereignty. The Court in The Schooner Exchange addressed 
that problem by finding, in the absence of a legislative indication to 
the contrary, an implied exemption for the foreign sovereign from 
the forum sovereign’s jurisdiction. But precisely because of the 
need to preserve the equal status of the forum sovereign, the Court 
made clear that this immunity is merely a background principle of 
the law of nations, subject to abrogation by an explicit act of Con-
 
This critique is valid as far as it goes; Justice Souter surely is correct to argue that 
the notion of “‘royal dignity,’” which (according to Blackstone) served to “‘distin-
guish the prince from his subjects’” and signified the monarch’s “great and transcen-
dent nature,” is wholly “inimical to the republican conception, which rests on the un-
derstanding of its citizens precisely that the government is not above them, but of 
them, its actions being governed by law just like their own.” Id. at 802 (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (quoting 1 Blackstone, supra note 124, at *241). But Chief Justice Marshall 
(and subsequent voices on the Court) did not purport to limit the notion of sovereign 
dignity to monarchs. See, e.g, Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1943) 
(“This case involves the dignity and rights of a friendly sovereign state . . . .”); United 
States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 524 (1875) (“One nation treats with the citizens of 
another only through their government. A sovereign cannot be sued in his own courts 
without his consent. His own dignity, as well as the dignity of the nation he represents, 
prevents his appearance to answer a suit against him in the courts of another sover-
eignty, except in performance of his obligations, by treaty or otherwise, voluntarily 
assumed.”). In The Schooner Exchange itself, the Court spoke of the “dignity and the 
independence of a nation,” and the Court has often referred to the sovereign dignity 
of the United States, which surely does not vest sovereign authority in any one indi-
vidual. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 145 (emphasis added); see, e.g., United States v. Bank of 
N.Y. & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 480–81 (1936); Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 
169, 178 (1903); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 220 (1901) (McKenna, J., dissenting) 
(“All powers of government, placed in harmony under the Constitution; the rights 
and liberties of every citizen secured—put to no hazard of loss or impairment; the 
power of the nation also secured in its great station, enabled to move with strength 
and dignity and effect among the other nations of the earth to such purpose as it may 
undertake or to such destiny as it may be called.”). Similarly, when Secretary of State 
Thomas Jefferson famously sought an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court on 
various matters arising under “the laws of nature and nations,” Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson, Secretary of State, to Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices (July 18, 
1793), in 3 The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 486, 486 (Henry P. 
Johnston ed., Burt Franklin 1970) (1890–93), the Justices responded by acknowledg-
ing the importance of the questions “to the preservation of the rights, peace, and dig-
nity of the United States,” but declined to decide them because of the separation of 
powers. Letter from Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices to President Washington 
(Aug. 8, 1793), in 3 The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, supra, at 488, 
488–89 (emphasis added). 
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gress. As Chief Justice Marshall explained, “[w]ithout doubt, the 
sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this implica-
tion . . . .”195 But, because in the arena of foreign relations the 
courts’ role is necessarily limited,196 the Court made clear that it 
would not lightly infer congressional intent to extend jurisdiction 
over foreign nations: “until such power be exerted in a manner not 
to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be considered as having 
imparted to the ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction, which it would be 
a breach of faith to exercise.”197 
In other words, Congress has power to override a background 
principle of the law of nations; but given the judiciary’s limited role 
in foreign relations and the damage to harmonious relations that 
likely would result from a judicial declaration that a foreign nation 
is amenable to suit, the courts will refrain from questioning the 
immunity of foreign nations without a clear statement from Con-
gress. Chief Justice Marshall explained that this principle of judi-
cial non-intervention in matters of foreign affairs recognizes the— 
general inability of the judicial power to enforce its decisions in 
cases of this description, from the consideration, that the sover-
eign power of the nation is alone competent to avenge wrongs 
committed by a sovereign, that the questions to which such 
 
195 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146. 
196 The Constitution vests control over foreign relations in Congress and the Presi-
dent, not the courts. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427–28 
(1964); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (“Governmental power 
over internal affairs is distributed between the national government and the several 
states. Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested ex-
clusively in the national government.”); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 
299 U.S. 304, 320–22 (1936). Congress has the power, among other things, to “declare 
War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on 
Land and Water,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; to “raise and support Armies,” id. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 12; to “provide and maintain a Navy,” id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13; to “regulate com-
merce with foreign Nations,” id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; and to “lay and collect . . . Duties, 
Imports and Excises,” id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The President “shall be Commander in Chief 
of the Army and Navy of the United States,” id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, and has the power 
(subject to Senate confirmation) to “make Treaties” and “nominate . . . [and] appoint 
Ambassadors [and] other public Ministers and Consuls,” id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. This con-
stitutional allocation of authority is intended in part to ensure that the courts do not 
“imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations.” 
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918). 
197 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146. 
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wrongs give birth are rather questions of policy than of law, that 
they are for diplomatic, rather than legal discussion . . . .198 
The courts’ refusal to entertain a suit against a foreign sovereign 
absent an explicit conferral of jurisdiction from Congress is one 
manifestation of the “political question” doctrine.199 
 
198 Id. 
199 As Professor Laurence Tribe has explained, the political question “doctrine” is 
really a collection of distinct theories about the role of the Court “with regard to the 
other branches of the government.” Tribe, supra note 52, § 3-13, at 366. Under the 
“doctrine,” the Court declines to adjudicate a matter that is more properly left for de-
cision by the political branches. According to Justice Brennan: 
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the set-
tings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although 
each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the 
separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a 
political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment 
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discover-
able and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discre-
tion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution with-
out expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or 
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements 
by various departments on one question. 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
The Court has long treated many questions implicating U.S. relations with foreign 
nations as akin to political questions, not amenable to judicial resolution, at least ab-
sent authorization from Congress. See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 
Wheat.) 610, 634 (1818) (noting that when a foreign nation is in the midst of civil war, 
questions regarding which faction constitutes the nation’s legitimate government “are 
generally rather political than legal in their character. They belong more properly to 
those . . . who can place the nation in such a position with respect to foreign powers as 
to their own judgment shall appear wise; to whom are entrusted all its foreign rela-
tions . . . .”); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815) (stating that when and 
how to retaliate against a foreign nation “is for the consideration of the government 
not of its Courts”); Armitz Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128–29 
(1814) (“When war breaks out, the question, what shall be done with enemy property 
in our country, is a question rather of policy than of law. The rule which we apply to 
the property of our enemy, will be applied by him to the property of our citizens. Like 
all other questions of policy it is proper for the consideration of a department which 
can modify it at will; and for the consideration of a department which can pursue only 
the law as it is written. It is proper for the consideration of the legislature, not of the 
executive or judiciary.”).  
The act of state doctrine, which holds that because “[e]very sovereign state is bound 
to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, . . . the courts of one 
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within 
its own territory,” is another variant of the political question doctrine in the context of 
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This principle of judicial nonintervention in cases involving for-
eign states’ sovereign immunity sheds light on the Court’s refer-
ences to sovereign dignity. Because Congress (the “sovereign 
power of the nation”) has authority to open the courts to suits 
against foreign nations, it follows that sovereign dignity (in the 
meaning of the law of nations) is not necessarily (or at least not 
impermissibly) offended by suit in another sovereign’s courts. 
Rather, the Court made a slightly more subtle point: The “perfect 
equality and absolute independence of sovereigns”—that is to say, 
the equal dignity of distinct sovereignties—requires that an asser-
tion of jurisdiction by one sovereign over another be made by the 
“sovereign power of the nation [that] is alone competent” to do 
so.200 In the United States, because such power does not rest in the 
courts, but rather is vested in the political branches,201 it would be 
inconsistent with the sovereign status of a foreign state—and thus 
 
foreign relations. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); see id. (“Redress 
of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be 
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.”); see also First Nat’l City 
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972) (plurality opinion) (stating 
that both the act of state and foreign state sovereign immunity doctrines are “judi-
cially created to effectuate general notions of comity among nations and among the 
respective branches of the Federal Government”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (“[The act of state doctrine] arises out of the basic 
relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of pow-
ers . . . . The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the 
Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign 
acts of state may hinder rather than further this country’s pursuit of goals both for it-
self and for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere.”). 
200 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 137, 146. 
201 In The Schooner Exchange, Attorney General Pinkney, appearing for the United 
States, urged that “the executive department . . . alone represents the sovereignty of 
the nation in its intercourse with other nations.” Id. at 132. In Armitz Brown, how-
ever, the Court suggested that the exercise of sovereign prerogatives “is proper for 
the consideration of the legislature, not of the executive or judiciary.” 12 U.S. (8 
Cranch) at 129. The Court today finds the question a bit more complicated. Compare 
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. at 768 (plurality opinion) (concluding that “where 
the Executive Branch, charged as it is with primary responsibility for the conduct of 
foreign affairs, expressly represents to the Court that application of the act of state 
doctrine would not advance the interests of American foreign policy, that doctrine 
should not be applied by the courts”), with id. at 787–88 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that a statement from the Executive Branch is insufficient to confer jurisdiction 
over a foreign state for an act of that state within its territory). 
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degrading to its dignity—for a court to assert jurisdiction over it 
without permission from Congress.202 
3. The Schooner Exchange’s Legacy 
The Court has consistently adhered to The Schooner Exchange 
Court’s understanding of the meaning of sovereign dignity in the 
foreign state sovereign immunity context.203 Moreover, although 
the Court in The Schooner Exchange announced a cautious rule of 
construction for deciding whether Congress has intended to confer 
jurisdiction over foreign states,204 its suggestion that Congress pos-
sesses the power to override the law of nations (as long as it speaks 
unmistakably) has been confirmed by an unbroken line of subse-
quent precedent.205 Of particular importance here, the Court has 
 
202 The Court has suggested that to do so would also be degrading to the political 
branches of the United States. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209 (1882) 
(“[T]he judicial department of this government follows the action of the political 
branch, and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.”). 
203 See, e.g., Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943) (“[T]he judicial sei-
zure of a vessel of a friendly foreign state is so serious a challenge to its dignity, and 
may so affect our friendly relations with it, that courts are required to accept and fol-
low the executive determination that the vessel is immune.”); The Santissima Trini-
dad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 354 (1822) (noting the “general proposition” that “all 
persons and property within the territorial jurisdiction of a sovereign, are amenable to 
the jurisdiction of himself or his Courts: and that the exceptions to this rule are such 
only as by common usage, and public policy, have been allowed, in order to preserve 
the peace and harmony of nations, and to regulate their intercourse in a manner best 
suited to their dignity and rights”); L’Invincible, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 238, 256 (1816) 
(holding that if a district court could exercise jurisdiction over libel claim for seized 
French private armed ship, “it would have detracted from the dignity and equality of 
sovereign states, by reducing one to the condition of a suitor in the courts of an-
other”) (emphasis added). 
204 In Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, Chief Justice Marshall first an-
nounced the basic principle that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to 
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.” 6 U.S. (2 
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). See generally Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International 
Law As a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 1103, 1135–52 
(1990) (describing The Schooner Charming Betsy and the important implications of its 
holding). In The Schooner Exchange, the Court applied this canon of construction to a 
foreign state’s sovereign immunity under the law of nations. See 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 
135–36. 
205 See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 610–11 (1992); Argen-
tine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1989); Verlin-
den B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486, 493–98 (1983) (holding that Con-
gress had authority to pass the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: “[F]oreign 
sovereign immunity is a matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States, 
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recognized Congress’s authority to abrogate foreign states’ law-of-
nations sovereign immunity. 
Although the Court acknowledged at least as long ago as The 
Schooner Exchange that Congress possesses authority to subject 
foreign states to suit in courts in the United States, Congress did 
not exercise that power until 1976. Indeed, until at least the early 
twentieth century, Congress’s silence led to the general conclusion 
that the sovereign immunity of foreign states was without excep-
tion. As trade and other commercial activities increased after the 
turn of the century—both among states and between states and 
private parties—however, persons aggrieved by the conduct of for-
eign states began to argue that those states should not enjoy im-
munity for that activity.206 In 1926, the Supreme Court rejected this 
argument, reaffirming that, in the absence of a contrary indication 
from Congress, a foreign state and its property are immune from 
 
and not a restriction imposed by the Constitution.”); Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 
271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926) (“The decision in The Exchange . . . cannot be taken as ex-
cluding merchant ships held and used by a government from the principles there an-
nounced. On the contrary, if such ships come within those principles, they must be 
held to have the same immunity as war ships, in the absence of a treaty or statute of the 
United States evincing a different purpose.”) (emphasis added); The Marianna Flora, 
24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 40 (1826) (stating that although congressional departures from 
the law of nations may adversely affect foreign relations, “whatever may be the re-
sponsibility incurred by the nation to foreign powers, in executing such laws, there can 
be no doubt, that Courts of justice are bound to obey and administer them”); La 
Amistad de Rues, 18 U.S. 385, 389–91 (1820) (noting that the “general law of nations” 
provides that “whenever a capture is made by any belligerent in violation of our neu-
trality, if the prize come voluntarily within our jurisdiction, it shall be restored to the 
original owners . . . . Until Congress shall choose to prescribe a different rule, this 
Court will, in cases of this nature, confine itself to the exercise of the simple authority 
to decree restitution, and decline all inquires into question of damages for asserted 
wrongs”); see also Louis Henkin, International Law As Law in the United States, 82 
Mich. L. Rev. 1555, 1568 (1984) (“[E]very State has the power—I do not say the legal 
right—to denounce or breach its treaties, or to violate obligations of customary inter-
national law. The Constitution does not allude to such power, but it is inconceivable 
that the Constitution intended to make it impossible or impermissible—
unconstitutional—for the United States to violate a treaty or other international obli-
gation.”). 
206 See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States ch. 5, 
subch. A, Intro. Note, at 391 (1987). Most of the arguments for an exception to the 
general rule of immunity were based on the assertion that “immunity deprived private 
parties that dealt with a state of their judicial remedies, and gave states an unfair ad-
vantage in competition with private commercial enterprise.” Id. 
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the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in all cases.207 During that same year, 
however, some European and other nations signed an international 
agreement declaring that state-owned merchant vessels, and the 
nations that owned them, were subject to suit under the same rules 
of liability as similarly situated private parties.208 
After the Second World War demonstrated some of the defects 
of a system built on the absolute immunity of sovereign states, 
momentum developed to apply a “restrictive” principle of immu-
nity, which would deny immunity at least for suits arising out of 
commercial transactions.209 In the 1950s, the U.S. Department of 
State adopted the restrictive theory of foreign state sovereign im-
munity, and made “suggestions” of immunity to U.S. courts based 
on that theory.210 In order to provide clearer standards for the rec-
 
207 See Berizzi Brothers, 271 U.S. at 576. Berizzi Brothers involved the question 
“whether a ship owned and possessed by a foreign government, and operated by it in 
the carriage of merchandise for hire, is immune from arrest under process based on a 
libel in rem by a private suitor in a federal district court exercising admiralty jurisdic-
tion.” Id. at 570. The Court noted that The Schooner Exchange had involved an 
armed vessel of a foreign nation, as opposed to a commercial vessel, but concluded 
that— 
the principles are applicable alike to all ships held and used by a government 
for a public purpose, and that when, for the purpose of advancing the trade of 
its people or providing revenue for its treasury, a government acquires, mans 
and operates ships in the carrying trade, they are public ships in the same sense 
that war ships are. 
Id. at 574. The Court made clear, however, that it would reach a different conclusion 
if there were “a treaty or statute of the United States evincing a different purpose.” 
Id. 
208 See Convention for the Verification of Certain Rules Relating to the Immunity of 
State-owned Vessels, April 10, 1926, art. I, 176 L.N.T.S. 199; Restatement (Third) of 
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States ch. 5, subch. A, Intro. Note at 391 
(1987) (citing 2 Hackworth Digest of International Law 463 (1941)). 
209 See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States ch. 5, 
subch. A, Intro. Note, at 391–92 (1987). 
210 The Executive Branch’s practice of urging the courts to grant immunity to foreign 
sovereigns began at least as early as The Schooner Exchange, in which the Attorney 
General urged the Court to recognize France’s immunity. See The Schooner Ex-
change, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 117–18. In 1943, the Court ruled in Ex Parte Republic of 
Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943), that “courts are required to accept and follow” such a sug-
gestion of immunity by the Executive, to avoid “embarrass[ing] the latter by assuming 
an antagonistic jurisdiction.” Id. at 588 (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209 
(1882)); see also Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (“[It is a] 
guiding principle in determining [a court’s] . . . jurisdiction . . . that the courts should 
not so act as to embarrass the executive arm.”). In 1952, Jack B. Tate, the Acting Le-
gal Adviser of the Department of State, set forth the Department’s adoption of the 
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ognition of foreign state sovereign immunity,211 Congress in 1976 
passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which codified the 
restrictive theory of immunity.212 
The Act confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts over 
civil actions against foreign states,213 and abrogates immunity under 
various circumstances, including when the challenged conduct is 
“commercial” rather than public.214 The Act is vague on certain im-
portant points—including what constitutes commercial activity215—
but for our purposes the particulars of practice under the Act are 
less crucial than the principle demonstrated by the Act: Congress 
can—at least as a matter of U.S. law216—regulate and abrogate the 
immunity to which foreign states are otherwise entitled in U.S. 
courts, their sovereign dignity notwithstanding. The Supreme Court 
expressly held as much when it upheld the constitutionality of the 
Act.217 
 
restrictive theory of immunity in a letter to the Acting Attorney General. See Alfred 
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711–15 (1976) (quoting 
Jack B. Tate, Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to 
Foreign Governments, 26 Dep’t St. Bull. 984, 985 (1952)). The quoted statement, 
which came to be known as the “Tate Letter,” served as the basis for suggestions of 
immunity until the 1970s. See Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law 
353 (2d ed. 1993). 
211 See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2000) (“Claims of foreign states to immunity should hence-
forth be decided by courts of the United States and of the States in conformity with 
the principles set forth in this chapter.”). 
212 Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 
1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–1611 (2000)). 
213 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2000). 
214 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000). The Act makes immunity the default, subject to 
the exceptions identified in the Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000) (“Subject to existing 
international agreements to which the United States is a party at the time of enact-
ment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of 
the United States and of the States except as provided [in the Act].”). 
215 See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2000) (“A ‘commercial activity’ means either a regular 
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The 
commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of 
the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its 
purpose.”). 
216 It is an open question whether international law—in the sense of a body of laws 
to which all sovereign nations are subject—permits one nation to abrogate the immu-
nity of another nation. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act—like the decision in 
The Schooner Exchange—must be viewed ultimately as U.S. law, albeit the United 
States’ interpretation of international law. 
217 See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491–97 (1983). Profes-
sor James Pfander and then-Professor Antonin Scalia have suggested that, under the 
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III. DOCTRINAL INTERMINGLING 
The concept of state dignity thus has a well-established meaning 
in the context of foreign state sovereign immunity. The Court’s re-
cent reliance on state dignity as a basis for decision in its state sov-
ereign immunity cases can plausibly be seen as drawing on the for-
eign state sovereign immunity cases. In fact, the Court’s recent 
state sovereign immunity cases are not novel in their references to 
state dignity, although their suggestion that the states’ dignity is the 
primary justification for the states’ broad immunity is new. During 
the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court peri-
odically referred to the states’ dignity in state sovereign immunity 
cases. In addition, in that period the Court occasionally made ex-
plicit, albeit cryptic, references in its state sovereign immunity deci-
sions to customary international law. A review of the cases reveals 
that reliance on the state dignity rationale has tended to coincide 
with broader efforts by the Court to restrict federal power in the 
 
American conception of the law of nations at the time of the framing, a sovereign’s 
immunity from suit in another sovereign’s courts was not defeasible by the forum sov-
ereign. See Pfander, supra note 135, at 582 n.102; Scalia, supra note 139, at 886. Both 
draw this conclusion from Nathan v. Virginia, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 77 (Pa. C.P. 1781). 
As the discussion above makes clear, The Schooner Exchange and its progeny ap-
pear to refute this claim. See 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146 (“Without doubt, the sover-
eign of the place is capable of destroying this implication [of immunity].”); see also 
supra notes 176–202 and accompanying text. Regardless of the understanding of the 
law of nations elsewhere, the U.S. courts’ interpretation of the law of nations has been 
consistently clear on the authority of the legislature to permit suits in its own courts 
against foreign sovereigns. See Clark, supra note 166, at 1283 (“Because the law of 
nations did not appear to consist of sovereign commands, the courts of one sovereign 
had no authority to bind those of another as to the proper content of that law. Rather, 
the courts of each sovereign considered themselves free to exercise independent 
judgment in cases arising under the law of nations.”). As explained above, although it 
surely is correct that courts would not entertain an action by an individual against a 
foreign sovereign without a clear statement from the legislature abrogating immunity, 
the U.S. courts’ interpretation of the law of nations is quite clear on the authority of 
the legislature to permit such suits. Professor Pfander presumably would have no 
quibble with the bottom line—that Congress can subject the states to suit in federal 
court—because he concludes that the Original Jurisdiction Clause of the Constitution, 
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, amounted to a constitutional abrogation of the states’ 
law-of-nations immunity. See Pfander, supra note 135, at 558–62. Justice Scalia, how-
ever, has argued that the states’ law-of-nations immunity survived the framing. See 
Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (“[T]he States entered 
the federal system with their sovereignty intact . . . .”). This makes his (I think errone-
ous) view about the absolute nature of law-of-nations immunity all the more prob-
lematic. See infra notes 403–04 and accompanying text. 
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name of state autonomy; the current focus on state dignity is con-
sistent with that trend. 
A. The Early Cases: Evaluating the Pathology 
The case most consistently cited by the modern Court for the 
proposition that “[t]he very object and purpose of the 11th 
Amendment were to prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to 
the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private 
parties” is In re Ayers,218 which the Court decided in 1887. Judicial 
invocations of state dignity in this context in fact date back at least 
to 1857, when the Court decided Beers v. Arkansas.219 But for the 
first sixty-five years after the ratification, the Court either es-
chewed or affirmatively rejected arguments based on state dignity 
in its state sovereign immunity decisions. 
1. Chisholm v. Georgia 
Any consideration of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity 
must begin with the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. 
Georgia.220 The suit arose out of a contract for war supplies be-
tween a South Carolina merchant and the State of Georgia. The 
merchant’s executor sued Georgia in the United States Supreme 
Court, invoking Article III’s grant of original jurisdiction to that 
Court over “Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of an-
other State.”221 Georgia “presented to the Court a written remon-
strance and protestation . . . against the exercise of jurisdiction in 
the cause,” but “declined taking any part in arguing the question” 
before the Court.222 Accordingly, the Court heard only from Edmund 
Randolph, one of the Framers of the Constitution, the Attorney 
General of the United States, and counsel for the plaintiff. Because 
of Randolph’s role in the framing—and because the ink on the 
 
218 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887) (emphasis added). 
219 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857). 
220 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
221 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 cl. 1; Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 450 (opinion of Blair, 
J.). 
222 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419. The remonstrance was actually a resolution that 
the Georgia House of Representatives passed after Chisholm filed his suit in the Su-
preme Court. See 5 Documentary History of the Supreme Court 132 (Maeva Marcus 
ed., 1994). 
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Constitution had not yet dried when the Court heard argument in 
Chisholm—his argument to the Court merits thorough considera-
tion here. 
Randolph’s argument that a state was subject to a damages ac-
tion in federal court turned principally on the language of Article 
III,223 which appeared plainly to embrace disputes to which a state 
was a party. But for support, Randolph relied on “the relation in 
which the States stand to the Federal Government,”224 on the “law 
of nations, on the subject of suing sovereigns,”225 and on the fact 
that there would not be any “embarrassment attending the mode 
of executing a decree against a State.”226 In other words, Randolph 
argued that the novel American theory of sovereignty left no place 
for “sovereign immunity”; that, in any event, the practice in other 
nations was to permit certain suits against the sovereign; and that 
the nature of the Union depended on the states heeding the judg-
ments of the Supreme Court. 
As to the first point, Randolph maintained that the states simply 
did not enjoy the status of full sovereigns. Under the Constitution, 
power was derived from the people: the “States are in fact assem-
blages of these individuals who are liable to process. The limita-
tions, which the Federal Government is admitted to impose upon 
their powers, are diminutions of sovereignty, at least equal to the 
making of them defendants.”227 As to the second point, Randolph 
insisted that the practices in other nations demonstrated two 
things. First, sovereign nations were not subject to suit in their own 
courts without their consent;228 but the only relevant entity with the 
status of “nation” (and thus sovereign immunity) was the United 
States—the “head of [the] confederacy”—as opposed to the 
states—its “inferior members.”229 Accordingly, the United States 
 
223 Article III, § 2 provides in relevant part: 
The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies between two or more 
States; – between a State and Citizens of another State; . . . and between a State, 
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 




228 Id. at 425. 
229 Id. 
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could not involuntarily be subjected to suit in its own courts.230 Sec-
ond, Randolph argued that the appropriate analogy for suits 
against the states was the practice in other nations that took the 
form of union or confederation, and that in those systems, the 
courts of the union generally could hear disputes against its mem-
bers.231 
As Professor Laurence Tribe has noted, the “precise holding of 
Chisholm is obscured by the fact that each Justice in the majority 
wrote his own opinion.”232 Chief Justice Jay and Justices Blair, 
Cushing, and Wilson agreed that Georgia was amenable to suit. 
Justice Iredell dissented, ostensibly on the ground that the Judici-
ary Act of 1789 did not authorize the Supreme Court to hear such 
suits.233 The four Justices in the majority relied chiefly on the plain 
language of Article III and Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789.234 The Justices rejected Georgia’s apparent argument that the 
 
230 Id. Randolph acknowledged the English common-law practices of “petitions of 
right, monstrans de droit, and . . . process in the Exchequer,” but explained that these 
devices were “widely remote from an involuntary subjection” to suit. Id. (second em-
phasis added). 
231 Id. at 424–25 (describing practice in the “Germanic Empire,” where “both the 
Imperial Chamber, and the Aulic Council hear and determine the complaints of indi-
viduals against the Princes”) (emphasis omitted). It is clear from Randolph’s argu-
ment here that, in referring to the “law of nations,” he was describing not what we to-
day call customary international law but rather the domestic law of other nations. As 
to that issue, Randolph noted that there was some question “whether one Prince 
found within the territory of another, may be sued for a contract,” but asserted that 
“where the effects, or property, of one Prince are rested in the dominions of another, 
the proprietor Prince may be summoned before a tribunal of that other.” Id. at 425 
(emphasis omitted). In any event, Randolph argued that although “each State has its 
separate territory, in one sense, the whole is that of the United States, in another. The 
jurisdiction of this Court reaches to Georgia, as well as to Philadelphia.” Id. (empha-
sis omitted). 
232 Tribe, supra note 52, § 3-25, at 521. 
233 Justice Iredell’s principal argument was that Congress gave the Supreme Court 
remedial powers according to “the principles and usages of law,” and that common-
law sovereign immunity was one such general principle of law. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) at 434–36 (opinion of Iredell, J.). Justice Iredell did, however, opine, in what he 
readily confessed was dicta, that the Constitution did not authorize Congress to abro-
gate the states’ sovereign immunity. Id. at 449–50. 
234 Section 13 provided: 
[T]he Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a 
civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its citizens; and 
except also between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which latter 
case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction. 
Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80 (1789). 
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Court should read those provisions narrowly to accommodate the 
state’s sovereignty, concluding instead that, whatever immunity 
from suit full sovereign nations enjoy, the constitutional plan nec-
essarily deprived the American states of sovereignty in the custom-
ary sense of that word under the law of nations. 
For example, Justice Wilson, in a strongly pronationalist opin-
ion, expressly declared that the immunity of sovereigns under the 
law of nations was inapposite because the American states were 
not co-equal sovereigns with the United States or with other na-
tions of the world: “As to the purposes of the Union, . . . Georgia is 
NOT a sovereign State”;235 therefore, “[f]rom the law of nations lit-
tle or no illustration of this subject can be expected. By that law the 
several States and Governments spread over our globe, are consid-
ered as forming a society, not a NATION.”236 Justice Blair made 
the same point in his separate opinion.237 And although Justice Ire-
dell thought that the “Conventional Law of Nations” was applica-
ble to the case as a background principle, he found Randolph’s 
comparisons to the practices in other confederations inapposite, 
 
The majority Justices rejected Georgia’s apparent argument that the language of 
Article III and the Judiciary Act should be construed to confer jurisdiction only when 
a state was a plaintiff, and not when a state was a defendant. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) at 450 (opinion of Blair, J.) (“A dispute between A. and B. is surely a dispute 
between B. and A. Both cases, I have no doubt, were intended . . . .”); id. at 466 (opin-
ion of Wilson, J.) (“Causes, and not parties to causes, are weighed by justice, in her 
equal scales: On the former solely, her attention is fixed: To the latter, she is, as she is 
painted, blind.”) (emphasis omitted); id. at 467 (opinion of Cushing, J.) (“It may be 
suggested that it could not be intended to subject a State to be a Defendant, because 
it would effect the sovereignty of States. If that be the case, what shall we do with the 
immediate preceding clause; ‘controversies between two or more States,’ where a 
State must of necessity be Defendant?”) (emphasis omitted); id. at 476 (opinion of 
Jay, C.J.) (“If the Constitution really meant to extend these powers only to those con-
troversies in which a State might be Plaintiff, to the exclusion of those in which citi-
zens had demands against a State, it is inconceivable that it should have attempted to 
convey that meaning in words, not only so incompetent, but also repugnant to 
it . . . .”) (emphasis omitted). 
235 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 457 (opinion of Wilson, J.). 
236 Id. at 453 (opinion of Wilson, J.). 
237 See id. at 452 (opinion of Blair, J.) (“When sovereigns are sued in their own 
Courts, such a method [that is, proceeding by petition only upon consent of the sover-
eign] may have been established as the most respectful form of demand; but we are 
not now in a State-Court; and if sovereignty be an exemption from suit in any other 
than the sovereign’s own Courts, it follows that when a State, by adopting the Consti-
tution, has agreed to be amenable to the judicial power of the United States, she has, 
in that respect, given up her right of sovereignty.”) (emphasis omitted). 
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reasoning that “unquestionably the people of the United States 
had a right to form what kind of union, and upon what terms they 
pleased, without reference to any former examples.”238 He accord-
ingly did not rest his conclusion that Georgia was not amenable to 
suit on principles of customary international law. 
To the extent that dignity was a relevant consideration in the de-
cision, the Justices seemed principally concerned with the dignity 
of the people. Justice Wilson, for example, elaborated on his view 
of the novel American idea of popular sovereignty by explaining 
that “[a] State; useful and valuable as the contrivance is, is the infe-
rior contrivance of man; and from his native dignity derives all its 
acquired importance.”239 Chief Justice Jay made a similar point, “It 
is remarkable that in establishing [the Constitution], the people ex-
ercised their own rights, and their own proper sovereignty, and 
conscious of the plenitude of it, they declared with becoming dig-
nity, ‘We the people of the United States, do ordain and establish 
this Constitution.’”240 
This is not to say that the notion of state dignity was entirely for-
eign to the Court. Justice Blair acknowledged, for example, that 
securing the state’s appearance before the Court was a delicate 
matter, and he observed that “[a] judgment by default, in the pre-
sent stage of the business, and writ of enquiry of damages, would 
be too precipitate in any case, and too incompatible with the dig-
nity of a State in this.”241 But other than Justice Blair’s understand-
able concern that Georgia have an adequate opportunity to defend 
 
238 Id. at 449 (opinion of Iredell, J.). Justices Blair and Cushing agreed with this in-
terpretive approach. See id. at 450 (opinion of Blair, J.) (“The Constitution of the 
United States is the only fountain from which I shall draw.”) (emphasis omitted); id. 
at 466 (opinion of Cushing, J.) (“The point turns not upon the law or practice of Eng-
land . . . nor upon the law of any other country whatever; but upon the Constitution 
established by the people of the United States.”) (emphasis omitted). 
239 Id. at 455 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 456 (opinion of 
Wilson, J.) (“If the dignity of each [man] singly is undiminished; the dignity of all jointly 
must be unimpaired. A State, like a merchant, makes a contract. A dishonest State, like 
a dishonest merchant, wilfully refuses to discharge it: The latter is amenable to a Court 
of Justice: Upon general principles of right, shall the former when summoned to answer 
the fair demands of its creditor, be permitted, proteus-like, to assume a new appearance, 
and to insult him and justice, by declaring I am a SOVEREIGN State? Surely not.”). 
240 Id. at 470–71 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (emphasis omitted). 
241 Id. at 452–53 (opinion of Blair, J.) (emphasis added). He thought it better first to 
“warn the State of the meditated consequence of a refusal to appear.” Id. at 453 
(opinion of Blair, J.). 
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the merits of the suit, the Justices were not particularly receptive to 
the position of the Georgia legislature that only immunity from 
Chisholm’s suit was consistent with the state’s sovereign dignity.242 
The majority Justices’ hostility to Georgia’s argument stemmed 
from their views on the contrast between the American and Eng-
lish conceptions of sovereignty. Justice Wilson described the feudal 
origins of the English common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
which vested in the King “jurisdiction over others,” but “excluded 
all others from jurisdiction over him. With regard to him, there was 
no superior power; and, consequently, on feudal principles, no 
right of jurisdiction.”243 Justice Wilson recognized that this doctrine, 
which relied for its force on the notion that the King enjoyed com-
plete “superiority of power,”244 was a particularly unappealing 
analogy for a doctrine in the United States— 
Suffice it, at present to say, that another principle, very different 
in its nature and operations, forms, in my judgment, the basis of 
sound and genuine jurisprudence; laws derived from the pure 
source of equality and justice must be founded on the 
CONSENT of those, whose obedience they require. The sover-
eign, when traced to his source, must be found in the man.245 
 
242 See, e.g., id. at 450–51 (opinion of Blair, J.) (responding to argument that the 
“dignity of a State” requires interpretation of the federal courts’ jurisdictional grant 
over controversies between a state and citizens of another state to be limited to cases 
in which the state is a plaintiff); id. at 472 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (“Will it be said, that 
the fifty odd thousand citizens in Delaware being associated under a State Govern-
ment, stand in a rank superior to the forty odd thousand of Philadelphia, associated 
under their charter, that although it may become the latter to meet an individual on 
an equal footing in a Court of Justice, yet that such a procedure would not comport 
with the dignity of the former?”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 423 (statement of 
E. Randolph) (responding to argument that executing a decree against the state 
would result in “embarrassment”); id. at 425 (statement of E. Randolph) (denying 
that there would be any “degradation” of Georgia’s sovereignty to “submit to the Su-
preme Judiciary of the United States”) (emphasis omitted). 
243 Id. at 458 (opinion of Wilson, J.). As Justice Iredell explained, a remedy was 
available against the King only upon his permission, “[t]he remedy, in the language of 
Blackstone, being a matter of grace, and not on compulsion.” Id. at 444 (opinion of 
Iredell, J.) (emphasis omitted). 
244 Id. at 458 (opinion of Wilson, J.). 
245 Id. (opinion of Wilson, J.); see also id. at 471 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (emphasis 
omitted) (“No such ideas obtain here; at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on 
the people . . . .”). 
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Chief Justice Jay echoed this conception of government power, 
noting that whereas in Europe the “Princes have personal powers, 
dignities, and pre-eminences, our rulers have none but official; nor 
do they partake in the sovereignty otherwise, or in any other ca-
pacity, than as private citizens.”246 To the Chisholm Justices, the 
concept of state sovereign dignity was alien to the founding princi-
ple of popular sovereignty. 
It is now familiar—and undisputed—history that the Chisholm 
decision prompted the proposal and ratification of the Eleventh 
Amendment.247 But that simple statement of historical fact is per-
haps the only point of agreement between the Supreme Court’s 
current majority of five on state sovereign immunity matters and 
 
246 Id. at 472 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (emphasis omitted). Chief Justice Jay’s observa-
tion is particularly significant, for our purposes, for its use of the term “dignities” in its 
specific legal sense. “A dignity, in the English law, is the right to bear a title of nobil-
ity or honor.” Stewart Rapalje & Robert L. Lawrence, A Dictionary of American and 
English Law 388 (N.J., Frederick D. Linn & Co. 1883). “Dignities are either for life, 
such as knighthood, or of inheritance, such as baronetcies and ordinary peerages.” Id. 
“Dignities” are “a species of incorporeal hereditaments, in which a person may have a 
property or estate.” Alexander M. Burrill, A New Law Dictionary & Glossary 377 
(N.Y., John S. Voorhies 1850). Such titles are flatly inconsistent with the American 
conception of sovereignty, and they accordingly are expressly prohibited by the Con-
stitution. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the 
United States; And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, 
without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or 
Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”); id. art. I, § 10, 
cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . grant any Title of Nobility.”); see also John Bouvier, Law 
Dictionary 531 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1886) (“Dignities. In English 
Law. Titles of honor. They are considered as incorporeal hereditaments. The genius 
of our government forbids their admission into the republic.”). 
The Court recognized this particular meaning of the term in other early decisions. 
See, e.g., Cassell v. Carroll, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 134, 153–56 n.(a) (1826) (“[T]he king 
cannot devise the lands and revenues allotted for the support of his royal dignity . . . . 
Anciently, when the king made a duke, and gave possessions to him, they were so an-
nexed to the dignity as not to be transferrable without a preceding act of Parlia-
ment. . . . [I]f the king creates a duke, and gives him 20 pounds a year for the mainte-
nance of his dignity, he cannot give it to another, because it is not incident to his 
dignity. Many things, of a special nature, are unalienable. Dignities are so, because 
they are personal, and in the blood.”). 
247 See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (“[Chisholm] created such a 
shock of surprise throughout the country that, at the first meeting of Congress there-
after, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution was almost unanimously pro-
posed, and was in due course adopted by the legislatures of the States.”); William A. 
Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 
56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1261, 1264–75 (1989); Nelson, supra note 20, at 1602–08. 
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its four dissenters. Indeed, much of the current debate on the 
Court about state sovereign immunity doctrine is over the correct-
ness of the Chisholm Justices’ conceptions of the nature of sover-
eignty and their interpretations of the Framers’ original intent with 
respect to the issue.248 This Article is less concerned with the cor-
rectness of Chisholm,249 however, than with what its five opinions 
reveal about the two distinct doctrines of sovereign immunity. 
The discussion above reveals that all five of the Chisholm Jus-
tices apparently believed that the principle of sovereign immunity 
that Georgia advocated derived from the English common-law 
rule, with which they were clearly familiar.250 They were quick to 
discount any arguments drawn from the law of nations. Indeed, 
given the view held by the four majority Justices of the states’ sur-
render of sovereignty at the founding, it is unsurprising that they 
thought that the answer could draw no help from the law of na-
tions, which confers immunity only if the sovereign that is sued is 
“equal in respect to” the sovereign in whose courts the action was 
brought.251 Even Justice Iredell, who acknowledged that the “Con-
ventional Law of Nations” might be relevant to the interpretive 
 
248 Compare Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1870 
(2002) (“We have since acknowledged that the Chisholm decision was erroneous.”), 
and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 721 (1999) (describing as “unsupportable” the ar-
gument that “the Chisholm decision was a correct interpretation of the constitutional 
design and that the Eleventh Amendment represented a deviation from the original 
understanding”), with id. at 790 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The significance of Chis-
holm is its indication that in 1788 and 1791 it was not generally assumed (indeed, 
hardly assumed at all) that a State’s sovereign immunity from suit in its own courts 
was an inherent, and not merely a common law, advantage.”). 
249 Professor Akhil Reed Amar has persuasively argued that the Chisholm Court’s 
only error was in concluding that a cause of action in assumpsit could properly lie 
against the state: 
Having established the Court’s power to entertain the case (and the suability of 
Georgia in a jurisdictional sense), the majority proceeded to opine that a cause 
of action in assumpsit would properly lie (and that the state was properly suable 
in the substantive sense) notwithstanding any immunity from assumpsit liability 
under state law. Under the common law of Georgia and, apparently, every 
other state, no cause of action lay for a breach of contract by the state itself. At 
common law, such contracts, though perhaps morally binding, were not legally 
enforceable. 
Amar, supra note 20, at 1469. 
250 See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 458, 460 (opinion of Wilson, J.); id. at 437–44 
(opinion of Iredell, J.); id. at 471 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). 
251 Kent, supra note 136, at 21. 
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task confronting the Court,252 limited his argument in favor of the 
existence of immunity to “principles and usages of law” inherited 
from English common-law sovereign immunity.253 
2. The Marshall Court 
After the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, the Marshall 
Court tended to dispense with references to the English common 
law, relying instead on the language and purpose of the Amend-
ment, as well as the constitutional structure, in deciding the scope 
of the states’ immunity from suit. And although the Court did not 
typically discuss the law of nations as a source of the states’ immu-
nity from suit, the Court effectively rejected such a claim by insist-
ing that the states’ relationship to the United States was different 
than that of a foreign state to the United States. 
For example, in Cohens v. Virginia,254 which addressed (among 
other things) whether the Eleventh Amendment bars jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court to review the disposition of a federal ques-
 
252 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 449. 
253 Id. at 434. Justice Iredell reasoned: 
The only principles of law . . . that can be regarded, are those common to all the 
States. I know of none such . . . but those that are derived from what is properly 
termed ‘the common law,’ a law which I presume is the ground-work of the laws 
in every State in the Union, and which I consider, so far as it is applicable to the 
peculiar circumstances of the country, and where no special act of Legislation 
controuls [sic] it, to be in force in each State, as it existed in England, (unaltered 
by any statute) at the time of the first settlement of the country. . . . No other 
part of the common law of England, it appears to me, can have any reference to 
this subject, but that part of it which prescribes remedies against the crown. 
Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 435 (emphasis omitted). Professor Lee has argued that 
Justice Iredell understood instinctively and maintained consistently that the best way 
to protect this special status—the sovereign dignity of the States—was to forge an 
absolute identity between the sovereignty of the States and the more general, 
inviolable principle of sovereignty as it was understood in the laws and political 
theories of nations. Lee, supra note 119, at 1082. I do not dispute Professor Lee’s 
conclusion that Justice Iredell’s “life project” was to resist “any encroachment on 
formal legal distinctions that accorded special respect for sovereign states, foreign or 
domestic,” and that “he sought to design the doctrine in a way that brooked no 
distinction between the two types of sovereigns.” Id. at 1082–83. But to say that 
Justice Iredell found an analogy to the prerogatives of sovereignty under the law of 
nations helpful in the task of creating protections for state autonomy is not to say that 
he believed that the states actually were wholly independent sovereigns within the 
meaning of international law. See discussion infra notes 390–417 and accompanying 
text. 254 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
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tion by a state court in a suit initiated by the state, Virginia relied 
on the “general proposition, that a sovereign independent State is 
not suable, except by its own consent.”255 Chief Justice Marshall re-
jected Virginia’s reference to background principles by noting that 
the Constitution, particularly the Supremacy Clause,256 “marks, with 
lines too strong to be mistaken, the characteristic distinction be-
tween the government of the Union, and those of the States. The 
general government, though limited as to its objects, is supreme 
with respect to those objects.”257 
The Court then concluded that the Eleventh Amendment did 
not preclude its review of the state court’s resolution of a federal 
question. Virginia argued that exercising jurisdiction would be in-
consistent with the state’s dignity, but the Court rejected that view 
of the Amendment— 
That [the Eleventh Amendment’s] motive was not to maintain 
the sovereignty of a State from the degradation supposed to at-
tend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the nation, 
may be inferred from the terms of the amendment. It does not 
comprehend controversies between two or more States, or be-
tween a State and a foreign State. The jurisdiction of the Court 
still extends to these cases: and in these a State may still be sued. 
We must ascribe the amendment, then, to some other cause than 
the dignity of a State.258 
The Eleventh Amendment, the Court explained, was proposed and 
ratified to maintain the financial integrity of the states— 
It is a part of our history, that, at the adoption of the constitution, 
all the States were greatly indebted; and the apprehension that 
these debts might be prosecuted in the federal Courts, formed a 
very serious objection to that instrument. Suits were instituted; 
and the Court maintained its jurisdiction. The alarm was general; 
and, to quiet the apprehensions that were so extensively enter-
tained, this amendment was proposed in Congress, and adopted 
 
255 Id. at 380. 
256 U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. 
257 Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 381; see also id. at 414 (“These States are constitu-
ent parts of the United States. They are members of one great empire—for some pur-
poses sovereign, for some purposes subordinate.”). 
258 Id. at 406 (emphasis added). 
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by the State legislatures . . . . Those who were inhibited from 
commencing a suit against a State, or from prosecuting one 
which might be commenced before the adoption of the amend-
ment, were persons who might probably be its creditors.259 
In the Court’s view, whatever immunity the states might have en-
joyed before the ratification of the Constitution had been displaced 
by the limited scheme of immunity suggested by the terms of the 
Eleventh Amendment. 
The Court’s treatment of Virginia’s arguments makes clear, 
moreover, that the Court did not believe that after the ratification 
the states enjoyed any of the immunity that the law of nations re-
served for full sovereigns. This view is particularly notable in light 
of the oft-cited pre-ratification state court decision in Nathan v. 
Virginia, which appeared to hold that the states (again, before the 
ratification) enjoyed law-of-nations immunity in the courts of other 
(sovereign) states.260 Furthermore, Chief Justice Marshall’s subse-
quent opinion in Osborn v. Bank of the United States261 demon-
strates the Court’s belief that the Eleventh Amendment—or the 
Constitution itself, as modified by the Eleventh Amendment—
 
259 Id. In the Court’s view, this reading of the Eleventh Amendment answered the 
question why jurisdiction remained over controversies between states and sister states 
or foreign states. “There was not much reason to fear that foreign or sister States 
would be creditors to any considerable amount, and there was reason to retain the 
jurisdiction of the Court in those cases, because it might be essential to the preserva-
tion of peace. The amendment, therefore, extended to suits commenced or prose-
cuted by individuals, but not to those brought by States.” Id. at 406–07. Although vir-
tually all of Chief Justice Marshall’s pronouncements have tended to take on the 
character of gospel, it is worth noting that the Court’s entire discussion of the Elev-
enth Amendment in Cohens is arguably dicta, in light of its subsequent conclusion 
that because the suit was between Virginia and one of its own citizens, it did not fall 
within the plain language of the Amendment. See id. at 412; cf. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 
U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state 
brought by a citizen of that state). In classic Marshall fashion, the Court in Cohens ul-
timately affirmed the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court, which sustained Vir-
ginia’s authority to punish a person for selling lottery tickets in Virginia even though 
Congress had authorized their sale in the District of Columbia, but not before ex-
pounding on the Court’s powers of review. See Cohens, 19 U.S. at 444–47. 
260 Nathan v. Virginia, 1 Dall. 77 n.(a) (Pa. C.P. 1781); see discussion supra notes 
148–51 and accompanying text. 
261 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
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displaced the English common law as a source of immunity from 
suit.262 
B. Echoes of the Law of Nations 
Notwithstanding the relative clarity of Cohens and Osborn with 
respect to the place of the law of nations in state sovereign immu-
nity jurisprudence, the Court in the mid-nineteenth century sug-
gested for the first time that the states’ Eleventh Amendment im-
munity from suit had roots in the law of nations after all. From the 
mid-nineteenth century until the Court’s decision in Monaco v. 
Mississippi263 in 1934, the Court often appeared to draw as much on 
the doctrine of foreign state sovereign immunity in announcing the 
states’ constitutional immunities from suit as it did on the doctrine 
of English common-law sovereign immunity. And the Court’s prin-
cipal means of invoking the law of nations was rhetorical—by re-
ferring to the imperative to protect the “dignity” of the states. 
In Beers v. Arkansas, for example, a holder of bonds issued by 
Arkansas sued in state court to recover interest on the bonds.264 Af-
ter the suit was filed, the state by statute added a condition to an 
earlier statutory waiver of immunity from suits to collect on the 
bonds.265 The plaintiff failed to comply with the condition, and the 
state court dismissed the action.266 The plaintiff claimed in the Su-
 
262 In Osborn, the Court was confronted with the question whether a suit against an 
officer of a state was a suit against the state within the meaning of the Eleventh 
Amendment. Id. at 851. In holding that the Court’s jurisdiction turned solely on 
whether the state was a party of record, the Court stated— 
If this question were to be determined on the authority of English decisions, it 
is believed that no case can be adduced, where any person has been considered 
as a party, who is not made so in the record. But the Court will not review those 
decisions, because it is thought a question growing out of the constitution of the 
United States, requires rather an attentive consideration of the words of that in-
strument, than of the decisions of analogous questions by the Courts of any 
other country. 
Id. at 851. The Court thus rejected the suggestion that the American doctrine of state 
sovereign immunity had incorporated, at least in full, the doctrine as it existed under 
the English common law. The Court subsequently departed from Osborn’s “party of 
record” rule in In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 447 (1887), as discussed infra notes 277–86 
and accompanying text. 
263 292 U.S. 313 (1934). 
264 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 527–28 (1857). 
265 Id. at 528. 
266 Id. at 528–29. 
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preme Court that the state’s limitation of its prior waiver of sover-
eign immunity violated the Contracts Clause of the Constitution.267 
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taney, held that the 
state can control the conditions on which it waives immunity. The 
Court could have rested on the ground that, because in an action 
based on state law in the state’s own courts the state can assert ab-
solute immunity, the state a fortiori can effect a partial waiver.268 But 
the Court painted with a broader brush, explaining that— 
It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized na-
tions that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in 
any other, without its consent and permission; but it may, if it 
thinks proper, waive this privilege, and permit itself to be made a 
defendant in a suit by individuals, or by another State. And as 
this permission is altogether voluntary on the part of the sover-
eignty, it follows that it may prescribe the terms and conditions 
on which it consents to be sued, and the manner in which the suit 
shall be conducted, and may withdraw its consent whenever it 
may suppose that justice to the public requires it.269 
The Beers Court’s reference to the law of nations270 is striking not 
simply because it appeared to depart from the early post-ratification 
view of the origin of the states’ immunity from suit. Putting aside 
for a moment the Court’s implication that Arkansas is sufficiently 
sovereign to be considered a “state” under customary international 
law, the logical source of Arkansas’s immunity in the suit would 
have been the English common law. Because Beers involved a suit 
 
267 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”); Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 529. 
268 This would have been a particularly straightforward rationale in light of the 
Court’s conclusion that “[t]here is evidently nothing in the decision, nor in the act of 
the Assembly under which it was made, which in any degree impairs the obligation of 
the contract.” Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 530. 
269 Id. at 529 (emphasis added). 
270 There is no doubt that the Court intended to invoke the law of nations, as op-
posed to the English common law. Not only did the Court use the familiar reference 
to the law of “all civilized nations,” id. at 559; see, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116,  137 (1812) (describing “the immunity which all 
civilized nations allow to foreign ministers”), but the Court also suggested that the 
states’ immunity extends to suits brought in the other sovereign’s courts. Id. This was 
the domain of the law of nations. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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in the defendant state’s own courts, the law of nations was simply 
inapposite.271 
But viewed in context, the Court’s reference to the law of na-
tions is not particularly surprising. In 1857, the nation was on the 
brink of Civil War, in part because of profound disagreements over 
the degree to which the states retained sovereign authority within 
their borders.272 Given the general receptivity during this period of 
the Court to states’ rights arguments, its implicit suggestion in Beers 
that the states are the natural heirs of the law of “all civilized na-
tions” is hardly surprising.273 
Indeed, the ebb and flow of references to state dignity in state 
sovereign immunity cases correlates relatively neatly with shifting 
views about the appropriate balance between federal and state 
power.274 Accordingly, in the late nineteenth century, when the Court 
began to grapple with the implications for federal power of an in-
creasingly national economy,275 the Court continued to invoke the 
dignity rationale in expanding the states’ immunity from suit.276 In 
 
271 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
272 Indeed, in the same term that it decided Beers, the Court issued its now-infamous 
decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), which helped to pre-
cipitate the Civil War. See Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Signifi-
cance in American Law and Politics 192–94, 206–08 (1978); Carl B. Swisher, Roger B. 
Taney 495–523 (1935). 
273 See also Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 126 (1868) (“Every gov-
ernment has an inherent right to protect itself against suits . . . . The principle is fun-
damental, [and] applies to every sovereign power . . . .”). 
274 See generally Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 
1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 125 (tracking changing judicial interpretations of constitutional 
federalism over time to better understand changing views of the proper balance be-
tween federal and state power). 
275 Compare United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1895) (holding that 
Congress lacks authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate “manufacturing”), 
with Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 353–54 (1914) (hold-
ing that Congress had authority to empower the Interstate Commerce Commission to 
set rates on an intrastate rail route). 
276 In United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), the Supreme Court appeared (for the 
time being) to revert to the Marshall Court’s understanding that both common-law 
and law-of-nations notions of sovereign immunity were foreign to our constitutional 
structure. The case involved a suit by descendants of General Robert E. Lee against 
two federal officers to recover possession of the former Lee estate, which the federal 
government had taken and used as a national cemetery. Id. at 197–99. As this recital 
reveals, Lee did not involve a suit against a state, but rather raised a question about 
the scope of the immunity of the United States and its officers. The Court’s view of 
the place of sovereign dignity in defining that immunity is nonetheless revealing. 
SMITH.BOOK.DOC 2/24/03  9:31 PM 
66 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 89:1 
re Ayers,277 which the current Court has repeatedly cited as support 
for its dignity rationale, was one in a series of cases leading up to 
Ex Parte Young278 in which the Court sought to balance federalism 
interests with the interest in ensuring that state violations of consti-
tutional rights do not go without a remedy.279 Ayers was a suit by 
holders of interest coupons on bonds issued by Virginia who were 
concerned that certain actions of the state’s Attorney General 
would render their coupons worthless.280 They sued the Attorney 
 
The Court noted that any sovereign immunity of the government is “derived from 
the laws and practices of our English ancestors.” Id. at 205. Like the Marshall (and 
Chisholm) Court before it, however, the Court disavowed any place for such practices 
here, because of the “vast difference in the essential character of the two governments 
as regards the source and the depositories of power.” Id. at 208. The Court then re-
jected the United States’ claim that its sovereign dignity mandated dismissal of the 
suit. The Court first rejected the argument to the extent that it relied on the notion of 
royal dignity. See id. (noting that in England “the monarch is looked upon with too 
much reverence to be subjected to the demands of the law as ordinary persons are,” 
because the “crown remains the fountain of honor, and the surroundings which give 
dignity and majesty to its possessor are cherished and enforced all the more strictly 
because of the loss of real power in the government”). The Court responded that 
“[u]nder our system the people, who are [in England] called subjects, are the sover-
eign . . . . The citizen here knows no person, however near to those in power, or how-
ever powerful himself, to whom he need yield the rights which the law secures to him 
when it is well administered.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Nor was the law-of-nations doc-
trine of foreign state sovereign immunity applicable; that doctrine requires a foreign 
sovereign, and, in any event, leaves interactions with such a foreign state to the politi-
cal branches. Id. at 209. Accordingly, the Court could not say “that [the dignity of] the 
government is degraded by appearing as a defendant in the courts of its own crea-
tion,” where “it is constantly appearing as a party in such courts, and submitting its 
rights as against the citizen to their judgment.” Id. at 206. Because “[n]o officer of the 
law may set that law at defiance with impunity,” the Court permitted the suit against 
the officer to proceed. Id. at 220. In dissent, Justice Gray invoked the law of nations, 
relying on the “fundamental maxim, that the sovereign cannot be sued.” Id. at 226 
(Gray, J., dissenting); see id. at 227 (Gray, J., dissenting) (“The principle is fundamen-
tal, applies to every sovereign power, and, but for the protection which it affords, the 
government would be unable to perform the various duties for which it was created.”) 
(quoting Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 126 (1868)). 
277 123 U.S. 443 (1887). 
278 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
279 See Tribe, supra note 52, § 3-27, at 555–56. 
280 See Ayers, 123 U.S. at 446–50. The state, concerned about counterfeit interest 
coupons, had passed a statute that required persons seeking to use such state bond 
coupons to pay taxes to “prove affirmatively that the coupons tendered by them are 
the State’s coupons and not counterfeit and spurious coupons, the burden of proving 
the same being placed upon the tax-payer and the coupon being taken to be prima 
facie spurious and counterfeit.” Id. at 447–48. Another statute required that such per-
sons “shall produce the bond from which the coupon so tendered by him was cut.” Id. 
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General to enjoin him from taking such actions, alleging that his 
action would violate the Contracts Clause.281 The principal question 
before the Supreme Court was whether the suit, which was filed 
against an officer of the state, should be considered a suit against 
the state itself. 
The Court held that Virginia was the real party in interest, and 
thus that the suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.282 The 
Court reasoned that “[w]hether [Virginia] is the actual party, in the 
sense of the prohibition of the Constitution, must be determined by 
a consideration of the nature of the case as presented on the whole 
record.”283 Because the “relief sought is against the defendants, not 
in their individual, but in their representative capacity as officers of 
the State of Virginia,” the Court concluded that the state was the 
real party in interest.284 The Court stated, in language that has be-
come vogue at the current Court— 
The very object and purpose of the 11th Amendment were to 
prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process 
of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties. It was 
thought to be neither becoming nor convenient that the several 
States of the Union, invested with that large residuum of sover-
eignty which had not been delegated to the United States, should 
be summoned as defendants to answer the complaints of private 
persons, whether citizens of other States or aliens, or that the 
course of their public policy and the administration of their pub-
lic affairs should be subject to and controlled by the mandates of 
judicial tribunals without their consent, and in favor of individual 
interests.285 
 
at 448. The Attorney General was alleged to be preparing to file suits against persons 
who had paid taxes with coupons without complying with the statutes, in order to 
condemn such coupons as spurious. Id. at 449–50. 
281 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see Ayers, 123 U.S. at 450 (discussing the plaintiffs’ 
argument that a refusal to recognize state-issued bond coupons as valid payment of 
property taxes violates the Contracts Clause). 
282 Ayers, 123 U.S. at 507–08. 
283 Id. at 492. 
284 Id. at 497. 
285 Id. at 505 (emphasis added). The Court continued— 
To secure the manifest purposes of the constitutional exemption guaranteed by 
the 11th Amendment requires that it should be interpreted, not literally and too 
narrowly, but fairly, and with such breadth and largeness as effectually to ac-
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The Court’s reference to the state’s dignity plainly was intended 
to underscore the importance of ensuring that the Eleventh 
Amendment is not evaded by suits that are filed against officers 
but that nonetheless are, in effect, against the state. Because the re-
lief that the plaintiffs sought in every meaningful sense would run 
against the state, the Court concluded that the suit was barred.286 
 
complish the substance of its purpose. In this spirit it must be held to cover, not 
only suits brought against a State by name, but those also against its officers, 
agents, and representatives, where the State, though not named as such, is, nev-
ertheless, the only real party against which alone in fact the relief is asked, and 
against which the judgment or decree effectively operates. 
Id. at 505–06. The Court insisted, however, that suits against state officers in their of-
ficial capacities do not violate the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 506 (“But this is 
not intended in any way to impinge upon the principle which justifies suits against in-
dividual defendants . . . .”). This doctrine remained in flux until the Court’s decision in 
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
286 Cf. PRASA, 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993); see also discussion supra notes 25–46 and 
accompanying text. When the Court finally held in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 
(1908), that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suits to enjoin state officers from 
violating federal law, Justice Harlan invoked the notion of state dignity in dissent. In a 
reversal of his position in Ayers, see Ayers, 123 U.S. at 515–16 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 
Justice Harlan protested that “[t]he preservation of the dignity and sovereignty of the 
States, within the limits of their constitutional powers, is of the last importance, and 
vital to the preservation of our system of government.” Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 
182–83 (emphasis added). It is important, however, to appreciate the context in which 
Justice Harlan invoked such language. The doctrinal battle in Ayers and Young was as 
much about substantive due process as it was about federalism; the majority in Young 
sought to subject states to suit in large part as a means of ensuring that challenges to 
state economic regulation could be heard by the courts. For Justice Harlan, shielding 
the states from suit was a means of limiting the force of that (ultimately misguided) 
doctrine. See Sherry, supra note 7, at 1129–30.  
Similarly, Professor Sherry suggests that Justice Bradley saw the expansion of state 
immunity in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (discussed infra notes 287–89 and 
accompanying text), as a way to stem the tide of decisions seemingly granting “per-
sonhood” to corporations and permitting them to challenge otherwise valid state eco-
nomic regulations under the Fourteenth Amendment. Sherry, supra note 7, at 1128–
29. Today, however, “the personifiers have switched sides. It is Justice Bradley’s opin-
ion in Hans that gives the most comfort to those who would protect the states from 
assaults on their dignity.” Id. at 1130. 
Nevertheless, although the Court’s trend during the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries was to suggest that state sovereign immunity had roots in the law of 
nations, Young itself represented a significant detour from that approach. Indeed, the 
Court’s decision in Young is in many ways the doctrinal heir to the English common-
law rule of state sovereign immunity. Young’s rule echoes “the venerable common-
law practice of permitting suit against officers of the Crown despite the King’s immu-
nity from suit.” Tribe, supra note 52, at 557; see Jaffe, supra note 122, at 9. 
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Three years after the Court decided Ayers, the Court held in 
Hans v. Louisiana287 that the Eleventh Amendment, notwithstand-
ing its plain language, barred a suit against a state by its own citi-
zens. The decision is second only to Chisholm in the amount of de-
bate that it has produced.288 For present purposes, however, it suffices 
to note that this decision, in which the Court renounced reliance on 
the text of the Eleventh Amendment as its principal means of giv-
ing content to state sovereign immunity doctrine, invoked Chief 
Justice Taney’s reference in Beers to the immunity enjoyed by sov-
ereign states under the law of nations.289 
In Ex Parte New York,290 which extended the Eleventh Amend-
ment bar to suits in admiralty, the Court used language similarly 
consistent with foreign state sovereign immunity: “That a State may 
not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurispru-
dence.”291 Likewise, in the Court’s decision in Monaco v. Missis-
sippi,292 which held that notwithstanding the language of Article III 
and the Eleventh Amendment the states are immune from suits by 
 
287 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). 
288 Compare Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68–70 (1996) (“[The dis-
sent’s] undocumented and highly speculative extralegal explanation of the decision in 
Hans is a disservice to the Court’s traditional method of adjudication . . . . Hans—with 
a much closer vantage point than the dissent—recognized that the decision in Chis-
holm was contrary to the well-understood meaning of the Constitution.”), with id. at 
117 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“A critical examination of [Hans] will show that it was 
wrongly decided, as virtually every recent commentator has concluded. It follows that 
the Court’s further step today of constitutionalizing Hans’s rule against abrogation by 
Congress compounds and immensely magnifies the century-old mistake of Hans itself 
and takes its place with other historic examples of textually untethered elevations of 
judicially derived rules to the status of inviolable constitutional law.”). 
289 Hans, 134 U.S. at 17 (“It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civi-
lized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, 
without its consent and permission . . . .”) (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 
How.) 527, 529 (1857)). As Professor Thomas Lee has observed, the Hans Court’s so-
licitude for state autonomy, like the reaction to Chisholm, might be explained by the 
fact that “the southern States confronted daunting war debts in the wake of another 
rebellion, though of different cause and result.” Lee, supra note 119, at 1043 (citing 
Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Jr., The Contract Clause of the Constitution 94 (1938)). 
290 256 U.S. 490 (1921). 
291 Id. at 497 (emphasis added). As in Beers, the Court invoked the law of nations in 
a second, implicit way—by suggesting that the states “enjoy the prerogatives of sover-
eignty to the extent of being exempt from litigation at the suit of individuals in all 
other judicial tribunals.” Id. at 503 (emphasis added); see supra note 270 and accom-
panying text. 
292 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934). 
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foreign states,293 the Court’s rationale was based in part on a sug-
gestion that states enjoy a sovereignty comparable to that of for-
eign nations. Because under the law of nations foreign states enjoy 
immunity from suit by American states in U.S. courts, the Court 
asserted that the American states should enjoy a reciprocal privi-
lege.294 Such reciprocity would make sense only upon the assump-
tion that the states are akin, for purposes of immunity, to fully sov-
ereign nations. The Court’s reference to the immunity of foreign 
states was, to be fair, merely one fleeting reference in a decision 
that relied principally on the “postulate” that “[the] States of the 
Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune 
from suits, without their consent, save where there has been ‘a sur-
render of this immunity in the plan of the convention.’”295 But it 
was consistent with the Court’s approach, since Beers, of invoking 
principles of foreign state sovereign immunity from the law of na-
tions to justify the immunity of the several states. 
This forceful defense of state sovereignty in Monaco should come 
as no surprise. The Court issued the decision in 1934, when the 
federal government was asserting its powers in bold new ways and 
the Court was defiantly resisting those efforts.296 A mere three 
 
293 Article III extends jurisdiction to “Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citi-
zens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
Although the text of the Eleventh Amendment divests federal court jurisdiction over 
suits against states commenced or prosecuted by “Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State,” it does not purport to bar jurisdiction over suits by foreign states themselves. 
See U.S. Const. amend XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by . . . Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”). For an argument 
that Monaco was incorrectly decided, see Lee, supra note 119, at 1088–92. 
294 Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330. To be sure, the Court did recognize the difference be-
tween the states’ peculiar form of quasi-sovereignty and the sovereignty of foreign 
states. The Court suggested that the federal government’s primacy in international 
relations argues in favor of state immunity from suits by foreign states, on the theory 
that “a controversy growing out of the action of a State, which involves a matter of 
national concern and which is said to affect injuriously the interests of a foreign State, 
or a dispute arising from conflicting claims of a State of the Union and a foreign State 
as to territorial boundaries,” ought to be addressed by action of the federal govern-
ment alone. Id. at 331. But the Court’s suggestion of reciprocal privileges between 
American states and foreign states belies this concession. 
295 Id. at 322–23 (quoting The Federalist No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)) (footnote 
omitted). 
296 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521, 551 
(1935) (invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. 
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years later, however, the Court had accepted an expansive view of 
federal power and the concomitant limits that such a view implied 
for state autonomy.297 It should also come as no surprise that the 
Court’s reliance on the customary international law doctrine of 
foreign state sovereign immunity—and, more specifically, the Court’s 
invocations of state dignity—waned in state sovereign immunity 
cases in the sixty years following Monaco.298 During the years of the 
Warren Court, the Court rarely made arguments based on dignity 
in the cause of states’ rights.299 
 
Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 340, 374 (1935) (invalidating the Railroad Retirement Act 
of 1934). 
297 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30–38 (1937) (holding the 
National Labor Relations Act constitutional); Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 
301 U.S. 548, 583, 585, 593 (1937) (upholding a national employment tax in the Social 
Security Act). 
298 Indeed, even shortly after deciding Monaco, the Court began to retreat from the 
notion that state dignity required judicial protection. In United States v. California, 
297 U.S. 175 (1936), for example, the Court upheld Congress’s power to authorize the 
United States to recover a penalty from a state for violation, in its capacity as the op-
erator of a railroad, of the Federal Safety Appliance Act. The Court stated— 
The suggestion that it should be assumed that Congress did not intend to sub-
ject a sovereign state to the inconvenience and loss of dignity involved in a trial 
in a district court is not persuasive when weighed against the complete appro-
priateness of the court and venue selected for the trial of issues growing out of 
the particular activity in which the state has chosen to engage. 
Id. at 188–89 (emphasis added). And in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 
(1937), in which the Court held that Social Security Act provisions imposing a tax on 
employers did not exceed Congress’s power or violate state autonomy, even Justice 
Sutherland’s dissent suggested that state dignity was not a relevant concern. He ar-
gued— 
By these various provisions of the act, the federal agencies are authorized to 
supervise and hamper the administrative powers of the state to a degree which 
not only does not comport with the dignity of a quasi-sovereign state—a matter 
with which we are not judicially concerned—but which denies to it that suprem-
acy and freedom from external interference in respect of its affairs which the 
Constitution contemplates—a matter of very definite judicial concern. 
Id. at 613–14 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice McReynolds did 
invoke the dignity of the states, but his claim fell on deaf ears. See id. at 606 (McReynolds, 
J., dissenting) (“If the time shall ever arrive when, for an object appealing, however 
strongly, to our sympathies, the dignity of the States shall bow to the dictation of Con-
gress by conforming their legislation thereto, when the power and majesty and honor 
of those who created shall become subordinate to the thing of their creation, I but 
feebly utter my apprehensions when I express my firm conviction that we shall see 
‘the beginning of the end.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting 5 James D. Richardson, Mes-
sages and Papers of the Presidents 247–51 (1897)). 
299 Indeed, when the Warren Court did ascribe dignity to a sovereign, it tended to be 
with a very different connotation. In Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 4 (1956), 
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C. Nevada v. Hall: Setting the Record Straight? 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Court was divided over the 
appropriate balance between the interest in protecting states from 
costly suits300 and the need to ensure state compliance with federal 
law.301 As a result, state sovereign immunity doctrine experienced 
some growing pains. In this period, however, the Court rarely sug-
gested—through rhetorical clues or otherwise—that the states’ 
immunity from suit (whether constitutionally indefeasible or sub-
ject to abrogation by Congress) had its origins in the law-of-nations 
doctrine of foreign state sovereign immunity. Indeed, in Nevada v. 
Hall,302 the Court explicitly recognized the distinction between Eng-
lish common-law immunity and foreign state sovereign immunity. 
Hall involved a tort suit in California state court by a California 
 
an appeal from a criminal conviction in federal court, the Solicitor General of the 
United States informed the Court that a government witness apparently had given 
false testimony. The Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, de-
claring that “[t]he dignity of the United States Government will not permit the con-
viction of any person on tainted testimony.” Id. at 9; cf. Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 
Pet.) 410, 436–37 (1830) (holding that a state could not enforce a promissory note 
against a citizen because the state statute on which it was based purported to author-
ize the state to “emit bills of credit” in violation of the Constitution: “In the argument, 
we have been reminded by one side of the dignity of a sovereign state; of the humilia-
tion of her submitting herself to this tribunal; of the dangers which may result from 
inflicting a wound on that dignity: by the other, of the still superior dignity of the peo-
ple of the United States; who have spoken their will, in terms which we cannot misun-
derstand.”). 
300 See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238–40 (1985) (apply-
ing a strict clear statement rule); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 
U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from 
enjoining state officers from violating state law); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 
(1974) (holding that state participation in a federal program was not sufficient to sig-
nify state consent to suit in federal court); Employees of Dep’t of Pub. Health & Wel-
fare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284–85 (1973) (holding that the 
Court will not presume congressional intent to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity without a clear statement). 
301 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion) (holding that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to abrogate 
the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 
(1976) (holding that Congress has authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity to ensure compliance with the 
Amendment); Employees, 411 U.S. at 283 (recognizing Congress’s power to bring 
“the States to heel, in the sense of lifting their immunity from suit in a federal court”). 
302 440 U.S. 410, 414 (1979). 
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citizen against the State of Nevada under California law.303 Nevada 
claimed that it was entitled to immunity from suit in the courts of 
another state, but the Supreme Court rejected Nevada’s argu-
ment.304 
The Court explained that “[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity 
is an amalgam of two quite different concepts, one applicable to 
suits in the sovereign’s own courts and the other to suits in the 
courts of another sovereign.”305 The former doctrine had its roots in 
the English common law and “rested primarily on the structure of 
the feudal system and secondarily on a fiction that the King could 
do no wrong.”306 That doctrine did not apply to the case at bar, 
however, because Nevada, to the extent that it was a full sovereign 
within the meaning of the doctrine, was being sued in another sov-
ereign’s courts. A claim of immunity under those circumstances, 
the Court explained, could be answered only by reference to the 
“common usage among nations in which every sovereign was un-
derstood to have waived its exclusive territorial jurisdiction over 
visiting sovereigns, or their representatives, in certain classes of 
cases.”307 Even “if California and Nevada were independent and 
completely sovereign nations”—a proposition that the Court re-
fused to accept308—California would enjoy the power to subject 
Nevada to suit in its own courts, just as Congress has authority to 
subject foreign states to suit in the courts of the United States.309 
This is because any decision of one sovereign to grant immunity in 
its courts to another sovereign ultimately is a “voluntary decision 
of the [former] to respect the dignity of the [latter] as a matter of 
comity.”310 
 
303 Id. at 411–12. 
304 Id. at 426–27. 
305 Id. at 414. 
306 Id. at 414–15; see supra notes 122–34 and accompanying text. 
307 Id. at 417 (citing The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 
136 (1812)). 
308 Id.; see id. at 425 (discussing constitutional provisions that place “specific limita-
tion[s] on the sovereignty of the several States,” and that “[c]ollectively . . . demon-
strate that ours is not a union of 50 wholly independent sovereigns”); see also infra 
notes 311–13 and accompanying text. 
309 See Hall, 440 U.S. at 417 (citing The Schooner Exchange); id. at 417 n.13 (drawing 
an analogy to the rule of restrictive immunity under the law of nations). 
310 Id. at 416. 
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In concluding that California could authorize a suit against Ne-
vada in California courts, the Court explicitly relied on Chief Jus-
tice Marshall’s interpretation of the law of nations in The Schooner 
Exchange.311 As explained in greater detail below, however, the Court 
did not suggest that customary international law norms applied of 
their own force to the relations among the several states. Instead, 
the Court borrowed the notion of comity from international law 
because the relationship among the states, which are equal in status 
in most constitutionally relevant ways, resembles the relationship 
among co-equal sovereigns on the world stage.312 
As demonstrated below, the relationship between the states and 
the federal government differs in important ways from the rela-
tionship among sovereign nations. It is perhaps for this reason that 
the Court’s state sovereign immunity cases since Hall have not 
read that decision to suggest that the states’ immunity derives from 
the law of nations; instead, the Court has steadfastly insisted that 
the states’ immunity derives from the English common law, and 
has even cited Hall for that proposition.313 
In his dissent in Alden, Justice Souter recognized the Court’s 
“occasional seduction” with what he called the “natural law view,” 
but insisted that the Court had consistently adhered to the English 
common-law approach.314 By “natural law view,” Justice Souter was 
 
311 Id. at 417. 
312 See id. at 417 & nn.12–13. 
313 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715–16 (1999) (“Although the American 
people had rejected other aspects of English political theory, the doctrine that a sov-
ereign could not be sued without its consent was universal in the States when the 
Constitution was drafted and ratified.”) (emphasis added); cf. id. at 715 (“When the 
Constitution was ratified, it was well established in English law that the Crown could 
not be sued without consent in its own courts.”) (citing Hall, 440 U.S. at 414). The 
Court had an opportunity during the October 2002 Term to revisit the decision in 
Hall. See Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, No. 35549, 2002 LEXIS 57 (Nev. Apr. 4, 
2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 409 (2002) (No. 02-42). 
314 Alden, 527 U.S. at 795 n.30 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Beers v. Arkansas, 61 
U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857)); Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 126 
(1868); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13, 17 (1890); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Flor-
ida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996)); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 130 n.26 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (acknowledging that the Court’s reference to Hans’s reliance on the “ju-
risprudence in all civilized nations” could be taken as an abandonment of the “com-
mon-law roots” of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity, but arguing that Hans 
itself was, at bottom, based on the common-law view of immunity) (citations omit-
ted). 
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referring to Justice Holmes’s famous description of sovereign im-
munity, under which immunity may be invoked “only by the sover-
eign that is the source of the right upon which suit is brought.”315 
Justice Holmes believed that sovereign dignity was an empty no-
tion,316 and his general approach to the issue of sovereign immunity 
was one of skepticism. But his reconceptualization of sovereign 
immunity has much to commend it; among other things, it is 
(unlike the Court’s current approach)317 perfectly consistent with 
popular sovereignty,318 and it accounts for the consistent approach 
 
315 Alden, 527 U.S. at 796 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 
205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907)) (“A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any for-
mal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there 
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right 
depends.”). 
316 See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 202 U.S. 598, 599–600 (1906) (Holmes, J.). In that 
case, Missouri sued Illinois under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to restrain 
the discharge of sewage from Chicago into an artificial canal that ran into the Missis-
sippi. Id. After the suit was dismissed, Illinois sought costs. Id. Missouri challenged 
the authority of the court to grant such costs, but Justice Holmes tersely dismissed the 
state’s assertion: “[I]t is said that it is inconsistent with the dignity of a sovereign State 
to ask for costs . . . . So far as the dignity of the State is concerned, that is its own af-
fair.” Id. at 599 (emphasis added). 
317 See Meltzer, supra note 11, at 1044 (noting that the majority in Alden “makes no 
reference to the sovereignty of the people as a whole”). 
318 If the citizens of a state believe that the state’s resources are better spent on, say, 
education than on paying judgments in lawsuits arising under the state’s own laws, 
there is no reason why they cannot permit the state to declare its immunity from suit. 
And if the perception grows that the state government is acting “above the law,” 
there is nothing to prevent the citizens from urging their representatives to waive the 
government’s immunity from suit. Justice Holmes’s view is not particularly problem-
atic even when a non-citizen has a grievance with the state. A non-citizen deals with 
the state on the terms announced by the state, and if he dislikes those terms (for ex-
ample, immunity from suit for failure to pay interest on a bond), he can decline to 
contract. And if the out-of-state citizen’s claim is under a different source of law—for 
instance, a claim that the state violated the Constitution—then Justice Holmes’s the-
ory of immunity would not bar the claim. 
Professor Caleb Nelson makes a related argument. See Nelson, supra note 20, at 
1584. He maintains that although “sovereignty rests ultimately in the people and not 
in any government . . . , this fact does not compel the conclusion that governments 
must be amenable to suit by individuals.” Id. He explains: 
Under the theory of popular sovereignty, after all, individuals who sue a state 
are not really seeking the government’s money or resources; instead, they are 
seeking money or resources that the people as a whole have gathered for use in 
carrying out the people’s business. Suits against a state need not be regarded as 
suits against an impersonal (and therefore nonsovereign) government, but can 
instead be seen as suits against the sovereign people of the state in their collec-
tive capacity. 
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under the law of nations of permitting the sovereign authority of 
one nation—at least with a clear statement—to subject a foreign 
sovereign to suit in its own courts.319 Whether one accepts Justice 
Holmes’s formulation or the more conventional formulation in the 
cases arising under customary international law,320 Justice Souter’s 
point was that the Court has, despite periodic indications to the 
contrary, not seriously attempted to dispute that the English com-
mon law serves as the foundation of its current state sovereign im-
munity doctrine.321 
IV. JURISPRUDENTIAL AMBIVALENCE 
But although the Court has not explicitly disagreed with the view 
that its modern state sovereign immunity decisions derive from the 
 
Id. Professor Nelson’s argument encounters difficulties, however, when the individual 
who sues the state does so under a cause of action created by the United States to en-
force an obligation imposed by the United States—or, in Professor Nelson’s formula-
tion, “the sovereign people of the [United States] in their collective capacity”—on the 
state. Id. 
319 Justice Holmes’s view is consistent with the law-of-nations approach first an-
nounced in this country in The Schooner Exchange. As explained above, that case ac-
knowledged the power of Congress (as the repository of sovereign authority) to sub-
ject foreign states to suit in our courts. See supra notes 176–205 and accompanying 
text; see also The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 
(1812). When Congress exercises that power, the foreign state is not “the source of 
the right upon which suit is brought.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 796 (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(citing Kawananakoa, 205 U.S. at 353). 
320 See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 137 (“One sovereign be-
ing in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by obligations of the highest 
character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign 
rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory 
only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to 
his independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by 
implication, and will be extended to him.”) (emphasis added). 
321 Justice Souter argued in Alden that it ultimately does not matter whether the 
Court anchors its current doctrine in the English common law or in natural law— 
There is no escape from the trap of Holmes’s logic save recourse to the argu-
ment that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not the rationally necessary or 
inherent immunity of the civilians, but the historically contingent, and to a de-
gree illogical, immunity of the common law. But if the Court admits that the 
source of sovereign immunity is the common law, it must also admit that the 
common law doctrine could be changed by Congress acting under the Com-
merce Clause. It is not for me to say which way the Court should turn; but in ei-
ther case it is clear that Alden’s suit should go forward. 
Alden, 527 U.S. at 798 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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English common law,322 the Court’s recent elevation of state dignity 
as a basis for its state sovereign immunity doctrine suggests that, 
whatever the Court might say about the doctrine’s common-law 
roots, it is looking elsewhere for doctrinal support. The Court’s 
rhetorical clues suggest that it is drawing support from the doctrine 
of foreign state sovereign immunity and the law of nations. 
To be sure, the Court has not explicitly or avowedly relied on 
customary international law in its state sovereign immunity deci-
sions, and the Court has not explicitly analogized the immunity en-
joyed by the (several) states to the immunity of sovereign nations 
in the courts of other nations. But, as explained above, “state dig-
nity” is a legal term of art that our courts have used since the 
founding, and it has a particular implication in the context in which 
it has conventionally been used. Absent some indication from the 
Court that its use of the concept in the state sovereign immunity 
cases is intended to mean something else, it is fair to assume that 
the Court has borrowed the concept from its original context. 
It is, of course, impossible to know precisely what the Court in-
tends when it relies on the concept of state dignity in the state sov-
ereign immunity cases. It is entirely possible, for example, that the 
 
322 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 715 (explaining the legacy of the English common law for 
the Framers) (citing 1 Blackstone, supra note 124, at *234–35, regarding the “preroga-
tives of the Crown”); Alden, 527 U.S. at 715–16 (“Although the American people had 
rejected other aspects of English political theory, the doctrine that a sovereign could 
not be sued without its consent was universal in the States when the Constitution was 
drafted and ratified.”); id. at 733 (“Although the sovereign immunity of the States de-
rives at least in part from the common-law tradition, the structure and history of the 
Constitution make clear that the immunity exists today by constitutional design.”); id. 
at 734–35 (“The dissent has offered no evidence that the Founders believed sovereign 
immunity extended only to cases where the sovereign was the source of the right as-
serted. No such limitation existed on sovereign immunity in England, where sovereign 
immunity was predicated on a different theory altogether.”); id. at 741–42 (describing 
English common-law rule, and its impact on the ratification debates); 1 Pollock & 
Maitland, supra note 132, at 518. To be fair, because Alden involved a suit against a 
state in its own courts, the English common law was the doctrinally appropriate 
source of whatever immunity the state enjoyed. But the Court has not attempted, 
since Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 417–18 (1979), to draw any distinction based on 
the court in which the state is sued. Instead, the Court has insisted that the historical 
origins of the doctrine are largely irrelevant, because the states’ immunity is now fixed 
in the constitutional structure. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 n.4 (1999) (“[S]tate sovereign immunity, unlike 
foreign sovereign immunity, is a constitutional doctrine that is meant to be both im-
mutable by Congress and resistant to trends.”). 
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references to state dignity are merely loose talk, rhetorical flour-
ishes intended to underscore the fundamental point that “the states 
matter”—that is, that the states’ status (or “dignity”) in our consti-
tutional system means that they cannot be treated as ordinary de-
fendants.323 Professor Daniel Farber has suggested, for example, 
that the Court’s focus on the states’ dignity is simply a means (al-
beit a crude one) to underscore the states’ “unique role in republi-
can self-government.”324 If this is the sense in which the Court has 
used the notion of state dignity, then it is a slender reed on which 
to rest current state sovereign immunity doctrine, and it is a par-
ticularly unsatisfying response to the substantial historical and tex-
tual evidence that scholars have offered to demonstrate that the 
states’ constitutional immunity from suit was in fact intended to be 
much more limited than that recognized by current doctrine.325 
It is fair, for several reasons, to assume that the persistent refer-
ences to state dignity in fact mean much more. First, as explained 
above, a historical survey of the Court’s state sovereign immunity 
doctrine reveals periodic waves of judicial interest in the notion of 
state dignity. Second, the increasing centrality of the concept of 
state dignity in the state sovereign immunity decisions naturally 
will lead commentators to question the meaning and content of the 
concept. Third, “state dignity” has a well-established meaning in 
the related context of foreign state sovereign immunity, a meaning 
with which one can assume the Court is familiar. Fourth and most 
important, the Court has said that the fundamental inquiry in the 
state sovereign immunity cases, as in other federalism cases, is to 
determine precisely what “attributes of sovereignty” the states re-
tained at the ratification. The Court has attempted to answer this 
question by invoking a concept—“state dignity”—that has a well-
 
323 Indeed, other than a few cryptic references to international law in this context, 
the Court has not purported to rely explicitly on foreign state sovereign immunity 
doctrine as support for its state sovereign immunity doctrine. See Seminole Tribe of 
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996) (arguing that Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 
(1890), “found its roots not solely in the common law of England, but in the much 
more fundamental ‘jurisprudence in all civilized nations’”) (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 
17) (citation omitted)). 
324 Farber, supra note 7, at 1136. Under this view, the states’ virtually categorical 
immunity from private suits resembles other recently identified categorical rules of 
federalism, such as the anti-commandeering principle. See Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
325 See sources cited supra note 20. 
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established doctrinal meaning and that serves to delimit the “at-
tributes of sovereignty” of fully sovereign nations. In light of these 
considerations, it is difficult to understand the Court’s reliance on 
state dignity as anything other than a conscious attempt to draw on 
the international law doctrine of foreign state sovereign immunity 
to support state sovereign immunity doctrine.326 At a minimum, if 
the Court is not attempting to invoke the doctrine of foreign state 
sovereign immunity, the burden is on the Court to demonstrate 
that “state dignity” means something different in this context than 
it does in the context in which it developed. 
In any event, the Court’s recent elevation of the notion of state 
dignity as a basis for decision has made more imperative a critical 
assessment of the appropriateness of relying on a notion drawn 
from the law of nations to justify an expansive doctrine of state 
sovereign immunity. In addition, the centrality of the concept of 
state dignity to the current doctrine invites an inquiry into the doc-
trinal implications of importing the concept from the doctrine of 
foreign state sovereign immunity. 
This Article has so far demonstrated that the concept of state 
dignity is not alien to cases governing the immunity of foreign states 
in U.S. courts, and that the notion of state dignity has a particular 
meaning in that context. As explained above,327 the Court invokes 
sovereign dignity in those cases to underscore two important 
points. First, for one sovereign to entertain a suit against another 
sovereign inevitably diminishes the sovereign authority of the lat-
ter, and thus (contrary to the presumptive “equal rights and equal 
independence” of the two sovereigns328) suggests that the latter’s 
status is inferior to the former’s. Second, the presumptive equal 
status of distinct sovereigns requires that an assertion of jurisdic-
tion by one over another be made by the “sovereign power of the 
 
326 Ultimately, it does not matter whether the Court has purposefully sought to im-
port wholesale into state sovereign immunity doctrine the particular notion of state 
dignity that is central to foreign state sovereign immunity doctrine. If in relying on 
state dignity the Court means to suggest something other than what the notion has 
long meant in its original context, the burden is on the Court to explain what precisely 
the notion means in the domestic context. Until the Court suggests that an American 
state’s dignity is sui generis, it is appropriate to consider whether the customary inter-
national law notion of state dignity is apposite in the domestic context. 
327 See supra notes 190–202 and accompanying text. 
328 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). 
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nation [that] is alone competent” to do so, and not by a court that 
has no authority in the field of foreign relations.329 
The current Court’s reliance on the notion of state dignity sug-
gests that it, like the Court in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, is borrowing from foreign state sovereign immunity 
doctrine. But in light of the Court’s recent elevation of state dignity 
as a rationale for its expansion of state sovereign immunity doc-
trine, one might wonder why the Court has refused to disavow the 
English common law as the source for its expansive view of state 
sovereign immunity and expressly embrace the law of nations from 
which the concept of sovereign dignity derives. Indeed, one would 
expect the Court to be eager to distance itself from a doctrine 
originally premised on the notion that the “King can do no wrong.” 
The answer, I suggest here, is two-fold. First, although the Court’s 
anti-federalist majority has not been shy about promoting the view 
that the states retain a significant degree of sovereign authority, it 
would be another thing altogether to suggest that the states stand 
in a relationship to the federal government comparable to that en-
joyed by foreign sovereign nations. Second, even assuming that the 
Court’s (implicit) analogy of the several states to “wholly independ-
ent sovereigns”330 is appropriate, the consequences of that analogy 
would directly contradict the Court’s most recent pronouncements 
on the scope of the states’ sovereign immunity. 
A. American States as Foreign States 
At first blush, there is nothing particularly striking about the 
Court’s apparent reliance in its state sovereign immunity doctrine 
on the notion of state dignity drawn from the related doctrine of 
foreign state sovereign immunity. Indeed, the Court has often bor-
rowed principles of international law to govern relations among the 
states. For example, the Court has long borrowed principles from 
the law of nations to resolve disputes between states. Article III of 
the Constitution creates jurisdiction over disputes “between two or 
more States,”331 and gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction 
 
329 Id. at 146. 
330 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 425 (1979). 
331 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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of disputes in which a “State shall be a Party.”332 The Court has of-
ten exercised this authority to resolve disputes between states, 
most frequently border disputes and controversies over the appor-
tionment of water from interstate waterways. In deciding such 
cases, the Court’s guiding principle has been to ensure the states’ 
“equality of right”333—“a principle inferred from the constitutional 
structure and borrowed from background assumptions of the law 
of nations.”334 
The Supreme Court has explained that because the “several 
states are of equal dignity and authority, and [because] the inde-
pendence of one implies the exclusion of power from all oth-
ers[,] . . . the laws of one State have no operation outside of its ter-
ritory, except so far as is allowed by comity.”335 Because this 
constitutionally compelled336 relationship among the states so closely 
 
332 Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Alexander Hamilton argued that the reasoning behind this 
grant of original jurisdiction was that “[i]n cases in which a State might happen to be a 
party, it would ill suit its dignity to be turned over to an inferior tribunal.” The Feder-
alist No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Cali-
fornia v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65–66 (1979) (stating that the Framers gave the Su-
preme Court original jurisdiction over cases involving states in order to “match[] the 
dignity of the parties to the status of the court”). 
333 Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931). 
334 Clark, supra note 166, at 1323. 
335 Brown v. Fletcher, 210 U.S. 82, 89 (1908) (emphasis added) (quoting Pennoyer v. 
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877)); see also Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907) 
(“Neither State can legislate for or impose its own policy on the other.”). 
336 The Constitution’s treatment of the states as co-equals is most evident in its guar-
antee of equal representation in the Senate. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The 
Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, cho-
sen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one vote.”); 
id. art. V (“[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in 
the Senate.”). Other constitutional provisions underscore this principle. See, e.g., id. 
art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“[N]o new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of 
any other State . . . .”). The Court has often recognized the constitutional equality of 
the states. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911) (“[T]he constitutional equality 
of the States is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the 
Republic was organized.”). 
This principle is the basis of the Court’s “equal footing” doctrine—that is, the re-
quirement that new states be admitted to the union on an “equal footing” with exist-
ing states. See, e.g., Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845) (“When Ala-
bama was admitted into the union, on an equal footing with the original states, she 
succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which 
Georgia possessed at the date of the cession . . . .”). 
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parallels the relationships among sovereign nations,337 the Court 
has drawn, in resolving interstate disputes, on principles from the 
law of nations.338 Specifically, the Court has sought to implement, in 
the words of customary international law doctrine, the “absolute 
equality” of the states.339 
It is unsurprising that the Court has looked to the law of nations 
to resolve disputes between states. Congress is largely divested of 
authority to resolve such disputes through ordinary legislation,340 
 
337 See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (“Every sovereign State is 
bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of 
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done 
within its own territory.”); The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 
116, 136 (1812) (“The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily 
exclusive and absolute. . . . Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external 
source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restric-
tion . . . .”). 
338 See Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146–47 (1902) (“Sitting, as it were, as an 
international, as well as a domestic tribunal, we apply Federal law, state law, and in-
ternational law, as the exigencies of the particular case may demand . . . .”). 
339 For example, in resolving a dispute between New Jersey and Delaware over the 
location of the boundary between the two states in the Delaware Bay and River, the 
Court invoked the principle of the ‘Thalweg’—that is, the strongest current and the 
track used by boats in their course down the waterway—to resolve the issue. See New 
Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 379 (1934). The Court thus drew the boundary 
through the “middle of the main channel,” not “by the geographical centre, half way 
between the banks.” Id.; see also Louisiana v. Mississippi, 516 U.S. 22, 24–25 (1995) 
(recounting the use of the rule of ‘Thalweg’ in previous boundary dispute cases be-
tween Louisiana and Mississippi). 
340 See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 84 (1907) (“[E]arly drafts of the Constitu-
tion [made] . . . provision . . . that the Senate should have exclusive power to regulate 
the manner of deciding [certain] disputes and controversies between the States. . . . As 
finally adopted, the Constitution omits all provisions for the Senate taking cognizance 
of disputes between the States and leaves [that authority] to the Supreme Court.”). In 
fact, as Professor Brad Clark explains: 
[T]he Constitution established two alternative and exclusive means of resolving 
controversies between states. First, the states themselves may voluntarily enter 
into an “Agreement or Compact” to resolve their differences, but only with 
“the Consent of Congress.” Second, the states may seek judicial resolution of 
their disputes by invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
Clark, supra note 166, at 1325–26. This is not to say that the Executive Branch has no 
role in interstate disputes. In Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478 (1854), which 
involved a border dispute between Florida and Georgia, the United States sought 
leave to intervene to protect land that had “been considered and treated heretofore as 
public domain of the United States.” Id. at 479. The states contended that permitting 
the United States to intervene was inconsistent with Article III’s grant of original ju-
risdiction over controversies in which a state is party. Id. at 493. The Court disagreed, 
noting that the intervention of the United States is not “derogatory to the dignity of 
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and the law of any one state would be an obviously inappropriate 
basis on which to decide a dispute between states. More important, 
as a matter of constitutional structure, the states stand as equals in 
their relations inter se. This, of course, is the same relationship that 
international law contemplates among sovereigns. Accordingly, the 
Court has looked to background principles of the law of nations in 
resolving disputes between states.341 This does not mean, however, 
that the states are otherwise comparable to foreign nations. Nor do 
the Court’s references to state dignity in this context somehow 
suggest that the states ought to be treated as akin to wholly inde-
pendent sovereigns within the meaning of the law of nations. In-
stead, the Court has intended its references to the states’ “equal 
 . . . power, dignity and authority”342 to demonstrate that the states 
enjoy equal status with respect to each other, not with respect to 
the United States or any other foreign nation.343 
 
the litigating States, or any impeachment of their good faith. It merely carries into ef-
fect [the Interstate Compact Clause], which was adopted by the States for their gen-
eral safety.” Id. at 495 (emphasis added). 
341 That the Court has drawn on rules from customary international law does not 
mean that international law actually applies of its own force to controversies between 
states. Accordingly, the Court in Kansas v. Colorado (with self-conscious hyperbole) 
described its role “as it were, as an international, as well as a domestic tribunal.” 206 
U.S. at 48; see also id. at 97 (“International law is no alien in this tribunal.”). It made 
clear, however, that the law it applied to the states’ dispute was properly character-
ized as “interstate common law,” not international law. Id. at 98. 
342 Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566–68 (1911) (discussing the “equal footing” doc-
trine: “‘This Union’ was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and author-
ity, each competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution itself.”). 
343 Professor Thomas Lee argues that Article III’s provision of Supreme Court origi-
nal jurisdiction only in cases affecting ambassadors and those in which states are par-
ties “makes perfect sense from an international law perspective, if one were to equate 
the sovereign dignity of the States with that of nation-states.” Lee, supra note 119, at 
1059–60. I fail to see how this conclusion follows from the premise. The Framers gave 
the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over cases involving states to “match[] the 
dignity of the parties to the status of the court.” California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 
65–66 (1979); accord The Federalist No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961). In this context, it seems plain that the term dignity merely de-
scribes the special status that states enjoy in our constitutional system. Whatever one 
thinks about the degree to which the states retain sovereignty, they surely retain some 
privileged status in the Constitution, and easy recourse to the highest court in the land 
is one recognition of that status. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. But it is settled 
that it is up to Congress to decide whether to make that jurisdiction exclusive or in-
stead to confer such jurisdiction on the lower federal courts, and the permissible 
manner in which Congress has exercised that power is instructive. See Bors v. Pre-
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Before the mid-twentieth century, this theory of interstate rela-
tions that the Court borrowed from the law of nations also served 
as the foundation of the doctrine of personal jurisdiction. In Pen-
noyer v. Neff, the Court held that a state court could enter a bind-
ing judgment against an unconsenting nonresident defendant only 
if he had been served with process within the forum state.344 The 
Court based its theory of personal jurisdiction on “two well-
established principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction of an 
independent State over persons and property.”345 First, “every State 
possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and 
property within its territory.”346 Second, “no State can exercise di-
rect jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its 
 
ston, 111 U.S. 252, 256–58 (1884). Congress has conferred on the Supreme Court 
“original but not exclusive jurisdiction” of “[a]ll actions or proceedings by a State 
against the citizens of another State or against aliens” and “[a]ll actions or proceed-
ings to which ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, or vice consuls of foreign 
states are parties,” 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2002) (emphasis added), whereas it has con-
ferred exclusive original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court only of “controversies be-
tween two or more States,” id. § 1251(a). This underscores the Supreme Court’s 
unique role as arbiter of interstate disputes, given the equal status of the states. But it 
hardly suggests that the states are equal in status to foreign nations; indeed, it appears 
to suggest the opposite. 
This is not to say that I necessarily disagree with Professor Lee’s conclusion that 
disputes among co-equal states are “analytically indistinguishable from international 
disputes.” Lee, supra note 119, at 1067. The relationship of one state to other states is 
indeed comparable to the relationship of one nation to another, but the important 
point is that these parallels do not lead to the step that the Court has taken—that the 
states somehow are equal in status to foreign nations. Professor Lee thus may well be 
correct that the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment “looked to international law for 
insight into how to protect the sovereign dignity of States involved in interstate and 
international disputes,” but that does not mean that the Eleventh Amendment ele-
vates the status of the states to that of foreign nation. Id.; see also id. at 1031 (same); 
id. at 1030 (arguing that international law was an analogy and did not govern when 
states could be sued, a matter governed by domestic law). 
344 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). 
345 Id. at 722. The Court made clear that “public law” referred to the law of nations: 
The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, 
many of the rights and powers which originally belonged to them being now 
vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained 
and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of inde-
pendent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are 
applicable to them. 
Id. 
346 Id. 
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territory.”347 The Court acknowledged that the states are not “in 
every respect independent” as are sovereign states within the mean-
ing of the law of nations.348 But principles drawn from the law of 
nations nevertheless were apposite, the Court explained, because 
the relationship of the states with each other was analytically indis-
tinguishable from the relationships among sovereign nations. Be-
cause “[t]he several States are of equal dignity and authority[,] . . . 
the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all 
others.”349 
The Pennoyer Court’s theory of the territorial limitations on the 
authority of state courts has, of course, been replaced by a more 
expansive theory of personal jurisdiction based on the contacts of 
the defendant with the forum state.350 But the Pennoyer Court’s 
view of the necessary limitations on state authority imposed by the 
federal system retains some vitality in modern personal jurisdiction 
analysis.351 Indeed, because it is not uncommon for several states to 
have equally compelling interests in providing a forum for the reso-
lution of a single controversy, there must be some basis for deter-
mining when one of those states can assert jurisdiction over the 
controversy, effectively excluding the other states from doing the 




349 Id. (emphasis added). 
350 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310 (1945). 
351 See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (arguing that physical pres-
ence alone is a sufficient basis for state-court jurisdiction); World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293–94 (1980) (“[W]e have never accepted the 
proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, 
and remain faithful to the principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Consti-
tution. . . . The sovereignty of each State . . . implied a limitation on the sovereignty of 
all of its sister States—a limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of 
the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 
235, 251 (1958) (“[The requirement of minimum contacts is] more than a guarantee of 
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. [It is] a consequence of territorial 
limitations on the power of the respective States.”). 
352 For example, consider the facts in World-Wide Volkswagen. The plaintiffs, origi-
nally New York residents, purchased a car from one of the defendants in New York, 
decided to move to Arizona, and on the way were involved in a car accident in Okla-
homa that caused their car to ignite. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288–89. The 
plaintiffs brought a products liability action, claiming that the car was defectively de-
signed. Id. Arizona (the plaintiffs’ new state of residence), New York (the defendant’s 
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states to adjudicatory authority requires some means of limiting 
the authority of any one over matters in which other states have an 
adjudicatory interest. This state of affairs calls to mind the relation-
ship among nations,353 and it thus is unsurprising that the Pennoyer 
Court’s reasoning and rhetoric closely tracked that of Chief Justice 
Marshall in The Schooner Exchange.354 
For the same reason, the Court invoked the notion of state dig-
nity in addressing whether one state enjoys constitutional immu-
nity from suit in another state’s courts under the forum state’s laws. 
As discussed above, the Court held in Nevada v. Hall355 that a state 
does not enjoy such immunity. In reaching that conclusion, the 
Court relied explicitly on the notion of comity in The Schooner Ex-
change.356 The Court explained that Nevada’s claim of immunity 
could be answered only by reference to the “common usage among 
nations in which every sovereign was understood to have waived its 
exclusive territorial jurisdiction over visiting sovereigns, or their 
representatives, in certain classes of cases.”357 And as the Court had 
made clear in The Schooner Exchange, under well-established 
principles of international law, the decision of one sovereign to 
grant immunity in its courts to another sovereign ultimately is a 
 
state of residence and the site of the sale of the allegedly defective car), and Okla-
homa (the site of the accident) all had an interest in the resolution of the dispute. The 
Court held that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction over the New York car dealer and the 
regional distributor, in part because any other conclusion would provide no basis for 
reconciling the competing interests of these states in adjudicating the controversy. Id. 
at 293–94. 
353 Indeed, the Court in Pennoyer also invoked principles of comity under the law of 
nations to support its view of the territorial limitations on the authority of state 
courts. 95 U.S. at 722 (“And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, 
that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is 
allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process be-
yond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions.”). 
354 See 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Compare Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722 (“The sev-
eral States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies 
the exclusion of power from all others.”), with The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) at 136 (“The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily 
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any re-
striction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution 
of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sover-
eignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.”). 
355 440 U.S. 410, 426–27 (1979). See supra notes 300–21 and accompanying text. 
356 Hall, 440 U.S. at 417. 
357 Id. at 416–17 (citing The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136). 
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“voluntary decision of the [former] to respect the dignity of the 
[latter] as a matter of comity.”358 
As with the federal common law of disputes between states359 
and the (now largely defunct) territorial view of personal jurisdic-
tion, the Court relied on principles of international law to resolve 
claims of interstate immunity because the relationship among the 
several states resembles the relationship among sovereign nations 
on the world stage. It is clear from the Court’s decision in Hall, 
however, that it did not view the states as sovereigns within the 
meaning of the law of nations. The Court premised its conclusion 
that Nevada did not enjoy immunity from suit in California’s courts 
in part on the Constitution’s “limitation on the sovereignty of the 
several States.”360 Because of those limitations, the Court explained, 
“ours is not a union of 50 wholly independent sovereigns.”361 Cus-
tomary international law norms provided a useful rule of decision 
not because the states were subject to international law as “wholly 
independent sovereign[]” nations, but rather because the states’ co-
equal constitutional status—that is, the equal dignity of the 
states—resembles the relationship among wholly independent sov-
ereign nations. 
It makes sense to borrow norms of customary international law 
to resolve conflicts among the states because the states’ co-equal 
status is analytically indistinct from the relationship among sover-
eign nations. The three contexts discussed above—inter-state bor-
der disputes, personal jurisdiction, and inter-state immunity—
implicate the states’ co-equal status, and thus are usefully and logi-
cally resolved by reference to law-of-nations notions of sovereign 
authority and comity. 
 
358 Id. at 416. 
359 See generally Clark, supra note 166 (noting that the structural equality of the 
states under the Constitution allows the Court simply to borrow the international le-
gal doctrine of absolute equality of sovereign nations when resolving disputes be-
tween states). 
360 Hall, 440 U.S. at 425 (emphasis added) (citing Fugitives Clause, U.S. Const. art. 
IV, § 2, cl. 2; Privileges and Immunities Clause, id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1). The Court also 
noted that, under the Court’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the states lack 
power to impose discriminatory taxes. Hall, 440 U.S. at 425 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, 
§ 8). Finally, the Court was careful to note that, as a historical matter, immunity ap-
plied to “truly independent sovereign[s].” Hall, 440 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added). 
361 Id. at 425. 
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The Court’s reliance on state dignity in its state sovereign immu-
nity decisions, however, appears to suggest that the states stand in 
the same relationship to the federal government as do foreign states. 
The rule of The Schooner Exchange is that a foreign state’s equal-
ity of status on the world stage presumptively bars a suit by an in-
dividual asserting a claim against the foreign state in a U.S. court 
under U.S. law. By referring to the dignity of the states to justify 
the rule that the states are immune from suits by individuals assert-
ing claims under federal law, the Court has effectively suggested 
that the states enjoy equality of status with the United States. In 
other words, the Court’s implicit suggestion in relying on the states’ 
dignity is that the states are analogous to independent sovereigns 
within the meaning of customary international law. 
The Court’s decision in Hall provides a useful illustration of this 
point. Although the Court in Hall discussed a state’s imperative vel 
non to respect the “dignity” of a co-equal state, the Court’s reason-
ing does not suggest that the states enjoy law-of-nations immunity 
from suits authorized under federal law. Indeed, it is a non sequitur 
to suggest that because the relationship among the several states 
resembles the relationship among sovereign nations, the states 
stand in equal dignity—in the sense of customary international law 
doctrine—to the federal government. California and Nevada may 
enjoy constitutional equality of status, as do France and Britain 
under customary international law; but both California’s and Ne-
vada’s sovereignty is subordinate in constitutionally meaningful 
ways to the authority of the federal government. California can 
subject Nevada to suit in a California court for much the same rea-
son that Britain can (if it chooses) subject France to suit in a British 
court. Any other rule would suggest that California and France 
lack sovereign authority within their own borders and over matters 
otherwise within the scope of their sovereign powers. There is no 
governing international charter that provides a Supremacy Clause 
upon which France can rely to defeat an assertion of jurisdiction in 
a British court; the Constitution envisions a similar equality of right 
among the several states.362 
 
362 Hall could be read, to be sure, to suggest (though not decide) that the states’ im-
munity from suits in federal court finds its roots in the law of nations, not the English 
common law. The Court’s discussion of that latter source of immunity is limited to 
“suits in the sovereign’s own courts,” whereas the former source of immunity is impli-
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In relying on state dignity in the state sovereign immunity cases, 
the Court has opened another front in the continuing battle over 
the appropriate status of the states, the issue that most divides the 
current Court. Notwithstanding the risk of oversimplifying what 
Justice O’Connor has described as “our oldest question of constitu-
tional law,”363 the fundamental dispute has been over the degree to 
which the states retained sovereignty after the ratification.364 As 
Professor Akhil Amar has described the fault line, the battle is be-
tween those who view the Constitution as a “federal compact among 
 
cated in “suits in the courts of another sovereign.” Id. at 414. If one views a suit 
against a state in a federal court as a suit in the court of “another sovereign,” then the 
Court’s decision in Hall appears to support the proposition that the states’ immunity 
from suit in federal courts—that is, the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity—
derives from the doctrine of foreign state sovereign immunity. 
This view of Hall, however, appears wrong for two reasons. First, the decision 
makes clear that the Court did not view the states as sovereigns within the meaning of 
the law of nations. The Court premised its conclusion that Nevada did not enjoy 
immunity from suit in California’s courts in part on the Constitution’s “limitation on 
the sovereignty of the several States.” Id. at 425 (emphasis added) (citing Fugitives 
Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2; Privileges and Immunities Clause, id. art. IV, § 2, 
cl. 1). The Court also noted that, under the Court’s interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause, the states lack power to impose discriminatory taxes. Id. at 425 (citing U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 8). Finally, the Court was careful to note that, as a historical matter, 
immunity applied to “truly independent sovereign[s].” Id. at 414 (emphasis added). 
Because of these limitations, “ours is not a union of 50 wholly independent sover-
eigns.” Id. at 425. Second, as discussed above, the Court’s most recent cases on state 
sovereign immunity have steadfastly insisted that the states’ immunity derives from 
the English common law, and have even cited Hall for that proposition. See, e.g., 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715–16 (1999) (“Although the American people had 
rejected other aspects of English political theory, the doctrine that a sovereign could 
not be sued without its consent was universal in the States when the Constitution was 
drafted and ratified.”) (emphasis added); cf. id. at 715 (“When the Constitution was 
ratified, it was well established in English law that the Crown could not be sued with-
out consent in its own courts.”) (citing Hall, 440 U.S. at 414). 
363 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). 
364 Compare U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (“The ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority is the consent of 
the people of each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of 
the Nation as a whole.”), and Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 
(1991) (stating that the states entered the Union “with their sovereignty intact”), and 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (“‘[U]nder our federal system, the 
States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject 
only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause.’”) (quoting Tafflin v. Levitt, 
493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990)), with Alden, 527 U.S. at 812 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“A 
State is not the sovereign when a federal claim is pressed against it . . . .”), and Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 548 (1985) (“[T]he sovereignty of 
the States is limited by the Constitution itself.”). 
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thirteen sovereign principals” and those who view the Constitution 
not as “an inter-sovereign compact or treaty, but a supreme statute 
deriving from the supreme sovereign legislature—the People of the 
nation.”365 The current Court has consistently divided over which 
view is correct.366 This debate has spawned a rich literature,367 and 
there is no need to dwell at length on this general question here. It 
is, however, worth noting that state sovereign immunity doctrine 
has, at least since the Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 
been but one battle in a larger war over the status of the states. 
Yet the Court’s reliance on the notion of state dignity—a con-
cept that defines the prerogatives of sovereignty of wholly sover-
eign nations—is in many ways more striking than other assertions 
of state autonomy in the Court’s recent federalism revival. What-
ever one can say about the sovereign prerogatives retained by the 
states at the ratification—and, indeed, there is much debate with 
 
365 Amar, supra note 20, at 1452. 
366 For the quintessential example of this debate, compare U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 801 (1995) (“As we have frequently noted, ‘[t]he States un-
questionably do retain a significant measure of sovereign authority. They do so, how-
ever, only to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original 
powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government.’”) (quoting Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985)), and U.S. 
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 837–38 (describing “the Framers’ understanding that Mem-
bers of Congress are . . . not merely delegates appointed by separate, sovereign States; 
they occupy offices that are integral and essential components of a single National 
Government”), with id. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The ultimate source of the 
Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people of each individual State, not the 
consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole.”). 
367 There is not enough room to chronicle here the countless worthy contributions to 
the literature. What follows is merely a representative sample of recent works from 
which I have benefitted. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Federalism: A Dialogue (1995); 
Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, 
Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71; Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Feder-
alism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 Duke L.J. 75, 135 (2001); Brad-
ford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 
1321 (2001); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist 
Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 429, 431 (2002); Barry Friedman, 
Valuing Federalism, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 317 (1997); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Poli-
tics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215 (2000); 
Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
125; Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National 
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903 (1994). 
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respect to that question368—the states indisputably did not remain 
(or become) full sovereigns within the meaning of the law of na-
tions after the ratification: “When the United States broke from 
Great Britain, it was not a foregone conclusion that the immunity 
enjoyed by sovereign nations should be accorded to each of the 
states. . . . [T]he [thirteen] individual states were not exactly thir-
teen separate countries.”369 The Declaration of Independence itself 
suggested something more in the nature of a confederation.370 As 
Professor Jack Rakove explains, under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, the states were not “nation-states in the conventional sense, 
fully empowered to confront the nations of Europe as equal sover-
eigns.”371 
 
368 Compare Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 (“[T]he founding document ‘specifically recog-
nizes the States as sovereign entities.’”) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44, 71 n.15 (1996)), and Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 779 (“[T]he States entered 
the federal system with their sovereignty intact . . . .”), with Alden, 527 U.S. at 800 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“The State of Maine is not sovereign with respect to the na-
tional objectives of the FLSA.”), and Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 150 (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (“[W]e surely did not mean [in Blatchford] that [the states] entered that sys-
tem with the sovereignty they would have claimed if each State had assumed 
independent existence in the community of nations, for even the Articles of Confed-
eration allowed for less than that.”), and id. at 153–54 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
ratification demonstrated that state governments were subject to a superior regime of 
law in a judicial system established, not by the State, but by the people through a spe-
cific delegation of their sovereign power to a National Government that was para-
mount within its delegated sphere.”). 
369 Nelson, supra note 20, at 1576. But cf. Pfander, supra note 135, at 584 (“During 
the period that preceded the framing, the states regarded themselves and one another 
as sovereign states within the meaning of the law of nations . . . .”). 
370 See The Declaration of Independence para. 32 (U.S. 1776) (stating that the mem-
bers of the Continental Congress issued the document as “Representatives of the 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, in General Congress, Assembled”). 
371 Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 
Stan. L. Rev. 1031, 1043 (1997). Under the Articles, many powers implicit in the na-
ture of sovereignty—including the power to enter treaties and to “determin[e] on 
peace and war”—were committed to “[t]he United States in Congress assembled,” as 
opposed to the individual states. Articles of Confederation of 1871, art. IX, cl. 2; see 
Samuel H. Beer, To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism 192–
94, 235–36 (1993) (arguing that, given the states’ lack of authority over foreign affairs, 
the states were not sovereign). To be sure, in practice the United States under the Ar-
ticles of Confederation “was not much more than the ‘United Nations’ is in 1987: a 
mutual treaty conveniently dishonored on all sides.” Amar, supra note 20, at 1448. 
Indeed, Professor Gordon Wood argues that the Articles contemplated an arrange-
ment whereby, in the words of Emmerich de Vattel, “sovereign and independent 
States” could “unite [to form] a perpetual confederacy” without “ceasing to be a per-
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Whatever doubt there may have been of the states’ sovereign 
status under the Articles372 was eliminated upon ratification of the 
Constitution, when the states “ceded important portions of their 
sovereignty to the federal government.”373 The Constitution, among 
other things, specifically divested the states of the traditional sov-
ereign powers of diplomacy,374 power over monetary policy,375 and 
the power to impose tariffs on imports and exports;376 imposed 
upon the states affirmative obligations with respect to citizens of 
other states;377 and provided that state law would yield to federal 
law when the two conflict.378 As a result of these important restric-
tions on state sovereignty, “[a] State of the United States is not a 
state under international law.”379 Indeed, at a minimum, to qualify 
as a “state” under the meaning of international law, the entity must 
 
fect State.” Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787, at 
354–55 (1969) (quoting Vattel, supra note 163, at 12). 
372 Notwithstanding such doubts about the degree to which the states were sovereign 
before the ratification, several commentators have argued that the states had sover-
eign immunity under the Articles. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 20, at 1577–78; 
Pfander, supra note 135, at 584; see also supra notes 147–51 and accompanying text. 
373 Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1245, 1325 (1996). 
374 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation; [or] grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal . . . .”); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 
(“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep 
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with 
another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or 
in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”). 
375 Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make 
any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts . . . .”). 
376 Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (“No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any 
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports . . . .”). 
377 See, e.g., id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). 
378 Id. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and 
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). A number of Amendments to 
the Constitution, of course, also limited the sovereignty of the states. E.g., id. amends. 
XIII–XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. 
379 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 201 
cmt. g (1987). The Restatement provides in full: “A State of the United States is not a 
state under international law since under the Constitution of the United States for-
eign relations are the exclusive responsibility of the Federal Government.” Id. 
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“engage[] in, or ha[ve] the capacity to engage in, formal relations 
with other such entities.”380 
Accordingly, although there is room for debate over precisely 
how much autonomy the states enjoy,381 the states plainly are not 
fully independent sovereigns in the sense of the word under cus-
tomary international law.382 Indeed, even a proponent of the most 
extreme anti-federalist view must concede that, under our constitu-
tional structure, the states have ceded a significant amount of 
power traditionally enjoyed by sovereign nations—most funda-
 
380 Id. § 201 (“Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory 
and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that en-
gages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.”). 
381 According to Professor Daniel Meltzer, it is possible to deduce three principal 
views of the status that the states attained after ratification. The nationalist view 
stresses that “the separate colonies acted collectively through the Declaration of In-
dependence and the Continental Congress” and holds that “neither before nor after 
Independence were the states fully sovereign in the classic sense . . . .” Meltzer, supra 
note 11, at 1042–43 n.131. The transformative nationalist view holds that “while the 
Articles of Confederation were a traditional federation that preserved state sover-
eignty, the Constitution represented a novel reordering of affairs, in which the sover-
eign people designed a new national government that was supreme over the states but 
whose powers were limited in important respects.” Id. Finally, the state-oriented view 
maintains that “the states not only became sovereign entities during Independence 
and remained so during the Confederation period, but also that they preserved their 
political sovereignty even when the Constitution was ratified, except insofar as they 
delegated limited powers to the national government.” Id. Although “[h]istory rarely 
falls into [such] neat models,” id. (citing Jack N. Rakove, Making a Hash of Sover-
eignty Part 1, 2 Green Bag 2d 35, 39 (1998)), it is fair to describe Justice Wilson’s 
opinion in Chisholm as illustrative of the nationalist view, see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 453 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.), Chief Justice John Marshall as a 
proponent of the transformative nationalist view, see, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 326–28 (1819), and at least Justices Thomas, O’Connor, and 
Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, as proponents of the state-oriented view, see U.S. 
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845–49 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
382 See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 201 
cmt. g (1987) (“A State of the United States is not a state under international law 
since under the Constitution of the United States foreign relations are the exclusive 
responsibility of the Federal Government.”); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 
299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936) (“[S]ince the states severally never possessed international 
powers, such powers could not have been carved from the mass of state powers but 
obviously were transmitted to the United States from some other source.”); 2 Joseph 
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 626 (photo. reprint 
1991) (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (“[T]he states can exercise no powers 
whatsoever, which exclusively spring out of the existence of the national government, 
which the constitution does not delegate to them. . . . No state can say, that it has re-
served, what it never possessed.”); see supra notes 379–80 and accompanying text. 
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mentally, the authority to engage in relations with foreign na-
tions.383 The Court’s reliance on state dignity, therefore, has taken 
the Court even farther down the anti-federalist path than it has 
gone in other recent skirmishes over the appropriate balance be-
tween federal and state power. 
The Court’s analogy to foreign sovereign immunity therefore 
fails on its own terms. Although there is room for debate over pre-
cisely how much autonomy the states enjoy, they plainly are not 
co-equal sovereigns with the United States (or any other foreign 
state). The French government surely is not bound by U.S. federal 
law, “any Thing in [France’s] Constitution or Laws . . . to the Con-
trary notwithstanding.”384 Yet by drawing on the doctrine of foreign 
state sovereign immunity—again, implicitly through invocation of 
the notion of state dignity—the Court suggests that the states enjoy 
sovereignty as does France.385 
 
383 For example, Thomas Jefferson—who rarely has been accused of being a forceful 
proponent of the nationalist view of federalism—considered it “‘indispensably neces-
sary that with respect to everything external we be one nation firmly hooped to-
gether.’” Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution 46 (1937) (citing a letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison dated Oct. 8, 1786). Madison agreed, argu-
ing that “[i]f we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to 
other nations.” The Federalist No. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). Jefferson’s and Madison’s agreement is not surprising given the ultimately dis-
astrous state of affairs under the Articles of Confederation, which effectively permit-
ted the states “by their conduct [to] provoke war without controul.” James Madison, 
Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 The Records of the Fed-
eral Convention of 1787, at 19 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
384 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Under evolving conceptions of the obligations arising 
under international law, there may well be substantial limits on the ability of even 
fully sovereign nations to take certain actions. See generally Laurence R. Helfer & 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 
107 Yale L.J. 273 (1997) (exploring the effectiveness of European supranational tri-
bunals’ ability to convince domestic governments to enforce their judgments). But 
such principles merely define the upper limit of the prerogatives of sovereignty; they 
do not purport to convert entities that enjoy something less than complete sovereignty 
into sovereign nations for the purposes of international law. 
385 The other context in which the Court has suggested that the states stand in equal 
dignity to the federal government is inter-governmental taxation. See McCallen Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620, 628 (1929) (“Not only may the power to tax be exercised 
oppressively, but for one government—state or national—to lay a tax upon the in-
strumentalities or securities of the other is derogatory to the latter’s dignity, subver-
sive of its powers, and repugnant to its paramount authority.”); see also id. at 637 
(Stone, J., dissenting) (“[O]nly considerations of public policy of weight, which appear 
to be here wholly wanting, would justify overturning a principle so long established. It 
has survived a great war, financed by the sale of government obligations; and it has 
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Reliance on “state dignity” is particularly inapposite in the con-
text of state sovereign immunity when one considers the connota-
tion of that term in the law-of-nations context. In the latter context, 
the Court refers to state dignity as a shorthand description of the 
relationship in which a foreign sovereign stands to the United 
States, and to underscore that our relations with foreign nations 
ought to be conducted not by courts—which do not have constitu-
tional authority to engage in foreign relations with co-equal sover-
eigns—but rather by the political branches, which can deal as 
equals with other nations on the international stage. Neither of 
these rationales has any application to the relationship between the 
United States and the several states. As to the first—the natural 
corollary of the proposition that foreign states and the United 
States have “equal rights and equal independence”386—the states 
plainly do not stand in the same relationship to the United States 
as do foreign states; instead, they must yield, even in their own re-
 
never even been suggested that in any practical way it has impaired either the dignity 
or credit of the national government.”). The Court has long held that states lack au-
thority directly to tax the federal government. See Tribe, supra note 52, at 1222. The 
Court has also suggested that the federal government cannot levy a tax that falls only 
upon the states. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575–76 (1946). This 
structural principle, however, is premised on the theory that the Constitution contem-
plates the continued existence of both the states and the federal government. Because 
“[a]n unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to destroy,” the constitu-
tional structure requires a prohibition on at least some inter-governmental taxation. 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 327 (1819). 
In any event, the Court has suggested that the “dignity” of the United States is not 
impermissibly affronted by requiring it to litigate in the courts of one of the several 
states. In United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 470 (1936), the 
United States sued banks that held certain Russian insurance funds, claiming that 
they were the owners of the funds as a result of an assignment made by the Russian 
government upon its recognition by the United States. Id. State courts simultaneously 
were conducting in rem proceedings over the same funds. Id. The Court held that the 
state courts had jurisdiction to dispose of the funds, and that the United States ought 
to intervene in those suits: “In intervening for the presentation of its claim, the United 
States would be an actor—voluntarily asserting what it deemed to be its rights—and 
not a defendant. We cannot see that there would be impairment of any rights the 
United States may possess or any sacrifice to its proper dignity as a sovereign, if it 
prosecuted its claim in the appropriate forum where the funds are held.” Id. at 480–81 
(emphasis added). If it does not offend the dignity of the United States to be forced to 
litigate in the state courts, it is difficult to see how it can offend the dignity of a state—
which, after all, is constitutionally bound by federal law—to be forced to litigate in 
federal court. 
386 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). 
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spective territories, to the federal government whenever it exer-
cises one of its enumerated powers.387 As to the second, although 
the courts will, as a matter of comity, refrain from intervening in 
certain disputes involving states,388 the Constitution explicitly envi-
sions an exclusive role for the Court as an arbiter of disputes be-
tween states.389 
B. Doctrinal Consequences of Viewing American States  
as Foreign States 
The Court’s implicit equation of the several states with foreign 
states in their relationship to the United States would be largely a 
matter of academic interest if no consequences flowed from the 
comparison.390 But there are important doctrinal consequences of 
the Court’s importation of the principles of foreign state sovereign 
immunity to the jurisprudence of state sovereign immunity, al-
though the Court has thus far demonstrated a disconcerting ten-
dency to refuse to take the bitter with the sweet. By relying on the 
states’ dignity—and thus by invoking the doctrine of foreign state 
sovereign immunity—the Court has presumably intended to bol-
ster its arguments elsewhere391 about the status of the states in our 
constitutional system. But if in fact the states ought to be treated, 
for purposes of immunity doctrine, as wholly independent sover-
 
387 See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
388 See, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 
817 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44, 45 (1971). 
389 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907); 
Pfander, supra note 135, at 597. 
390 Of course, even if no doctrinal consequences flowed from the Court’s invocation 
of state dignity, both the nonconsequentialist and the instrumental expressivist ac-
counts of the doctrine would still be apposite. Under the nonconsequentialist view, 
the Court’s repeated references would be intended to affirm that “the fundamental 
structural commitments embedded in our constitutional system of governance matters 
for its own sake, not as a means to achieving some other end.” Caminker, supra note 
7, at 85. Under the instrumental view, the Court hopes that 
[j]udicial protection and exaltation of state dignity will encourage people to in-
ternalize, as a political norm, the importance of having strong and vibrant states 
exercising significant governmental authority. This norm-internalization will 
help lead to an actual revival of such state power, thus securing the . . . advan-
tages of decentralization within the federal structure. 
Id. at 89–90. See supra notes 112–17 and accompanying text. 
391 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991). 
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eigns—that is, as entities that possess “equal rights and equal inde-
pendence” with respect to the United States—then the conse-
quence ought to be that Congress can, with a clear statement of in-
tent, abrogate the states’ presumptive immunity, at least in federal 
court. 
This conclusion flows directly from the cases that the Court has 
echoed in invoking the status and dignity of the states. As ex-
plained above, Congress has power to override a background prin-
ciple of the law of nations, and the Court has confirmed this princi-
ple in the context of foreign state sovereign immunity.392 To be sure, 
to preserve their limited role in foreign relations and in recognition 
of the damage to harmonious relations that could result from a ju-
dicial declaration that a foreign nation is amenable to suit, the 
courts will refrain from finding that a foreign nation is subject to 
suit unless Congress has clearly abrogated the nation’s presumptive 
immunity.393 This self-imposed limitation on judicial power in the 
context of foreign state sovereign immunity is a means of preserv-
ing the exclusive authority of the political branches over the field 
of foreign relations. Of course, unlike some other political ques-
tions,394 the courts’ reluctance to intervene in the area of foreign 
state sovereign immunity does not amount to an ironclad rule of 
non-justiciability; the courts will entertain suits against foreign 
states as long as the political branches395 clearly have authorized it. 
 
392 See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486, 491–98 (1983); 
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812) (“Without 
doubt, the sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this implication . . . .”). 
393 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146 (“[U]ntil such power be ex-
erted in a manner not to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be considered as 
having imparted to the ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction, which it would be a breach of 
faith to exercise.”); cf. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 
428, 443 (1989) (holding that “the FSIA provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdic-
tion over a foreign state in the courts of this country”). 
394 See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993) (holding that the Con-
stitution commits to the Senate the power to try impeachments, and thus that an im-
peached federal judge’s claim that the Senate’s use of a committee to hear testimony 
and gather evidence in his impeachment trial was not justiciable). 
395 Although the power to abrogate foreign states’ sovereign immunity is largely 
Congress’s to exercise, the Court has deferred to statements of the Executive Branch 
about whether the related act of state doctrine should apply in a given case. See First 
Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972) (plurality opin-
ion) (concluding that “where the Executive Branch, charged as it is with primary re-
sponsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, expressly represents to the Court that 
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But the presumption against justiciability is strong enough, with its 
long historical lineage, that courts proceed with utmost caution.396 
Once the clear statement test is satisfied, however, it is established 
that the courts may entertain private suits against a foreign nation. 
Notwithstanding the Court’s recent importation of foreign state 
sovereign immunity doctrine to state sovereign immunity doctrine, 
the Court has expressly invoked the ground of non-justiciability 
only once in a state sovereign immunity case. And that case—
Monaco v. Mississippi397—actually involved a conflict with a foreign 
state, making judicial reluctance to intervene arguably appropriate. 
In suggesting that a foreign state’s suit against Mississippi was not 
of “a justiciable character,”398 the Court relied on the potential that 
such a case could “involve international questions in relation to 
which the United States has a sovereign prerogative.”399 Unlike in 
the foreign state sovereign immunity cases, however, the Court did 
not hold that Congress could exercise its “sovereign prerogative” 
by permitting a suit by a foreign state against one of the several 
states. Other than this context-specific invocation of federal pri-
macy in the field of foreign relations, the Court has steadfastly re-
fused to acknowledge the implications of relying on the foreign 
state sovereign immunity cases. 
Simply put, if the Court is prepared to treat the states as wholly 
independent sovereigns with respect to sovereign immunity, then 
the Court ought to be prepared to recognize Congress’s power to 
abrogate that immunity, as it does when wholly independent sov-
ereigns are sued in U.S. courts. This assuredly is not the current 
doctrine. The Court has, to the contrary, expressly held that Con-
 
application of the act of state doctrine would not advance the interests of American 
foreign policy, that doctrine should not be applied by the courts”). But see id. at 788–
89 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that a statement from the Executive Branch is 
insufficient to confer jurisdiction over a foreign state for an act of that state within its 
territory). For more on the act of state doctrine, see supra note 199. 
396 Indeed, even after Congress expressly abrogated foreign states’ sovereign immu-
nity, the Supreme Court held that because jurisdiction depends on the existence of an 
exception to the general rule of foreign state sovereign immunity, the court must de-
termine whether the state is entitled to immunity even if the foreign state has not en-
tered an appearance in the suit. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493–94 n.20. 
397 292 U.S. 313 (1934). 
398 Id. at 322. 
399 Id. at 331 (emphasis added). 
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gress lacks authority under Article I to abrogate the states’ immu-
nity, either from suit in federal court400 or state court.401 
An analogy to foreign state sovereign immunity clearly should 
lead to the conclusion that Congress can subject the states to suit in 
federal court. In the analogy, the state stands in the position that 
the foreign state would, and it is clear that Congress can subject 
foreign states to suit in our courts. Whether Congress can subject 
states to suit under a federal cause of action in their own courts 
raises slightly different considerations than the question whether 
Congress can subject states to suit under federal law in federal 
court. If in fact the source of the states’ immunity from suit is the 
law of nations, then Congress arguably lacks authority to subject 
states to suit in their own courts. By analogy, Congress surely could 
not authorize a suit against Spain in Spanish courts under a U.S. 
cause of action.402 But this analogy proves too much. The United 
States stands in a vastly different relation to the several states than 
it does to Spain, or to any other foreign nation. Unlike Spain, the 
states are bound to abide by federal law, “any Thing in [their] Con-
stitution or Laws . . . to the Contrary notwithstanding.”403 On the 
Court’s own terms, therefore, it should not be an affront to the 
states’ “dignity” to be subject to suit in state court under a federal 
cause of action, because the states do not enjoy a status equal to 
the United States on the world stage.404 
In effect, the Court has accorded the states more sovereign pre-
rogatives than it has extended to wholly independent sovereigns. 
Although it has, through repeated invocations of state dignity, im-
plicitly relied on notions of sovereignty drawn from the law of na-
tions, the Court has in fact provided protections to the states that 
dramatically exceed those now available to those states that truly 
 
400 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996). 
401 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999). 
402 See id. at 735 (“[I]t strains credibility to imagine that the King could have been 
sued in his own court on, say, a French cause of action.”). 
403 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
404 See, e.g., Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 
255 (1905) (“The exercise by the Circuit Courts of the United States of the jurisdic-
tion . . . conferred upon them is pursuant to the Supreme Law of the Land, and will 
not, in any proper sense, entrench upon the dignity, authority or autonomy of the 
States; for each State, by accepting the Constitution, has agreed that the courts of the 
United States may exert whatever judicial power can be constitutionally conferred 
upon them.”) (emphasis added). 
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are sovereign under customary international law. This is a peculiar 
place for the doctrine to rest. As discussed above, there is a strong 
argument that it is inappropriate to treat American states as equal 
in status to foreign sovereigns in the first place; it is certainly inap-
propriate to treat them as superior sovereigns.405 
Yet current doctrine does just that. Consider Nevada v. Hall 
once again. Under that decision, one state has authority to subject 
another state to suit in the former state’s courts under the former 
state’s law. In effect, each state has power to abrogate the immu-
nity from suit of every other state;406 and this state of affairs exists 
because the states’ relationship among themselves resembles the 
relationship among sovereign nations. Congress, however, lacks 
similar authority to abrogate the states’ immunity from suit. In 
 
405 In fact, the Court’s tendency to treat states as even more sovereign than sover-
eign nations is not limited to the context of state sovereign immunity. In the antitrust 
context, a person engaging in otherwise anticompetitive behavior is immune from li-
ability if his actions were supervised by one of the several states and if the state had a 
clear intent to displace competition. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 
504 U.S. 621, 634–35 (1992); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988); Cal. Retail 
Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). The adequate su-
pervision test is a corollary of the doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 
(1943), which held that the federal antitrust laws apply only to action by private par-
ties and not action by state legislatures or administrative bodies. 
A person cannot avoid antitrust liability on the ground that his conduct was super-
vised by a foreign state, in contrast, unless he can demonstrate that the foreign state 
actually compelled him to take the challenged action. See Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union 
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706 (1962). In other words, a United States 
court can grant antitrust relief against a private party if he has been merely authorized 
or permitted by a foreign state to take the anticompetitive action. In fairness, the 
Court has had some difficulty at the margins in determining when an American state 
has adequately supervised private action for antitrust immunity to attach. It is clear, 
however, that an American state need not compel a private party to take an anticom-
petitive action for that action to be immune from the federal antitrust laws. See, e.g., 
S. Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 66 (1985). Therefore, a 
state has greater leeway to immunize certain actions from antitrust liability than does 
a foreign state. 
406 Of course, Hall held precisely that states do not have “immunity” from suits un-
der other states’ laws in other states’ courts. 404 U.S. 410, 425–27 (1979). But one can 
expect, at a minimum, that the Court would be reluctant to conclude that one state 
has subjected its sister states to suit absent a clear statement of intent. Cf. Atascadero 
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (applying a strict clear statement 
principle to a federal-law suit against a state in federal court). Accordingly, it is fair to 
assume that even though the states do not enjoy constitutionally indefeasible immunity 
from suit in another state’s courts under the forum state’s law, they are presumptively 
immune from such suits. 
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other words, California has authority to subject Nevada to suit in a 
California court under California law, but (putting aside several in-
creasingly narrow exceptions) Congress lacks the power to subject 
Nevada to suit in any court under federal law. Under current doc-
trine, the states have more authority with respect to each other 
than the federal government has with respect to the states. This is, 
to say the least, a bizarre state of doctrinal affairs. 
Equally bizarre, Congress has undisputed power to subject a 
wholly sovereign nation to suit in U.S. courts but lacks authority to 
subject what Justice Sutherland—certainly no great fan of federal 
power—called a “quasi-sovereign state” to suit.407 In fairness, one 
could plausibly argue that because disputes involving states arise 
much more frequently in our courts than disputes involving foreign 
nations, a rule of special deference to the states is warranted. Al-
though there is some initial appeal to suggesting that the states 
ought to enjoy a more preferred status in our courts than do for-
eign states, this argument does not explain why the states deserve 
to be elevated in status with respect to the federal government—
which is precisely what according a constitutionally indefeasible 
immunity from suit does. In any event, it is the Court that has an-
chored its doctrine to the notion of the equal dignity of sovereigns; 
and, as explained above, it is difficult to see how the states can be 
considered, for purposes of enforcement of federal law, to be of 
equal status to the United States. 
To be sure, the Framers (to use Justice Kennedy’s elegant phras-
ing) “split the atom of sovereignty,”408 and in so doing limited the 
sovereignty not only of the states but also of the federal govern-
ment. One could plausibly argue, based on this division of sover-
eignty, that the federal government lacks the authority to abrogate 
the states’ immunity from suit even though it enjoys that authority 
with respect to foreign nations. The argument would progress as 
follows: The United States retains plenary “external sovereignty,” 
the authority to conduct foreign affairs and relations with other 
sovereign nations of the world. However, “internal sovereignty,” 
the right to regulate conduct within the relevant territory, was di-
 
407 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 613–14 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissent-
ing). 
408 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring). 
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vided among the several states and the federal government. The 
power at issue in foreign state sovereign immunity cases—
Congress’s authority to subject foreign states to suit in U.S. courts 
for violations of federal or international law—is a function of ex-
ternal sovereignty. Because the federal government’s power over 
external affairs is plenary, Congress must enjoy the power to abro-
gate the immunity of foreign states. In contrast, the power at issue 
in state sovereign immunity cases—Congress’s authority to subject 
the states to suit for violations of federal law—is a function of in-
ternal sovereignty. To ensure that Congress does not displace the 
states’ constitutional role over matters internal, the Court should 
conclude that Congress lacks the power to abrogate the states’ im-
munity from suit. 
There is certainly some ostensible appeal to this argument, al-
though of course justifying it with reference to constitutional text, 
history, and structure is another matter altogether. There are, 
however, two principal problems with the argument. First, if Con-
gress has the authority to impose substantive obligations (such as 
the requirement to pay a minimum wage) on the states,409 it is diffi-
cult to see why Congress should not also have the authority to cre-
ate a remedy for when the state fails to fulfill its obligation. Sec-
ond, and more important for our purposes, the Court has sought to 
justify its anti-abrogation rule by invoking the states’ dignity. As 
we have seen, the conventional notion of state dignity, drawn from 
the foreign state sovereign immunity cases, does not imply a power 
to resist suit when the forum sovereign has clearly authorized suit. 
The Court has not attempted to explain why the (several) states’ 
status compels an indefeasible immunity from suit. 
Some of the dissenters on the current Court have recently sug-
gested that foreign state sovereign immunity provides a useful ex-
ample of how the states’ immunity ought to be handled.410 They 
 
409 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555–56 (1985). 
410 In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense 
Board, Justice Stevens suggested that, given the increased role that states now play in 
the commercial marketplace, “[i]n future cases, it may . . . be appropriate to limit the 
coverage of state sovereign immunity by treating the commercial enterprises of the 
States like the commercial activities of foreign sovereigns under the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act of 1976.” 527 U.S. 666, 692 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Breyer made a similar point. See id. at 699 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that 
Congress has declined to accord immunity to foreign states when they act as market 
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have not, however, suggested that the Court has in fact been pick-
ing and choosing from that doctrine, adopting the facets that sup-
port its claims about immunity—specifically, the notion that states 
and the United States enjoy “equal rights” and “equal independ-
ence”—and rejecting those that do not—the important conse-
quence that Congress has authority to abrogate sovereign states’ 
immunity. 
The Court’s response presumably would track Justice Scalia’s re-
tort in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education Expense Board411 to Justice Breyer’s suggestion that 
state sovereign immunity doctrine should follow the example set by 
Congress in the Foreign State Sovereign Immunity Act. According 
to Justice Scalia, such a “proposal ignores the fact that state sover-
eign immunity, unlike foreign sovereign immunity, is a constitu-
tional doctrine that is meant to be both immutable by Congress and 
resistant to trends.”412 But this response attacks a straw man. If in 
fact (as then-Professor Scalia argued) the states retained law-of-
nations immunity at ratification,413 then that immunity—even as a 
constitutional matter—ought to be no less subject to abrogation af-
ter ratification than it was before. Otherwise, Justice Scalia is left 
to suggest that the immunity codified (albeit implicitly) in the Con-
stitution is something profoundly more potent than what the states 
enjoyed before ratification. This turns the transfer of sovereign 
powers that occurred at the ratification on its head. In ratifying the 
 
participants: “In doing so, Congress followed the modern trend, which spread rapidly 
after the Second World War, regarding foreign state sovereign immunity. . . . Indeed, 
given the widely accepted view among modern nations that when a State engages in 
ordinary commercial activity sovereign immunity has no significant role to play, . . . 
today’s holding . . . creates [a] legal anomaly.”) (quotation marks and citations omit-
ted); id. at 700 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The precedents that offer important legal 
support for the doctrine of sovereign immunity . . . all focus upon a critically different 
question, namely, whether courts, acting without legislative support, can abrogate 
state sovereign immunity, not whether Congress, acting legislatively, can do so.”). In 
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, Justice Stevens invoked The Schooner Exchange 
Court’s view of the defeasibility of sovereign immunity under the law of nations. 528 
U.S. 62, 97 n.6 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Under the traditional view, the sover-
eign immunity defense was recognized only as a matter of comity when asserted in the 
courts of another sovereign, rather than as a limitation on the jurisdiction of that fo-
rum.”) (citing The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136). 
411 527 U.S. 666 (1999). 
412 Id. at 686 n.4. 
413 See Scalia, supra note 139, at 886–88. 
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Constitution, the states agreed to cede a significant degree of sov-
ereignty to the United States. Even if we assume that the states be-
lieved that they would retain law-of-nations immunity after the 
ratification, it is difficult to fathom that they believed that they 
would be gaining a new and more potent form of immunity, one 
that is resistant to abrogation by another sovereign in that sover-
eign’s courts, and one that is not even (nor ever has been) enjoyed 
by wholly independent sovereign nations. 
To be sure, Justice Scalia may well be correct that the Framers 
believed that the states’ pre-ratification immunity from suit derived 
not from the English common law, but from the law of nations. 
According to a persuasive recent article by Professor Caleb Nel-
son, the Framers, including such prominent federalists as James 
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Marshall, believed that 
before the ratification the states enjoyed immunity under general 
principles of the law of nations.414 They also generally agreed that 
Article III would not itself abrogate the “states’ protections against 
being haled into court by individuals”; instead, they believed that 
“the content of those protections was not set by anything in the 
Constitution,”415 but rather was determined by the general law of 
nations.416 If the law of nations was understood at the time of the 
ratification to be subject to abrogation by the forum sovereign—as 
the Court in The Schooner Exchange clearly believed—then Justice 
Scalia’s view is plainly wrong. And even if one assumes that the 
Framers did not understand law-of-nations immunity to be subject 
to abrogation, their decision to leave for the states only the protec-
tions afforded by the law of nations—as opposed to some broader, 
unchanging set of immunities frozen into the Constitution itself—
means that changes in foreign state sovereign immunity under the 
 
414 Nelson, supra note 20, at 1574–1602 (citing Nathan v. Virginia, 1 Dall. 77 (Pa. C.P. 
1781)). 
415 Id. at 1621. 
416 Id. at 1577–78 (citing The Federalist No. 81, at 487–88 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); id. at 1592 (citing James Madison, Comments at the 
Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 The Documentary History 
of the Ratification of the Constitution 1412, 1414 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. 
Saladino eds., 1993)); id. at 1593 (citing John Marshall, Comments at the Debates of 
the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 The Documentary History of the Rati-
fication of the Constitution 1433 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 
1993)). 
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law of nations should directly affect the scope of the states’ immu-
nity from suit. As Professor Nelson explains, “[w]e could readily 
agree that Article III does not abrogate whatever protections the 
general law gives sovereign states, but we could maintain that those 
protections themselves have changed in important ways since the 
days of Madison and Marshall.”417 Under this view, as the scope of 
foreign state sovereign immunity has become increasingly restricted, 
so has the states’ (background) immunity from suit. 
C. Contextual Implications 
These doctrinal consequences of a direct comparison to the doc-
trine of foreign state sovereign immunity perhaps help explain why 
the Court has thus far not been willing to make the comparison ex-
plicitly, but instead has relied on cryptic references to state dignity. 
But by making (what are in the eyes of even the most avid Court 
watchers) mysterious references to state dignity, the Court leaves 
itself open to the charge that it values the dignity of the states over 
the dignity of individuals. Indeed, one cannot help but be struck by 
the fact that in those contexts in which dignity is intuitively a singu-
larly relevant consideration, the Court has consistently subordi-
nated those dignity considerations to other interests. 
Consider, for example, the law of procedural due process. Al-
though the Court in its seminal decision in Goldberg v. Kelly418 ap-
peared to suggest that an individual’s dignitary interests are an im-
portant consideration in determining whether a hearing is required 
when a state seeks to deprive him of an important benefit without 
according him an opportunity to challenge the deprivation in per-
 
417 Nelson, supra note 20, at 1621. 
418 397 U.S. 254 (1970). There is an extensive literature on the appropriate role of 
individual dignitary interests in procedural due process doctrine. See, e.g., William J. 
Brennan, Reason, Passion, and “The Progress of the Law,” 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 3 
(1988); Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary 
Theory, 61 B.U. L. Rev. 885 (1981); Jerry L. Mashaw, Dignitary Process: A Political 
Psychology of Liberal Democratic Citizenship, 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 433 (1987); William 
H. Simon, The Rule of Law and the Two Realms of Welfare Administration, 56 
Brook. L. Rev. 777 (1990); see also Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: 
Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficiency, 87 Geo. L.J. 
887, 939 (1999) (describing process-based metric for court rulemaking, which is based 
on the view that litigants have a “participation right” that “derives from the state’s 
obligation to respect the dignity and autonomy of persons affected by adjudication”). 
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son, the Court has since clarified that the inquiry into what process 
is due turns principally on the degree to which such process is nec-
essary to reach an accurate result, regardless of the individual’s 
dignitary and participatory interests.419 Under the Court’s current 
doctrine, therefore, a state’s dignity is a “preeminent” considera-
tion in deciding whether an individual who alleges that the state 
violated his federal rights can seek redress in court, but the indi-
vidual’s dignity is beside the point when a state deprives the indi-
vidual of a valuable benefit. 
This is, to say the least, an odd place for the doctrine to come to 
rest. In fairness, the Court has insisted that the protections it an-
nounces for state autonomy are intended ultimately for the sake of 
the individual;420 but it is difficult to take this contention seriously 
when the Court is dismissive of claims based on individual dignity. 
Whatever expressive value there may be in the Court’s invocation 
of state dignity in its state sovereign immunity decisions surely 
must be balanced against the contextual implications of those invo-
cations: The Court is at risk of announcing that it cares about states 
qua states, even at the expense of individual dignity.421 
CONCLUSION 
This Article demonstrates that although the notion of state dig-
nity at first seems oxymoronic, it in fact has a particular legal con-
notation that, in context, is perfectly sensible. In its recent state 
sovereign immunity decisions, however, the Court has imported 
 
419 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). In Mathews, the Court explained 
that the inquiry whether more process is due involves a balancing test that weighs 
“the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; “the risk of an erro-
neous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and “the Govern-
ment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. 
420 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution di-
vides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individu-
als.”); cf. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 681–82 (1999) (analogizing the waiver of a state’s right not to be sued to “other 
constitutionally protected privileges,” such as the right to a jury) (emphasis omitted). 
421 Cf. Caminker, supra note 7, at 87 (“Dignity assumes hierarchy, and the hierarchi-
cal relationships between persons and states embedded within the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity runs precisely counter to the hierarchy entailed by the distinctively 
American principle of popular sovereignty.”). 
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the concept to a context in which it is largely inapposite. In the 
context of foreign state sovereign immunity, state “dignity” con-
notes a parity of status that appears to be absent in the context of 
state sovereign immunity. More important, the Court has refused 
to accept the consequences that ought to flow from its suggestion 
that the states stand in relation to the United States much as do 
foreign nations: If the states truly enjoyed equal dignity with the 
federal government, the latter would have authority to abrogate 
the immunity of the former, at least in its own courts, just as it has 
that power with respect to foreign nations. 
Because the Court has not been willing explicitly to rely in the 
state sovereign immunity cases on principles of the law of nations, 
this account is susceptible to the critique that it constructs a straw 
man—the Court’s reliance on the law of nations—that it then tears 
down. But the idea of state dignity is not new, and it is not alien to 
the Court’s jurisprudence. When the Court invokes it, it is the 
Court that is embracing the connotations of the term, and the 
Court that has naturally conjured up the comparison between state 
sovereign immunity and foreign state sovereign immunity. Yet the 
Court’s assertion about state dignity ultimately bears no relation-
ship to the doctrinal and historical meaning of that phrase, and the 
Court has not provided an adequate justification for why the sov-
ereign status of the several states ought to entail broader immunity 
than that implied by the sovereign status of wholly sovereign na-
tions. 
To wage an important battle over the appropriate status of the 
states in relation to the federal government through implicit rhe-
torical links, moreover, demeans the arguments of history, struc-
ture, and policy that ought to animate the discussion over federal-
ism. As long as the Court refuses explicitly to ground its state 
sovereign immunity doctrine in the principles of customary inter-
national law, it remains vulnerable to the charge that it values the 
dignity of the states over the dignity of individuals. Justice Brennan 
would indeed be disappointed. 
 
